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Abstract 
The research reported in the present explored the interaction between perception 
and action, focusing on how this might occur under memory conditions. This was done 
in line with the proposals of grounded cognition and situated action, in which action and 
perception are tightly linked, and able to influence one another in order to aid the 
performance of a task. Following this idea of a bi-directional loop between the two 
processes, studies were conducted which focused on each side of this relationship, in 
conditions where memory would be necessary. The first experiments investigated how 
the perception of objects and the memory of those perceived objects could influence the 
production of actions. Later studies examined how the preparation and performance of 
actions could affect the perception of a scene, and subsequent recall of the objects 
presented. Throughout these studies, object properties (e.g., shape, colour, position) 
were used as a means to either manipulate or measure the effect of the tasks.  
The findings of the studies suggested that weighting an off-line memory 
representation by means of the task setting was possible, but that this was not an 
automatic occurrence. Based on the results obtained, it seemed that there were 
conditions which would affect whether memories could be tailored to the current 
demands of the tasks, and that these conditions were linked to the realism of the 
situation. Factors such as the task complexity, the potential for object interaction and the 
immersive environment were all suggested as possible contributors to the construction 
and use of weighted representations. 
Overall, the studies conducted suggest that memory can play a role in guiding 
action, as on-line perception does, so long as the situation makes it clear that this is 
necessary. If such weightings are useful, then the memory will be constructed 
accordingly. However, if the situation is such that there is no clear task, then the 
memory representations will remain unaffected and unprepared for one specific action, 
or not be used to aid action. Memory can be seen as serving action, but our memory 
systems are flexible, allowing us to cope with the demands and restrictions of particular 
situations. 
  
xvii 
 
Executive Summary 
Within the present thesis, six chapters present experiments designed to 
investigate how perception and action might interact in order to influence on-line 
performance and off-line memory representations. The following presents a brief 
summary of the studies and the reason they were conducted. 
Chapter 2 presents the findings of an investigation of perception on action. 
Participants were required to attend to a particular object feature, that could be action-
relevant (e.g., shape) or visually-relevant (e.g., colour). They then produced an action in 
response to this feature cue, which could be compatible or incompatible with the target 
object. This was done to determine if, by attending to an action-associated feature, 
participants’ might be primed to act with such an object, shown by faster responses 
when their gestures were object-compatible.  
This first study allows us to test one side of the perception-action link under 
both visual and memory condition in order to provide evidence that a memory 
representation can be formed in order to aid action. 
Chapter 3 is the first of a series of experiments which investigate the other side 
of the perception-action link, examining how action can affect the perception of a scene. 
Participants were required to form an action gesture (e.g., a type of grasp) while they 
viewed a scene presenting several different objects. Following this, they were given a 
memory test which asked them to recall the features of the objects. This was done to 
determine if, by preparing an action, participants’ would be primed to attend to objects 
compatible with that action, and thus show improved recall of such objects. 
Chapter 3 allows us to test how the simple preparation of action might influence 
perception, even without actual interaction. It also allows us to investigate how this 
might affect the memory representation, a previously neglected area. By requiring 
participants’ to form the action postures at encoding, we can investigate whether any 
influence on memory is acquired during the construction of the representation. 
Chapter 4 replicates the experiment presented in Chapter 3, but changes the 
stage at which the prepared action was present. Thus, rather than forming the grasps 
during encoding, as in Chapter 3, they were now formed during the retrieval stage, 
when participants were recalling the object features.  
This study allows us to investigate further how a memory representation might 
be weighted by the preparation of action. By manipulating the poses at the retrieval 
stage, we can determine if the weighting of the representation occurs when the 
memories are accessed for recall. 
Chapter 5 replicates the paradigm used in Chapters 3 and 4, but again changes 
when the action postures are present. For this study, participants’ were asked to perform 
the postures throughout the encoding and retrieval stages of the study.  
xviii 
 
This study allows us to investigate whether effects seen in Chapters 3 and 4 are 
simply additive, and will remain in the eye-movement and memory findings without 
being affected by the continued presence of the action. Alternatively, by maintaining the 
posture throughout encoding and retrieval, it may be that differences arise in either the 
construction of the representation, or later access to the information held there. 
Chapter 6 replicates the paradigm used in Chapter 3 once again, but this time the 
objects are physically present in the room with the participant. As in Chapter 3, 
participants perform the action postures while encoding the object information. 
This study allows us to determine if new or stronger effects can be seen in the 
memory measures that may be due to the use of a more realistic setting. For example, 
by having participants examine objects that are present in the same environment as they 
are; this may strengthen their ideas of interacting with the objects, resulting in more 
pronounced effects. 
Chapter 7 increases the realism of the environment further by locating the study 
in the context of an every-day task. Participants were required to carry out either a tea-
making or a sandwich-making task, prior to a memory test which asked them to recall 
the features of the objects present in the environment. The study also differentiated 
between interaction with objects in order to use them for a task, and interaction with 
objects in order to move them out of the way.  
This study allows us to determine if the task setting under which objects are 
interacted with can affect the way in which information about the objects is extracted 
and stored. It also uses a strongly realistic setting compared to the earlier studies, 
allowing us to investigate if the realism of the task is also an important factor in the 
effects on perception and memory. 
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Chapter One- Literature Review 
  
3 
 
1.1 Grounded Cognition and the Perception-Action Link 
The traditional view of cognition proposed a modular structure to the 
construction and arrangement of the processes which make up the cognitive system. 
According to this view, each module involved in cognition is held apart from the others. 
Thus, there is a central mechanism which receives input from the low-level perceptual 
processes. This input is then manipulated into the form of abstract, amodal symbols, 
before being output via the equally low-level motor processes. While the initial 
representations are formed with perceptual systems, transduction into amodal symbols 
is considered necessary for the central cognitive processes. For example, while the 
initial perception of coloured objects would involve activation of the neural populations 
in the visual cortex that respond to colours, the amodal representation of these colours 
in semantic memory would involve an entirely separate neural system. Similarly, motor 
processes begin as amodal symbols in the cognitive system, and must be translated into 
the correct patterns of excitation to move effector muscles and allow the action to be 
carried out. Figure 1.1 presents an illustration of this early approach, 
 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of the traditional cognitive approach, requiring translation 
between perceptual and amodal symbols 
However, more recent research has begun to suggest that the traditional 
approach to cognition may not adequately account for the way that perception appears 
to operate. In particular, the idea of amodal symbols is problematic, with the steps 
necessary to allow for these symbols to be part of the system being strongly criticised. 
Problems have been noted for both the process of translating perceptual experiences into 
an amodal form (the transduction problem; Barsalou, 1999), and how these symbols are 
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then converted back into perceptual outputs (the symbol grounding problem; Harnad, 
1990). 
Despite the fact that the transduction of incoming information into the abstract 
symbols is a key component of classical cognition, there is no strong account of how 
this would occur. Furthermore, even with the advent of powerful neural imaging 
technologies, there is no evidence from these methods to suggest that any such process 
is occurring (Barsalou, 1999). Similarly, without grounding amodal symbols in a 
perceptual base, it would not be possible for meaning to be assigned to the symbols. 
This has been likened to the task of trying to learn Chinese as a first language, using 
only a Chinese/Chinese dictionary (Harnad, 1990). Each symbol would link to another 
(its definition), but without any way for the reader to ever discover what the meaning 
was, and so interpret the symbol strings. The classical cognitive structure is faced with 
the same problem, and there is no explanation as to how the amodal symbols can ever 
be linked to anything other than another amodal symbol, and so allow for translation 
into a perceptual understanding. While it has been suggested that the symbols acquire 
meaning by being linked to the external world via the perceptual channels (e.g., Fodor, 
1980), Harnad states that this simply underestimates the scale of such a task, and the 
overall complexity of the problem. 
The alternative to the traditional approach is that of embodied or grounded 
cognition. While there are several different accounts of grounded cognition (see Wilson, 
2002, for six of them), they are united in their proposal that there are no amodal 
symbols representing knowledge. Instead, the cognitive processes are grounded in the 
body, and thus closely linked to sensorimotor processes. Barsalou (2008) suggests three 
broad groups of grounded cognition accounts: those that focus on the part the body 
plays in cognition, particularly the findings that show bodily states can influence 
cognitions; those that focus on simulation in cognition, the idea that bodily states during 
an experience are recorded in their particular modal representation, and then reactivated 
at a later time when the experience needs to be retrieved and those which focus on how 
action is situated, and how both perception and action are central to cognition, rather 
than being simply input and output systems. It is the ideas put forward in the third of 
these areas that is of most important for the work in this thesis; however, all three views 
have something to offer to the ideas that will be discussed here.  
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According to the traditional view of cognition, action processes are separate not 
only from the central semantic knowledge store, but from the initial perception of 
stimuli that triggers the action. The translation processes that are proposed to occur are 
necessary to allow the perceptual and motor systems to communicate. Thus, if we have 
to detect and pick up a red mug, the perception of the correctly coloured object would 
activate the neural areas in the visual system responsible for colour, which would then 
be transduced into amodal symbols that represent the concept of the mug. These 
symbols must then be mapped back onto the real world, to inform the motor system on 
the actions needed to achieve the goal of picking up the right mug. In contrast, the 
situated action theories of grounded cognition take the view that perception and 
cognition evolved in order to facilitate action. That is, our primary aim was to interact 
with the environment around us and the perception and use of this external information 
was solely in order to serve this aim. An early expression of these ideas is shown in 
Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach to perception and action. It was considered that 
there were no internal representations, but all information was derived directly from the 
environment. Objects in the environment possess ‘affordances’, which indicate how the 
observer may use the object in their actions. When an item is perceived, and the 
affordance used to determine the action, the information in the environment specifies 
how this action may be carried out. More recent anti-representational accounts have 
been proposed, such as Wilson and Golonka’s (2013) replacement style embodied 
cognition, which, in the same fashion as Gibson’s ecological approach, does away with 
any central representation system. It is proposed that as long as an organism can sense 
the world around them and allow this to guide behaviour, there is no need for internal 
representations to be constructed. 
As an alternative to the ecological approach, cognitive views on perception and 
action allow a role for off-line cognitive processes, such as memory and stored 
knowledge. An important and defining aspect of such theories is that they emphasise the 
fact that information derived from the environment can be stored in memory, and that 
this stored information can interact with new incoming perceptions. Rather than explain 
action as resulting from direct perception of the environment, the role of intention and 
planning in completing the tasks is considered. Such views are in many ways more 
flexible, and better able to cope with ‘representation-hungry’ problems (Clark, 1997). 
These are tasks which seemingly cannot be completed without some form of internal 
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representation, such as planning, recalling or reasoning about items that may be distant 
in time or space. As a result, the actor is no longer restrained to act on only what they 
see, but what they recall, and what they know from previous experience. The cognitive 
approach has largely overtaken the ecological theory as a basis for the more specific 
accounts of grounded cognition. 
Despite their differences, in both the ecological and the cognitive approaches, 
perception and cognition are seen as supporting action, having first developed to 
provide the information we need to achieve our active goals. However, as Bridgeman 
and Tseng (2011) point out, perception should not be considered a passive process in 
this system. Our perceptions allow us to find the information we need in order to carry 
out the actions we require, such as determining whether the current environment 
contains the items we need, finding the locations of required objects or working out the 
appropriate grip to act with the target object. Perception is an active process that we 
engage in, rather than a passive response to the environment and our own actions. This 
information can then be interpreted in terms of how we can act on it. Thus, perception 
and action are seen as being closely linked, with each informing the other throughout 
our experiences. Theories which allow action and perception a more equal role began 
with examples such as the ideo-motor principle, and the common coding approach, both 
of which form the basis for the more recent theory linking action and perception, the 
Theory of Event Coding. 
1.1.1 The ideo-motor principle. The basis of the ideo-motor principle was first 
formed in the 19
th
 century, in order to address the problem of how the thought of an 
action could lead to the execution of that action. Some authors suggested that such a 
link would be similar to a reflex action, and therefore not truly intentional. Furthermore, 
the researchers concentrated on very specific circumstances where thought seemed to 
produce action, limiting the applicability of the idea, and as a result, the term ‘ideo-
motor’ itself. Laycock, (1840; cited in Stock and Stock, 2004) examined behaviour 
initiated by ideas in the context of medical patients suffering from hydrophobia, after he 
noted that the physical phobic response could be triggered when the patient only 
thought of water. Due to examining the link only in the context of patients, Laycock did 
not move beyond considering this a cerebral reflex, not under the patient’s voluntary 
control. Carpenter (1852; cited in Stock and Stock, 2004) used the ideo-motor principle 
in order to scientifically explain various parapsychological phenomena of the time, such 
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as séances in which a participant was hypnotised and convinced they were unable to 
move parts of their body. Carpenter suggested that, in the absence of the participant’s 
conscious will, ideas and emotions had direct access to the motor outputs, resulting in 
the apparent paralysis. Like Laycock, he considered this to be another form of a reflex 
action, occurring when the participant was in some way impaired.  
Other researchers (e.g., Herbart, 1825; cited in Stock and Stock, 2004) 
conceptualised the ideo-motor principle as a part of action control, and held that such 
connections were formed in the earliest stages of development. Initially, an infant would 
produce involuntary movements, which would lead to a particular sensation being 
experienced by the infant. Over time, repetition of the movement would mean that 
perceptual consequence of the action would become integrated with the action itself, 
and so if the particular outcome was required, then the correct action could be made to 
produce it. Thus, the activation of the response would have come under intentional 
control (James, 1890). More recently, various studies have shown evidence for the 
integration of an action and its consequences. Elsner and Hommel (2001) found that if 
participants repeatedly paired a tone with a left or right key response in an initial 
learning stage, then presenting the same tone as a cue facilitated the production of the 
response if it maintained the previously learnt mapping between the key pressed and the 
tone pitch. The presence of the tone increased the frequency with which the paired key 
was chosen in a free choice task. Figure 1.2 shows a diagram of the principle in which 
communication is possible between perception (sensory codes) and action (motor 
codes). 
Figure 1.2 Diagram of 
the ideo-motor principle of cognition, incorporating bi-directional communication 
between perceptual events and motor responses 
1.1.2 The common-coding principle. The common-coding approach (Prinz, 
1997) similarly proposes that action and perception can interact directly, as in the ideo-
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motor principle. However, it goes further by suggesting that action and perception are 
linked by a common representational domain, and are essentially functionally 
equivalent. In the traditional view of cognition, the sensory codes for perceptual 
experiences and the motor codes that affect the action execution are separate, as they 
code for patterns of excitation in different sense organs and muscles, respectively. Thus, 
in order for communication to occur between the two codes, there must be a process of 
translation between them. However, Prinz (1997) drew on the earlier ideas from the 
ideo-motor principle that suggests there is no fundamental difference between the 
representational contents of perception and action codes. If actions can be represented in 
the terms of their perceptual consequences, then our representations of the events we 
perceive and the actions we perform should not essentially differ. Prinz (1997) applied 
these ideas to the functional mechanisms of perception and action, suggesting that there 
are event codes and action codes which form the basis of perception and action. The 
codes are commensurate, and share the same representational domain. Based on this 
proposal, the codes within the domain will overlap with each other to some extent, 
depending on the level of similarity between the external event (the stimulus) and the 
resulting response (the action). The classic example is that of affordance studies, which 
examine stimulus-response compatibility effects (e.g., Kornblum, Hasbroucq and 
Osman, 1990), where, for example, the location of the stimulus and the location of the 
response required are the same (i.e. stimulus on the right side, response button on the 
right side). Situations can therefore arise in which there is a greater or lesser degree of 
overlap between the stimulus and response, and this degree of similarity can have an 
influence on either the perception of the stimulus, or the production of the response. 
Such effects are strong evidence that it is possible for the supposedly separate 
perceptual and action processes to interact with each other, without the need for 
translation between them. Figure 1.3 presents a diagram of the common-coding 
principle. 
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Figure 1.3 Diagram of the common-coding principle of cognition, incorporating 
a common representational domain in which both perceptual and motor codes are held 
1.1.3 The Theory of Event Coding. Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben and 
Prinz (2001) proposed the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) on the basis of the ideo-
motor principle, and common-coding theories. Following Prinz (1997), the TEC claims 
that perception and action features are stored in a common representational framework, 
and so may be considered to be functionally equivalent. Action involves the anticipation 
of the perceptual outcome of that action, and over time, the outcome will become 
integrated with the action in question (following the ideo-motor principle). Perception is 
similarly active, employed to seek out the relevant information to inform the anticipated 
action. Thus, perceiving and acting with an object will activate the same associated 
codes for that object, and so perception and action are seen as being bi-directionally 
linked, with perception able to influence action, and action able to influence perception. 
This theoretical basis is still very much a combination of the two earlier theories, but the 
TEC goes further by providing a more detailed account of the contents of the 
representations, and the procedures by which they may be manipulated. 
Within the representational domain, an object stimulus will be represented using 
feature codes for each of its individual properties (e.g., colour, shape), which are 
supported by different neural populations. As a result, the complete representation of a 
single object is actually distributed across the cortex (e.g., DeYoe and VanEssen, 1988; 
Zeki, 1990). Similarly, action plans are coded in terms of action features (e.g., direction, 
force and distance, Georgopoulos, 1990), supported by different neural populations. The 
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perception or planning of an event will lead to activation of the relevant feature codes, 
which must then be integrated into an event code, from which the theory takes its name. 
Figure 1.4 presents a diagram of the TEC, in which an event file is formed from the 
activation of both perceptual and motor codes. Figure 1.5 shows  a diagram representing 
the integration of relevant featural and motor codes into an event file within the 
common representational domain. 
 
Figure 1.4 Diagram of the TEC, incorporating the formation of event files 
 This integration is necessary to ensure that the features from the same stimulus 
are grouped together, and is similar to the ideas of feature binding proposed for visual 
memory (e.g., Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs, 1992), where the feature codes must be 
temporarily synchronised. Indeed, Stoet and Hommel (1999) explored the 
characteristics of binding in action features; participants prepared a response before 
performing an intervening task prior to actually executing the original response. Any 
overlap between the prepared response, and the action required for the intervening task 
slowed the performance of the intervening task. This was suggested to support the idea 
that the action code for the prepared task had been bound into the first event code, and 
so was unavailable for code of the second action, similar to previous studies which had 
shown such binding problems for visual features of stimuli.  
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Figure 1.5 Representation of 
the formation of an event file: relevant featural codes (f1, f2) are bound within a file 
alongside the relevant motor code (m1) for the event 
The TEC suggests that the activated codes should overlap in time in order for 
them to be bound into the same event file (Hommel, 2004), but that the order in which 
the codes are activated is not important. Thus, a stimulus can precede or follow an 
action, and will still be integrated as one event, provided they fall into the same 
integration window (Hommel, 2009). This allows for the incorporation of the main 
ideo-motor proposal: that action-effect experiences can be integrated, and then reversed 
to allow for the later intentional re-activation of the effect. Evidence has been found to 
support this idea. Dutzi and Hommel (2009) showed that repeated perception of a tone 
stimulus increased the probability that participants would produce the action response 
that had been used to produce that tone in a previous trial, thus suggesting that the there 
is an automatic binding between even arbitrarily paired stimuli and responses, which 
can be reactivated via either part of the event code. The preparation of actions or stimuli 
prior to a task should also lead to activation and binding of the relevant codes, without 
the presence of the stimulus or the execution of the response (Hommel, 2009). Indeed, 
in the spirit of the ideo-motor principle, even thinking or mentally running through a 
task should be enough to activate and form weak bindings between the required codes, 
which will be strengthened by the actual performance of the action. 
Another important proposal from the TEC is the idea of intentional weighting, or 
the influence of the task on the construction of the event files. Depending on the task 
and goals of the actor, different features will be more or less relevant to the completion 
of the task. According to the TEC, by preparing for a task, the features considered to be 
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task-relevant will be primed prior to the task, meaning they have a higher level of 
activation in relation to task-irrelevant features (Hommel, 2009). The priming of these 
task-relevant properties takes place in a top-down fashion. While initially, any stimuli 
will activate or reactivate the associated codes, the weighting process ensures that 
information from feature dimensions that are known to be relevant to the task are 
primed, facilitating the processing of the information. Some of the previous studies 
investigating the binding processes in event files noted an influence of task relevance; 
for example, Dutzi and Hommel’s (2009) study found that the integration of action 
responses with the tone stimulus was affected by whether the response was part of the 
current attentional set, and therefore was task-relevant. Similarly, Hommel (2007) noted 
that changing the relevance of stimulus features affected their integration with particular 
action responses, indicating that both sides of the action-perception loop can be affected 
by the nature of the task. Furthermore, the task relevance of a feature did not affect the 
initial binding of stimuli and responses, but did affect their retrieval of the information 
at a later test phase (Hommel, Memelink, Zmigrod and Colzato, in press). Thus, event 
files may contain a wide range of feature and response information, but it is the current 
task restrictions that affect what parts of the code will be most easily retrieved, 
regardless of the task at the initial formation of the file.  
Hommel et al. (2001) suggested that weighting in perception is attentional, 
whereas weighting action selection is intentional, as perceptual weighting is proposed to 
affect the way the attentional processes operate, directing attention towards those 
features relevant for the task. The perceptual weighting processes have more recently 
been suggested to be no different from those weighting action selection, as both of them 
are the result of an intention to act or perceive, thus the term ‘intentional weighting’ is 
used for both processes (Memelink and Hommel, 2013). Intentional weighting is 
therefore a general principle underlying the action-perception link, allowing for the 
situation to influence the event code that is constructed. The intentional weighting is 
assumed to occur during off-line preparation for attentional or action selection, and thus 
influence the on-line execution of these processes. 
The TEC not only allows for perception and action to be closely linked, in 
accordance with grounded cognition, but also gives consideration to the role that the 
actors’ intentions, goals and previous experiences have on their performance. While 
many of the initial studies into the claims of the TEC were conducted using more 
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restricted stimulus-response paradigms, there are now many studies showing evidence 
for these ideas when dealing with more realistic objects. (e.g., Symes, Tucker, Vainio, 
Ellis and Ottoboni, 2008). Furthermore, the idea that there should be influences of 
action on perception and perception on action provides a structure with which to 
consider this evidence. Studies into object affordances provide further insight into 
perception influencing action, while the influence of action on perception has been 
shown using various visual search paradigms as a starting point. Within both areas, 
studies have been conducted examining what conditions are required for effect of either 
perception or action to be seen in performance. In the following section, these areas are 
examined more closely, to further clarify how perception and action work together to 
affect both aspects of behaviour. 
1.2 Action Influencing Perception: Intentional Weighting 
Evidence that our actions can influence the way in which we perceive the world 
is found in a wide range of studies. Initially, there are studies which show that even the 
potential for action can influence the deployment of attention towards objects. While 
there may not be any strong intention for action here, such studies demonstrate how the 
perceptual system is made for serving action. The addition of an intention to act adds 
further weight to this side of the action-perception link, showing how the same stimuli 
may be processed differently under different task conditions. Finally, using recordings 
of eye movements, it can be shown how the requirements of a task continue to direct 
perception throughout the actions themselves. 
1.2.1 The influence of a potential for action on attention. Given that action is 
the end goal of perception, it seems reasonable that attention might be attuned to action, 
including the possibilities that objects offer for actions. This can be linked to the 
proposals of the ideo-motor principle, and the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001), whereby the 
thought of an action is proposed to lead to the re-activation of the representation of the 
external stimuli (and vice versa) even if such effects are relatively weak. 
Evidence for this idea comes from neurological studies of patients suffering from 
neglect or extinction, conditions in which patients fail to detect objects that are located 
in the visual field contralateral to the lesion they have suffered. This work demonstrated 
that, even in the absence of a specific task, the possible action relationships between 
objects could influence the way in which these objects were viewed. Riddoch, 
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Humphreys, Edwards, Baker and Willson (2003) found that grouping objects into pairs, 
in which the two objects were depicted either about to act together (corkscrew about to 
open bottle) or in positions in which action would not be possible (bottle above 
corkscrew) led to patients being able to detect both items only in the action-possible 
condition. When action was not possible in the displayed configuration, patients 
exhibited the usual visual neglect for the contralesional object. Thus, the positioning of 
the objects in a way that suggested action might have led to patients encoding both 
items as a perceptual unit, leading to both items being selected and attended to. This 
effect was not maintained if the object pair was associated in terms of semantics (e.g., a 
hammer and a mallet) but not in terms of being frequently used together (as a hammer 
and nail are). Furthermore, Humphreys, Riddoch and Fortt (2006) found that the 
familiarity of locations (i.e. typically a hammer is above a nail) did not account for the 
reduction of neglect: non-action related items that have familiar location arrangements 
(e.g., the sun above a tree) did not lead to the same effect. Riddoch, Humphreys, 
Hickman, Clift, Daly and Colin (2006) also established whether the location of the 
object pair needed to afford action (for example, if the objects were used together, but 
were shown simply standing side by side, as they might be seen in everyday life), and if 
the objects acting together needed to be familiar to the patients. While identification was 
best when the two objects were frequently depicted together (e.g., a bottle pouring into a 
glass), it was still improved when the objects could be used together (e.g., a bottle 
pouring into a bucket) compared to two objects that were not related in action (e.g., a 
bottle and a beach ball). Identification was also better if the objects were pictured in the 
process of interacting, rather than only side by side. Thus, the active interaction of the 
objects was important, as was the familiarity of the action, but if the two objects could 
act together in a plausible way, then this could lead to attention facilitation towards both 
objects. Action possibilities, or the affordances, seem to influence the perception of 
items. 
Another more recent set of studies has shown that neurologically normal 
participants are influenced by certain physical attributes and skills, such as size or 
sporting ability. These are still able to influence the way in which people perceive the 
environment. All such studies demonstrate that the participant appears to interpret the 
world not solely based on how it actually is, but in terms of their ability (either inherent 
or learnt) to interact with it. For example, participants’ body size was found to affect 
15 
 
their perception of the width of doorways, with those with broader shoulders (who 
would find it more difficult to pass through narrow spaces) perceiving doorways to be 
narrower than those with narrower shoulders (Stefanucci and Geuss, 2009). Taylor, Witt 
and Sugovic (2010) also found that such differences in perception could be acquired 
over time, due to increased expertise in a particular area. In their study, parkour experts 
judged walls to be shorter, in comparison to novices’ judgements. Thus, it appears that 
as a skill develops, the influence it has on perception will develop too. 
As well as ability, other studies have shown that energetic potential will 
influence perception. Bhalla and Profitt (1999) found that participants who wore a 
heavy backpack judged hills to be steeper than unburdened participants, while chronic 
pain sufferers, for whom walking was a greater effort, judged hallways to be longer than 
control participants (Witt et al., 2009). Such influences of ability on perception are 
proposed to have an adaptive advantage. Witt (2011) suggests that perceiving the 
environment in the terms of one’s ability to act with it will help shape the planning of 
future activities. If the observer has less ability, and so perceives the obstacle or distance 
as greater, they are less likely to attempt to act, and so prevent themselves from risking 
failure and/or injury.  
This action-specific approach shares some common ground with the TEC, as 
both propose that action can have some influence on the way in which the environment, 
and objects within it can be perceived. However, the mechanisms by which these are 
achieved differ. While the TEC suggests that planning of an action will influence 
perception, the action-specific account focuses on the action capabilities of the observer, 
and holds that this is the factor which will influence perception. In a comparison of 
these accounts, it was found that the TEC is a better account of the observed behaviour. 
When participants were given a gun-shaped object to respond to stimuli, then they 
perceived more incidences of other people holding guns, although these were incorrect 
perceptions. When participants were instead asked to hold a shoe, and respond with that 
item, then they similarly showed an increase in the incorrect detection of shoes being 
held in the presented stimuli (Witt and Brockmole, 2012). This is problematic for the 
action-specific account, as holding a shoe does not change the action capabilities of the 
holder in the same way that holding a gun does. However, the planned action with either 
object influenced perception for the specific object held, suggesting a particular 
weighting in favour of the specific item, which was unrelated to the action capabilities it 
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provided to the holder. While there may be action-specific effects in the earlier stages of 
visual perception of objects and their properties (particularly the spatial properties; Witt 
and Brockmole, 2012), it seems that the TEC can better account for higher level 
processes, such as object recognition. However, while the precise domain of influence 
for these action specific effects has yet to be determined, these studies again show that 
even without a specific preparation for action there is an influence on our general 
perception of the world. Importantly, they extend the previous findings of Riddoch and 
colleagues beyond initial studies on neurological patients.  
1.2.1.1 The influence of proximal hands on attention. There is also a growing 
area of research examining the influence of having the hands close to the area in which 
a task is being performed. In the typical paradigm investigating this, the participants are 
not required to perform any gesture with the hands, merely to hold them close to the 
display screen or work area. Like the studies reviewed above, there is therefore no direct 
task to be performed. However, the paradigm of using the hands to change behaviours is 
a rapidly growing and fairly distinct area of research, and so is considered separately 
here. It is proposed that the presence of the hands near items leads to an anticipation of 
action, as objects near the hands are items that we might be about to act with (Abrams, 
Davoli, Du, Knapp and Paull, 2008). Alternatively, it may be that items near the hands 
represent potential obstacles, which need to be avoided, and so require the extra 
attention to assess how much of an obstacle they are and the best way to deal with them 
(Graziano and Cooke, 2006). In either case, the presence of the hands may influence the 
visual processing of the environment, in order to facilitate upcoming actions, whether 
avoidance or manipulation. Thus, these studies represent another means by which the 
potential for action can affect an observer’s perception of a scene. Specifically, it is 
suggested that attention should be biased towards these proximal items in order to 
prepare us for the possibility of acting with them. 
The first studies on the influence of the hands used standard attention paradigms 
and search tasks, comparing performance when the hands were positioned close to the 
screen, and when they were at a distance. Several studies showed that the presence of 
the hands did indeed affect the distribution of attention, as shown by performance on the 
tasks. For example, Reed, Grubb and Steele (2006) found participants were faster to 
detect stimuli near the outstretched hand, indicating a biasing of attention to the items 
near the hands. Abrams et al. (2008) later showed that attention is not only biased to 
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items near the hands, but actually leads to altered processing of these items. Using 
visual search, spatial cuing and rapid serial visual presentation tasks, Abrams et al. 
(2008) showed that placing the hands next to the screen led to slower disengagement 
from these locations. This was so for both spatial attention, shown in the first two tasks, 
and attention over time, shown by the use of the RSVP paradigm.  
Neurological evidence provides further support for the influence of the hands on 
processing. Indeed, it was originally suggested that peripersonal space, that is, the space 
near the body, might be coded differently compared to areas further away (Graziano, 
2001). Makin, Holmes and Zohary (2007) showed this in humans, with specific brain 
regions responding to the objects near the hands. A later study found that activation was 
present in the parietal and premotor areas when objects were presented within 100cm of 
the hands (Brozzoli, Gentile, Petkova and Ehrsson, 2011). Interestingly, these two areas 
deal differently with the hands; while the parietal area is concerned with the position of 
the hands when static, the premotor area responds to the movements of the hands 
through space. It is suggested that the two areas work together, contributing to the effect 
of the nearby hands depending on whether or not the hand is in motion (Brozzoli et.al, 
2011). 
It could be argued that the influence of the hands is not necessarily functional, as 
the participants were not considering acting with objects when they placed their hands 
near the displays. However, there are several studies that indicate the proximity of the 
hands can influence perception in favour of action. Davoli, Du, Montana, Garverick and 
Abrams (2010) demonstrated that while placing the hands near visual display led to 
increased spatial processing, semantic processing was reduced, shown by slower 
responses in tasks such as judging the sensibleness of sentences. While perhaps more 
indirect, this suggests a trade-off favouring more detailed spatial processing of objects 
at the expense of higher level processes that are less related to action. Further evidence 
for the hands having a functional effect has focused on the conditions necessary for the 
influence to emerge, and so also identified conditions under which the effect is absent. 
Participants were found to produce more accurate pointing behaviour when a target was 
projected onto the palm of their hand, but not when it was projected onto the back 
(Brown, Morrissey and Goodale, 2009). Similarly, when both the hands enclosed a 
particular space, there was enhanced processing of items between them in comparison 
to items outside the enclosed space (Davoli and Brockmole, 2012). Both these studies 
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indicate that the effect of the hands is only directed towards items on the palm side, 
which is the side more commonly associated with acting with objects. In comparison, 
the back of the hands do not allow for any particularly complicated manipulation of 
objects close by (beyond, perhaps, pushing them away). Thus, it is only when the hands 
are posed in such a way to encourage the typical interaction style associated with the 
hands that this action-relevant influence on perception will be observed. Recently, 
studies have examined the involvement of the magno-cellular and parvo-cellular 
pathway in the near-hands effect. Gozli, West and Pratt (2012) suggested that objects 
near the hands are processed using the action based M-pathway, rather than the 
perception based P-pathway. Their study showed that the presence of the hands near 
objects improved temporal processing (requiring the M-pathway) over spatial 
processing (in which the P-pathway is most involved). The importance of the potential 
for action was further demonstrated in a study where the action ability was manipulated, 
either by the position of the hands (palms-in vs. palms-out/ proximal vs. distal 
positioning) or the position of the object (easily grasped vs. not easily grasped) (Chan, 
Peterson, Barense and Pratt, 2013). For each condition, the object or posture 
manipulation proposed to enhance the potential for action (hands proximal, palms-in, 
object graspable) improved the detection of stimuli presented as a low spatial frequency 
image, strongly suggesting the hand posture is closely linked to the preparation for 
action, and acts via recruitment of the M-pathway. Thus, there is a small but varied set 
of studies that all suggest that the presence of the hands has a functional influence, 
affecting processing of relevant objects in favour of action. 
1.2.2 The influence of action preparation on attention. The previously 
considered studies indicate an influence from the mere potential for action, while the 
participants do not yet have a specific intention to act with the objects. Despite this, the 
studies demonstrate that the suggestion of action, whether by the placement of objects 
in certain arrangements, the current ability of an observer to act in an environment, or 
the placement of the hands in a position that allows for the possibility of interaction is 
enough to influence the processes of perception in such a way that behaviour is 
noticeably changed. However, the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001) stresses the importance 
of the actor’s goal state, or intention in the context of the task. The following studies 
provide evidence for the influence that preparing for an action has on perception. These 
come largely from visual search tasks, in which the intention of the participant towards 
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the displayed objects is manipulated, to determine if this will affect their search for the 
target. 
Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti and Umiltà (1999) found some of the earliest 
support for this, demonstrating that when participants prepared a grasping movement 
towards a bar, they were faster in producing this response when the cue stimulus was 
congruent with the grasp they had planned. Craighero et al. (1999) considered this to 
indicate faster processing of the matching items, with the preparation of the grasp 
increasing the readiness of the motor system to execute the action, and facilitating 
processing of objects with properties that matched the grip. Craighero et al.’s (1999) 
study suggested that processing single objects could be influenced by action 
preparation. Subsequently, Bekkering and Neggers (2002) demonstrated that in the 
more crowded environment of a visual search task, action preparation could facilitate 
detecting a particular target. Participants were instructed to find a target defined by its 
colour or its orientation (e.g., a red target, or a target angled at 45°) in order to interact 
with it (by grasping) or to point towards it. Participants were more accurate in locating 
the object, as measured by their first saccades to it, when the object was defined by its 
orientation, and the task was to find and then grasp it. Again, planning an action did 
affect the visual processing of the scene, but the type of action, coupled with the 
property of the target in question also had an effect. The orientation of an object is 
clearly important to the way in which it will be grasped, but is less relevant if the object 
will only be pointed at. Similarly, the colour of the target is not relevant to forming 
either action. By preparing the action, processing of object features is facilitated, but 
only if the feature is relevant to the action. Bekkering and Neggers (2002) interpreted 
this in terms of visual attention as a selection-for-action mechanism, with action 
constraining attention to the relevant items within the scene. This is consistent with the 
TEC’s idea of weighting an event file in favour of the task-relevant features, and thus 
influencing subsequent attention to objects. 
Later work by Fagioli, Hommel and Schubotz (2007) looked at how different 
actions (pointing vs. grasping) influenced the perception of items that were defined by 
different properties. Again, the action prepared only facilitated the search for targets 
defined by a property that was relevant to the execution of the action (location and 
orientation, respectively). Fagioli et al. (2007) showed that the biasing of attention by 
action towards object features might occur not only for the individual features, but the 
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overall feature dimension. In their study, the overall feature dimensions of location and 
size were facilitated; not only the specific sizes or locations that directly matched the 
prepared gesture. That is, while the participant might be specifically cued by an item 
orientated at 90°, in the intervening oddity detection task, detection of the odd target 
would be enhanced if it stood out because it was at any angle different to the other items 
in the display, not only the orientation dimension used to cue. Thus, the intention to act 
seems to prime visual attention to process any information that is part of the relevant 
feature dimension.  
Further studies have confirmed and expanded on these findings, using 
adaptations of Fagioli et al.’s (2007) paradigm. Wykowska, Schubö and Hommel 
(2009) compared the influence of action preparation with other methods of biasing 
attention to targets, such as pre-defining the target to make it specifically relevant to the 
task, or presenting it repeatedly. The influence of the action weighting (the prepared 
action affecting perception of a feature dimension) was only present if the task had 
defined the feature as relevant. Wykowska et al. (2009) proposed that action induced 
weighting will only occur if the actions are relevant to the task, but not if the actions are 
made relevant by more bottom-up signals, such as a higher saliency. This further 
confirms the importance of intention and goals during the task for whether such action 
induced influences occur, and indicates that action preparation may not be the only 
influence on weighting representations in object search. Repetition of particular stimuli 
did have a priming effect, but only emerged in the absence of action-induced effects, 
suggesting that this priming occurs via a separate mechanism, apart from the top-down 
influence of task. Finally, it was demonstrated that the action effects could still emerge 
even if the stimuli that were to be interacted with didn’t bear any resemblance to the 
perceived stimuli that the search task was performed on (Wykowska, Hommel and 
Schubö, 2011). Their study used different stimulus sets for the items to be 
pointed/grasped at (to provide the action preparation cue) and those in the display that 
would be examined during the search task Despite the fact that the two stimulus sets did 
not share any specific object forms, the initial action preparation still influenced 
performance in the search task, so that preparation of pointing enhanced detections of 
luminosity oddballs, while preparation of grasping affected detection of orientation 
oddities. Action influences are therefore not dependent on the low-level perceptual 
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similarities, but may result from higher level perception-action representations, and the 
associations between particular actions and properties. 
While the standard paradigm for investigating the influence of action preparation 
tends to be the visual search task, other methods have been employed. Symes et al. 
(2008) used a change detection task in their experiment, again using this to determine if 
the preparation of an action could bias attention towards certain items. In contrast to the 
previous studies, the actions employed for this investigation were more specific. Rather 
than two clearly different actions such as a grasp vs. a point, they used variations of 
grasps that were appropriate for different sized objects (power vs. precision). Again, the 
preparation of the grips increased the detection rate of changes to items that were size 
compatible with the grip. Symes et al. (2008) further made the point that the prepared 
grip types were not being directed to a region in space (and did not possess a spatial 
dimension). Thus, the preparation of the grasp was not biasing attention towards 
particular spatial locations, but instead to the relevant specific features of the objects 
that were presented (in this case, the size). This is further evidence that the action 
preparation is biasing particular associated object properties. 
The set of studies described here demonstrate that the intention is an important 
part of the interactions between action and perception. Our previous experience in 
performing actions allows us to determine which aspects are the most relevant for our 
purposes, and so enhance their processing to facilitate our actions. However, while such 
studies introduce a little more realism by including specific goals related to the objects, 
they do not allow for any direct manipulation of the objects in question. Studies in real 
world settings deal with this problem, and eye movement studies in these contexts are 
particularly useful for examining perception and action interactions, as the movements 
of the eyes reflect an early perceptual response. Although the eye movements 
themselves are a motor response, it is one that occurs early, in order to direct the hands, 
or other motor effectors. Furthermore, unlike the hands, the eyes are not involved in 
acting with the objects, and so the eye movements are not conflated with the required 
manipulations of the task objects. 
1.2.3 The influence of action execution on attention. As well as gathering 
information prior to action, information about the changing environment needs to be 
gathered during action. Studies of vision during real world tasks have supported this, 
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showing clearly that the nature of the task influences where we look. Examples of such 
studies include Land, Mennie and Rusted (1999), using a tea making task; Hayhoe 
(2000) and Hayhoe, Srivastava, Mruczec and Pelz (2003) using sandwich making tasks, 
and Lee and Land (1994), recording eye movements during driving. In all such studies, 
the typical finding is that participants will direct their eyes to the places that provide 
them with the necessary information, whether this is the correct objects in the case of 
the tea and sandwich tasks, or to the tangent point on a winding road, which gives 
information about the bend curvature, and so informs steering behaviour (Land and 
Tatler, 2009). These fixations were made prior to any actions (grasping the fixated 
object, etc.), but only by a short time period of roughly 0.5s-1s, indicating a closely 
linked eye-hand strategy. The prioritisation of task-relevant objects is shown 
particularly clearly in Hayhoe et al.’s (2003) study, where the objects for the task were 
placed among irrelevant objects. While fixations were made more or less equally to both 
types of objects before the task began, after it started, fixations on irrelevant objects fell 
significantly, with more attention being paid to items that were necessary for the action. 
Perhaps even more importantly than the influence of task relevance, these and other real 
world tasks all show the common finding that vision is constantly in the service of 
action. As well as selecting the next item for use in the ongoing task, vision is involved 
in monitoring the actions currently being completed (see e.g., Ballard, Hayhoe, Li and 
Whitehead, 1992). Indeed, when participants were prevented from monitoring their 
actions, performance was slower (Ballard, Hayhoe and Pelz, 1995). In order to 
successfully complete tasks, not only do we need to select the correct items, we need to 
use them as the task demands. Vision is central to both these requirements, following 
the demands of action in order to allow for the end goal to be achieved. 
If perception is for action, as is suggested by various authors, and embodied 
theories, then it should be influenced by the action requirements. The studies outlined 
here show very clearly that this is the case: even without a guiding task or intention, the 
potential for action is enough to change how attention is biased. At the other extreme, in 
the context of everyday tasks, we can see how eye-movements (a strong measure of 
perception) respond and follow the on-going demands of an action. Thus, one side of 
the action-perception link is supported here, but the other side, where perception can 
influence action, must also be considered, as this provides evidence for the idea that 
perception is not merely a passive response to the demands of a task, but, as Bridgeman 
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and Tseng (2011) state, an active process itself, used to anticipate a potential upcoming 
action. In the following section, studies of affordance effects are examined, to provide 
evidence for the other side of the loop. 
1.3 Perception Influencing Action: Attentional Weighting 
Studies into the influence perception might have on action were conducted prior 
to the suggestions of the TEC, and so initially were not strictly linked into that 
framework. However, the findings and conclusions are compatible with much of the 
TEC’s proposals, and provide the required evidence for the complimentary side of the 
action-perception link.  
It is important to note that the object affordances considered in this area of the 
literature differ from the original meaning of the term, first used by Gibson (1979). 
Gibson’s affordances arise from the direct perception of the world, informing the viewer 
as to how the objects could be acted with. A chair affords ‘sit-ability’, a mug ‘grip-
ability’, and so forth, although the particular situation affects which affordance is most 
relevant; whether an object will be held or thrown, for example. Importantly, all this 
information is provided by on-line visual stimulation the object provides, with no 
internal representation required to store the various possibilities. In contrast, the 
affordances suggested by Tucker, Ellis and others result from the observer’s internal 
representation of the object. Rather than rely solely on what the visual system provides 
from the external world, these representations are the result of learning about the 
objects, their visual properties, and their associated actions. Thus, over time, familiar 
objects will become more detailed as further information is added from experience, 
allowing the mental representation to be grounded in the observers’ experience of the 
world. Indeed, Ellis and Tucker (2000) make the point that this sort of structure neatly 
provides a solution to Harnad’s (1990) symbol grounding problem. This inclusion of 
both action and visual features within the same representation has obvious parallels with 
the TEC’s suggestion of the common representational domain for perceptual and action 
features. They also result in similar, mirrored predictions for behaviour. Just as the 
overlap between action and feature codes leads to actions influencing perception, the 
object affordance literature predicts that the perception of an object should lead to the 
activation of its associated actions, even if they are not currently relevant to the on-
going goal (Ellis and Tucker, 2000).  
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Much of the research in the object affordances literature has used stimulus-
response compatibility (SRC) tasks, in which the performance of an action is influenced 
by some visual aspect of the object used as a stimulus. More specifically, these effects 
tend to be divided into two broad types: the Simon effect (e.g., Simon, 1969), and the 
affordance effect (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998). The Simon effect arises when 
participants make bimanual responses to stimuli, based on a feature such as colour, 
shape or orientation. When the location of the object and the location of the response 
match (e.g., object on the right hand side responded to with a button on the right hand 
side) then the responses are performed faster, despite the fact that the objects’ location 
is not relevant to the ongoing task.  
The affordance tasks follow a similar process, but examine whether other visual 
features of the objects will lead to the same effect on responses when they are task-
irrelevant. Tucker and Ellis (1998) used the handle location of objects in a task where 
participants decided if the object was orientated normally, or inverted. Again, the 
response time was affected by the handle location, with matches between the side of the 
handle, and the side of the response hand facilitating the speed of the response. From 
their studies, Tucker and Ellis (1998) further suggested the concept of ‘micro-
affordances’, where the visual appearance of the object activates a specific component 
of an action. This is a more precise activation of an action, so that rather than a grip 
being facilitated by any grasping gesture, one particular hand shape may be activated by 
perceiving a specific size of an object (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 2001). This is similar in 
many ways to Symes et al.’s (2008) study showing that preparation of a specific action, 
such as a precision grip, would enhance perception of a matching size, and demonstrates 
that the influences of perception on action operate at the same level as those seen when 
action influences perception. 
The two broad types of effect can be classed as either space-based or object-
based affordances, and there is some debate as to whether they constitute two separate 
effects, or if there is some closer relationship. Symes, Ellis and Tucker (2005) examined 
the differences between the conditions under which the two effects emerged. Under 
high attentional demand conditions, when participants were cued to respond by the 
object’s category (whether it belonged in a kitchen or garage), influences of both the 
objects’ location and orientation were found on the responses produced. Under lower 
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attentional demands, where the cue was the objects’ colour, only the Simon effect 
emerged, indicating that the two types of affordance may be different.  
Two main explanations were initially proposed for the affordance effect, 
separate from the Simon effect. Both emphasise the close link between perception and 
action, but vary in the precise manner in which objects’ action and visual properties are 
represented. Tucker and Ellis’ original account, as already mentioned, proposed that 
action information was stored in the representation of an object, and activated due to a 
match in the properties of the object being viewed(e.g., size activating a grip type). 
However, as implied by micro-affordances, this is a targeted activation, with specific 
hand shapes being facilitated by a particular size, and so forth. An alternative, but 
largely similar account suggested that the coding of actions was more abstract than 
proposed by Tucker and Ellis. The actions activated by the perception of an object did 
not have to be a precise match to the object’s properties. For example, it was found that 
affordances could emerge even when participants used left/right foot presses to respond 
to stimuli, (thus using an effector which would not normally produce the active 
manipulation when an interaction took place) or responded with their hands crossed (so 
that the right hand was actually responding on the left hand side, and vice versa, Phillips 
and Ward, 2002). In both these cases, it is not the specific limb that is being facilitated 
by perception, but an abstract facilitation of any associated action (i.e. it occurs on the 
congruent side, but does not have to be the congruent limb). As Symes et al. (2005) 
point out, a more abstract coding style is in line with the TEC’s proposals of a common 
representational domain, where action and perceptual codes are functionally equivalent. 
More abstract representations also allow greater flexibility for activating a wider range 
of actions, and so would be of greater benefit to an active organism. 
Explanations for the Simon effect differ slightly; it is suggested the results come 
from the overlap between the representations for the stimulus and response (see e.g., 
Kornblum et al., 1990), although early suggestions lacked detail in terms of how the 
overlap might occur. Of course, the TEC, with its common-coding principle can easily 
explain the overlap as being due to representations, whether for stimulus or response, 
sharing the same neural codes (Hommel, 2009). Thus, according to the TEC, as the 
location of the response in the Simon effect is task-relevant, these codes will be 
activated by intentional weighting. This will then prime the task-irrelevant location of 
the stimulus, which overlaps in the representational space with the codes for the 
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response location. To further support the TEC’s account for this effect, there are studies 
which show how the Simon effect can be lost or reduced if the task settings do not allow 
for the response to be prepared, which would prevent the weighting of the response 
dimension from taking place (Vallé-Inclan and Redondo, 1998). Thus, the Simon effect 
is certainly not incompatible with the TEC’s proposals, and provides further evidence 
for the influence of perception on action. 
1.3.1 Boundary conditions necessary for affordance effects. An important 
factor in the investigations into affordance effects is the conditions under which the 
effects will reliably emerge. The earliest studies into this area emphasised the 
automaticity of the effects; indeed, it was key to these studies that the feature that 
affected the response, whether orientation, size or position, was not relevant to the on-
going task. In this way, affordance effects are similar to the findings of Riddoch and 
colleagues, where the potential for action seemed to affect perception even without the 
intention to act. However, various studies have been conducted to determine if this 
automaticity is a key part of the effect, and whether there are situations which will 
influence its presence or strength. Tipper (2010) suggested that, if the strongest form of 
automaticity was correct, then any time an object was viewed, it would be enough to 
begin an action which might be disruptive or inappropriate for the situation. Instead, 
there might be processes that allow for the suppression of the vision-to-action 
conversion processes if they are not appropriate to the task. Three main areas have been 
investigated, to determine what influence they might have on affordance effects; levels 
of attention and where attention is directed; the response the participant makes, and the 
overall context of the task. 
1.3.1.1 Attention. The focus of attention has been suggested to be an important 
factor in allowing an affordance effect to emerge. Indeed, Tipper (2010) proposes that 
attention is the key component in allowing (or suppressing) the conversion of 
perception into an action effect. Various studies have examined how adjusting the 
attentional focus or the amount of engagement with a stimulus object can influence the 
emergence of affordance effects in responses. 
In their comparison of the Simon and affordance effects, Symes et al. (2005) 
found evidence to suggest that the level of engagement with the objects was important 
for the affordance effect at least. In this study, one of the tasks was to respond based on 
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whether the presented object was more commonly associated with a garage 
environment, or a kitchen. The other task required participants to respond based on the 
colour of the stimulus object. It was only in the classification task that the affordance 
effect was detected. Symes et al. (2005) suggested that it was only in this task that the 
participants engaged with the object’s identity, in order to successfully make their 
decision. As a result, they accessed the full representation of the object, and so the 
actions associated with it, which facilitated the actions made towards the item. In 
contrast, colour information was extracted more rapidly from the stimulus, and did not 
require the same level of engagement with the object. 
Similar findings were reported in a study of the compatibility effect; a version of 
the affordance effect in which participants respond with a pantomime gesture which can 
be compatible or incompatible with the cue object (Bub and Masson 2006). In this 
study, the objects were displayed to participants, and then replaced with a picture of a 
hand performing an action (either compatible or incompatible to the previous object). 
The object itself was irrelevant to the participant’s task, as it was the pictured hand 
posture they had to copy. Under these initial conditions, a compatibility effect 
(measured as the time taken for participants to begin making the response gesture) 
failed to emerge. However, when participants were instructed to name the object after 
they had made the hand gesture, then the expected pattern emerged, with faster response 
times when participants performed a gesture compatible with the use of the object they 
had seen earlier. This again seems to point to the importance of engagement with the 
objects. When they are passively viewed with no reason for engaging with the images, 
they do not trigger any kind of response. However, when participants know they must 
name the object, they examine it with the intention of determining its identity (as in 
Symes et al.’s study), thus accessing the representation, and the associated responses. If 
they are then required to form an incompatible response, then this is slowed, as the 
compatible responses are already primed. 
As well as the level of engagement with an entire object, studies have 
considered how the focus of attention on a particular property of an object might 
influence the emergence of the affordance effect. In one study, the handle orientation 
effect was examined when participants were cued to make their left/right responses 
either according to the colour of the door handle stimulus, or its shape (Tipper, Paul and 
Hayes, 2006). Affordance effects emerged only when attention was given to shape, and 
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not colour. Tipper et al. (2006) proposed that the shape of an object is more relevant to 
action processes than its colour, as the shape informs aspects of the grip that must be 
formed to interact with the object. Attending to this action-affording stimulus, rather 
than the more visually relevant property of colour, produces the affordance effect. 
Studies have even shown evidence for this difference due to attentional focus at the 
neurological level. Schuch, Bayliss, Klein and Tipper, (2010) used EEG recordings to 
observe the mu rhythm, a sequence of activity observed over the sensorimotor cortex in 
the frequency range of 8-13 Hz, which has been found to be suppressed during action 
(and observation of another’s action). Schuch et al. (2010) showed that it was also 
suppressed when observing an action sequence with instructions to concentrate on the 
action, (i.e., a hand gripping a mug) but not when observing the same sequence while 
concentrating on the colour of the acted-with object. Schuch et al. (2010) suggested that 
this indicated the importance of attention to action, and action relevant aspects of 
objects in order for object affordances to arise. Thus, it seems general attention is 
perhaps not enough to elicit an affordance effect, and there is some necessity for the 
object to be examined as an object, which can be achieved either by constraining 
attention to properties which are particularly relevant to its function, (such as shape), or 
by engaging with the object by identifying it, and therefore its associated uses. 
There is one study that suggests a slightly different way in which attention 
influences the affordance effect. Vainio, Ellis and Tucker (2007) employed a task in 
which the presented object was entirely irrelevant to the task requirements, and simply 
present throughout the duration of each trial. Despite this, the orientation of the object 
still affected the speed of responses, facilitating the button presses that were made on 
the same side as the object handle. In contrast to this, when participants were instructed 
to fixate on a point over the irrelevant object, the orientation had no such effect. This is 
in agreement with the earlier studies showing the importance of attending to the stimuli 
in allowing the effect to emerge, but the findings do not entirely fit with the other data. 
The exogenous attention to the object is apparently enough in this case, although there 
is no deeper engagement with the identity of the object presented, as in Symes et al. 
(2005) and Bub and Masson (2006). Instead, Vainio et al. (2007) proposed that attention 
is necessary, but it is enough for it to be captured exogenously, particularly if the object 
is displayed at the centre of the attentional focus. Further investigation is needed to 
clarify how this finding fits with the other studies suggesting that attention must be 
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engaged with the stimulus in an active manner in order for affordances to be seen in 
response times. 
1.3.1.2 Realism of response. Following their attendance to a cue, the participant 
in an affordance study is then required to produce some type of response. The initial 
affordance studies simply required responses to be made by pressing a button, 
regardless of the stimulus object. While the participant is still not required to act with 
the objects displayed, by introducing more specific responses, this may increase the 
strength of the intention towards the objects, and so lead to differences in how any 
affordance effects develop. This version of the affordance effect (termed the 
compatibility effect) is therefore determining whether the perception of a common 
object will facilitate not just an abstract response, but a response which is specific to the 
way that the object is used. 
There are very few studies which have incorporated more realistic responses. 
Bub and Masson’s (2006) investigation referred to above used the compatibility effect 
and demonstrated that a certain level of engagement with the stimulus was required for 
the effect to emerge. However, further studies using the compatibility effect and 
pantomime response gestures have suggested that the nature of the response itself may 
have an influence on the emergence of the effect. This was noted in a second study by 
Bub and Masson (2006), in which they presented participants with an action version of 
the Stroop task. Participants were instructed to produce action gestures in response to 
different colours (e.g., produce a trigger squeezing gesture in response to the colour 
red). Coloured objects were then displayed in the trials, so that participants had to 
ignore the actual object that was pictured, and respond only to the colour. Despite the 
irrelevance of the object, responses were facilitated when the response required by the 
colour was compatible with the object (e.g., a red bottle of antibacterial spray), and 
slowed when the gesture cued by the colour was incompatible with the pictured object 
(e.g. a red calculator). These findings are in contrast to those reported in the previous 
section, where it seemed that if the cue to act was the colour of the object, then this was 
not enough for the affordance effect to emerge (Tipper et al., 2006). The possibility that 
it was the use of more specific gestures was explored further by Bub and Masson (2010) 
using the handle orientation effect, where button press responses and pantomime 
gesture responses were directly compared. When cued by object colour to make a 
response using a button press, there was no advantage found when participants used a 
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hand congruent with the side of the handle. However, when participants responded 
using a reach and grasp response, then there was an advantage if the handle was aligned 
with the response hand. This suggests that the intention of the actor in the gestures they 
will form may have a role in modulating the ease with which the response actions 
performed too; perhaps stronger than that of where attention is focused on the object in 
question. 
1.3.1.3 Implied realism of setting. As well as the aspect which cues the action, 
and the response that must be produced, another factor in the emergence of the 
affordance effect is the level of realism which is implied to be present in the study. How 
realism is implied varies across the studies, but the methods all have in common the fact 
that they attempt to make the possibility of action more likely. Tipper et al. (2006) 
found that responses to images of door handles were facilitated if the handles were 
presented as though they were in the process of being used (i.e. presented at an angle, as 
though being pressed down). Here, it is implied that the stimulus is more than just a 
static picture, but that it is able to move and be acted with. Indeed, Tipper et al. (2006) 
also found that the affordance effect could be strengthened if participants were primed 
with video clips of the door handles being pressed down prior to the start of the 
experiment. Implying the object is capable of being acted on, or is observed in the 
process of being acted upon is thought to lead to participants simulating the action from 
the cues provided, which strengthens the activation of the affordances. A similar study 
examined how the perception of another’s actions with an object could affect the 
affordance effect, but expanded on Tipper et al.’s findings by showing that the 
plausibility of the actors’ interactions influenced the observers own responses. 
Participants were required to classify large and small items as natural or manmade by 
making power or precision grips to indicate their choice (Girardi, Lindemann and 
Bekkering, 2010). While the size of the stimulus objects was irrelevant, the typical 
affordance effect was found: making the grasp gesture was facilitated when it was 
compatible with the size of the object displayed. This effect was modulated however, by 
the introduction of the image of a hand pictured approaching the stimulus object, and in 
the process of making a power or precision grasp itself. When this actors gesture was 
incompatible with the stimulus objects, then the participants responses were not 
facilitated, even if their response was compatible with the object. A version of the study 
was also conducted in which the actor’s hand was shown making the grasp at a distance 
31 
 
from the object, as though it was interacting with something else, and not the pictured 
stimulus. Again, in the absence of a clear coupling between the actor’s action and the 
stimulus object, there was no facilitation of the participant’s own compatible gesture. 
As in Tipper et al.’s (2006) study, it appears that observation of an action can lead to 
simulation of the action in the observer, but the observed action must itself be plausible 
and accurate for this simulation to occur.  
As well as examining the action possibilities arising from observing another, the 
realism of the affordance paradigm has been manipulated by changing the participants’ 
perceived ability to act with the pictured objects. Yang and Beilock (2011) examined 
how the strength of the orientation effect was affected when the stimulus objects were 
presented either within the action space of the participant, or at a distance, as if the 
objects were out of reach. It was suggested that this effect may be particularly strong for 
the orientation effect, as this is a property that is not intrinsic to an object, and so the 
effect is stronger when there is a greater possibility for action, even though this is only 
implied by the presentation of the items. These conditions which increase the realism of 
the paradigm all seem to enhance the affordance effect, although more research is 
required to determine if they all operate via the same mechanism, and how they might 
interact together. All these boundary conditions, however, demonstrate that the 
affordance effect is not an inevitable, automatic response to the perception of an item, 
but is dependent on different aspects, which all act to encourage a perception of action 
in the participant making the response. 
1.3.2 Boundary conditions for the Simon effect. The Simon effect seems to be 
less affected by the context of an experiment than other affordance effects. Studies such 
as Symes et al. (2005) have shown that the effect still emerged when participants 
attended to low level cues, even when the affordance effect was absent. Pellicano, Iani, 
Borghi, Rubichi and Nicoletti (2010) found similar results, with the same object stimuli 
giving rise to both Simon and affordance effects, depending on the task instructions. It 
seems that the Simon effect is mainly dependent on their being a spatial overlap 
between stimulus and response, and a chance for this mapping to be prepared before 
responding, as suggested by Hommel (2009). This is perhaps due to the fact that the 
Simon effect depends on the position of the objects, rather than a more intrinsic object 
property, so that the actual nature of the object is less important to the action responses 
being prepared. 
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The various types of affordance effect demonstrate clear evidence for the ability 
of perceptual processes to influence the production and performance of action, filling in 
the other side of the action-perception loop proposed by situated action theories. While 
initial studies seemed to suggest that the conversion of perception into action was 
automatic, later studies indicate that this is not a strong form of automaticity, and is 
susceptible to influence of the context of the task. In particular, attention appears to be 
important in the emergence of the effect, with a certain amount of focus being required 
in order for any influence on action to be seen (although this may be more so for the 
object-based affordance effects, rather than the location-based Simon effect). Overall, 
perception can influence action in a similar manner to that by which action influences 
perception. 
1.4 Representations of the Visual World 
Theories of situated action have considered how action and perception 
contribute to object representations, but these proposals have been largely confined to 
on-line representations, in the course of a task. In contrast, theories of visual memory 
representations have not typically considered how action could be incorporated. 
However, embodied views of memory suggest that it is just as important a process for 
serving action as perception, and so it seems memory could be considered in the same 
way. In this section, the initial theories of modality-free visual representations will be 
considered, followed by more embodied theories that attempt to tie memory and action 
together. Finally, evidence will be considered which suggests that action’s influence on 
perception and perception’s influence on action can still be found in the absence of the 
presence of the stimulus. 
1.4.1Theories of visual representation. Initially, the visual representations we 
form of scenes were thought to be essentially picture copies of the external world. The 
visual contents of each fixation were added to an image of the overall scene, held in a 
low-level visual buffer (e.g., McConkie and Rayner, 1975). However, subsequent 
studies showed the problems with this approach, in particular, those using the change 
detection paradigm (e.g., Grimes, 1996). Changes made to pictures during interruptions 
to scene viewing (e.g., during saccades, or simulated saccadic disruptions such as 
flickers (Rensink, O’Regan and Clark, 1997) or blinks (O’Regan, Deubel, Clark and 
Rensink, 2000) went unnoticed by the viewers. This was considered to provide evidence 
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against the idea of a highly veridical picture representation of the world, because if the 
scene was represented in such a faithful fashion, then changes made during disruptions 
should be easily detected by comparing the ‘before’ and ‘after’ representations of the 
scene (Rensink, 2002). 
Thus, theories developed after these findings proposed either no representation 
(instead, the world was used as an outside memory source; O’Regan and Noe, 2001) or 
representations that were exceedingly sparse (e.g., Rensink, 2000; Irwin, 1992). In 
particular, Rensink’s coherence theory held that only those parts of the scene that were 
attended would be represented in a stable and detailed fashion. Unattended objects are 
maintained as volatile proto-objects, which are constantly replaced as vision moves 
across the scene. When attention is focused on an item, more detailed information is 
added to the representation, but this extra detail itself is fragile, and would not survive 
long after the withdrawal of attention. Although the information could be integrated 
with higher level information relating to scene gist and spatial layout, there is no use of 
representations that are both highly detailed and stable.  
A related proposal was that of object files (Irwin, 1992; see also Gordon and 
Irwin, 1996). Here again, attention to an object is necessary to create a temporary 
representation of that object, containing information about the visual features and 
location. These files can be maintained across several saccades, but will decay over 
time. However, up to five objects could be maintained at one time, instead of the single 
attended item proposed by Rensink (2000). 
Following these initial proposals, the theories returned to the idea of more 
detailed representations. In terms of these richer representations, there are two main 
ideas; that the representations are strongly visual, that is, formed and stored in visual 
short-term and long-term memory (e.g., Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002), or that the 
representations are detailed, but abstract (e.g., Melcher, 2001; Tatler, Gilchrist and 
Rusted, 2003).  
Hollingworth and colleagues suggest a robust visual representation based on 
findings from change blindness studies, in which it was found that participants could 
detect even quite small changes to objects, provided they had fixated the object prior to 
the change (e.g., Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; Hollingworth, Williams and 
Henderson, 2001). The fact these changes were still noticed despite not being directly 
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fixated at the time of the change argues against the sparser ideas of representation, as it 
shows the representation still being maintained at a level that allows changes to be 
detected, rather than rapidly decaying. Accurate detection of changes was still high even 
when up to nine fixations on other objects intervened between the initial fixation on the 
target object and the subsequent change detection test for that item (Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 2002). According to this approach, VSTM and VLTM both play a central 
role in supporting and maintaining these representations. Hollingworth (2004) examined 
the change detection performance of participants after they had to view object 
sequences of different lengths after their initial fixation on the changing target object. 
VSTM was shown to have a role in object representation, as memory performance was 
superior when the target object was one of the two most recently fixated objects. 
However, memory performance was still consistently robust on objects fixated 3-10 
fixations previously, which Hollingworth (2004) suggested showed the contribution of 
VLTM. Expanding on these findings, Hollingworth (2004; 2005) proposed that scene 
representations are built up across multiple fixations, starting with both precise sensory 
representations and higher level visual representations being produced during each 
fixation on an area of a scene. After a saccade is made, the sensory information is 
rapidly lost, but the higher level representations remain, first briefly within VSTM, and 
then in VLTM, allowing the accumulation of information from eye movements made 
across the scene, and the maintenance of the representation.  
There are similarities between the views of Hollingworth and colleagues, and 
the idea that scene representations are more abstract in nature. Again, it is suggested that 
information from scenes is accumulated across several fixations. For example, Melcher 
(2001; 2006) showed that memory for objects improved across both continuous and 
interrupted viewings of a scene, although he also suggested that a medium-term 
memory (MTM) store would better explain the integration of information, as there was 
no indication of a clear change in the memory performance that would suggest a 
transition from STM to LTM. Instead, the MTM acts as a ‘proto-LTM’, containing 
information available in early stages of memory that has not yet been fully consolidated 
into LTM proper. Tatler et al. (2003) also proposed a fairly rapid accumulation of more 
abstract information. It was suggested that in the earlier stages of scene viewing, the gist 
of the scene would be extracted (i.e. the overall meaning of the scene), as would the 
spatial layout (the way in which the objects are arranged within the scene), while other 
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object details would be extracted later on in viewing. This was supported by their study, 
with participants showing high performance levels regarding the gist of scene after only 
a second of viewing time, and spatial information after 2 seconds. The object details, 
such as shape, colour, presence and relative distance, are added later, with different time 
courses of accumulation being shown for the individual properties (Tatler, Gilchrist and 
Land, 2005). Thus, while the overall representation is proposed to be more abstract than 
strictly visual, the representations still contain a large amount of detail about the objects 
within the scene. 
1.4.2 Memory for action. The theories of visual representation outlined above 
do not give much consideration to the possible effects of action on the representation 
construction. However, other theories take a much stronger view on the influence of 
action on memory representations. In particular, Glenberg (1997) proposes an embodied 
view of memory which has similarities with the proposals made by simulated action 
theories. Just as perception is proposed to have evolved in order to serve action (e.g., 
Bridgeman and Tseng, 2011), so Glenberg (1997) proposes that memory storage 
developed in order to perform the same task. This is a strongly embodied view; 
Glenberg suggests that we perceive the world in terms of how we can act on it, and 
categorise objects in terms of how they can be used to complete a goal. In memory, 
these perceptions, or patterns of possible action, are meshed together with patterns 
based on our previous experience. Thus, when perceiving an object, we receive 
information about how we can act with it directly from the environment (in terms of 
how we individually are able to act with the object), but we also access patterns of 
previous interaction with that object, which provides the information that we cannot 
directly access from the environment. Together, these lead to a meshed 
conceptualisation, from which the overall meaning of the object arises, but importantly, 
this meaning is strongly in terms of serving action. When we must recall information, or 
decide on actions we wish to perform, then our perception of the environment must be 
suppressed, by averting our gaze from any potential stimulation taken directly from our 
surroundings, and allowing our stored patterns of previous interaction to be accessed 
(e.g., Glenberg, Schroeder and Robertson, 1998). 
This rather constrained view of memory as being only for action has been questioned, 
however. Koriat and Goldsmith (1997) suggest that while Glenberg’s (1997) theory 
addresses memory in the context of action, it is not able to account for the whole 
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structure of memory, with some aspects unable to account for memory phenomena any 
better than previously existing explanations. The theory is best able to cope with more 
implicit and procedural aspects of memory, i.e. those that are perhaps most closely 
concerned with supporting object interaction. Wilson (2002) also regards Glenberg’s 
(1997) theory as too extreme, as it suggests that objects should be perceived entirely in 
terms of how we could use them - their functional relevance - rather than as they 
actually are. However, as Wilson (2002) points out, we are able to encode visual events 
that we cannot interact with, and recall items that must be recognised based on their 
visual appearance rather than how we can interact with them (e.g., faces). Thus, not all 
perception, and so not all encoding, is just for action; we can engage in perception in 
order to achieve goals that are not linked to an immediate action response. Furthermore, 
Wilson (2002) makes the point that restricting encoding to only the information 
necessary for the current task is too strict, and does not allow for the flexibility we can 
show when dealing with objects. She reasons that if we only encode objects in terms of 
how we have used them in the past, this would restrict our flexibility if we needed to 
use the item in a novel way. Indeed, if memory is for action, then it might better serve 
action by allowing information to be stored without prior commitment to a particular 
use. According to Wilson (2002), our representations are purpose-neutral, containing 
information beyond that which is required for the present task. This is in line with the 
findings of Hollingworth and colleagues, where information is accumulated over 
multiple fixations, but without any particular bias towards a type of information. Thus, 
representations can contain both relevant and irrelevant information about objects and 
scenes, potentially allowing us greater flexibility in interactions. 
However, while Glenberg’s (1997) theory is less able to account for all the 
phenomena of memory, it may be that the presence of action will affect the way 
representations are formed. As noted, the initial studies into the representations were not 
particularly active tasks, merely requiring participants to view scenes with no intent to 
interact with them. However, if action were introduced, then certain items would be 
likely to become more relevant to the task, similar to the TEC’s (Hommel et al., 2001) 
idea of intentional weighting. Similarly, in studies examining eye movements during 
different tasks, it is clear that the task constraints affect how people direct their gaze. 
Given the link between fixation and memory accumulation shown in Hollingworth and 
others’ studies, it might be expected that some influence of task would influence the 
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construction of the representation. Indeed, several studies show that task-relevant 
objects are recalled better than those that are task-irrelevant (e.g., Castelhano and 
Henderson, 2005; Williams, Henderson and Zacks, 2005). Both studies used a standard 
memorisation task where participants viewed arrays or scenes, in which certain objects 
were task-defined targets, whereas others were distractors. There is some debate, 
however, as to how the task more specifically affects the representation; that is, whether 
it is simply via the increased number of fixations on relevant objects, or if these task 
relevant objects are processed in a fundamentally different manner. For example, 
Hollingworth (e.g., Hollingworth, 2009; Hollingworth, 2012) suggests that while the 
task may lead to a prioritisation of relevant objects in terms of the number of fixations 
they receive, all fixations on objects will result in the extraction of the same amounts of 
information, regardless of whether the item fixated is relevant or not. In contrast, Võ 
and Wolfe (2012), and Tatler and Tatler (2013) propose that the task also influences 
how much information is taken from fixations on task-relevant objects, so that the 
eventual representation is much more specific to the demands of the current task. For 
example, Võ and Wolfe (2012) reported that searching for a target object was only 
benefitted by the object having been fixated during an earlier search for it. If it had been 
fixated in the course of an earlier memory task where it was not the target, then no 
benefit for subsequent search was found. Similarly, Tatler and Tatler (2013) found that 
different task instructions affected the memory performance on the same set of objects. 
When fixation numbers and memory performance were compared across task relevant 
and irrelevant objects, it was found that for a given number of fixations, memory for 
task relevant objects was significantly better, indicating that the number of fixations 
alone did not determine what information was encoded. Rather, the task setting itself 
has an influence on how much information is extracted during these fixations. 
While these studies manipulated the task participants performed, they did not 
involve any instruction for the participants to act with the objects. From the studies on 
action influencing perception reviewed above, it is clear that we can consider different 
stages of action that might influence attention, and thus subsequent memory for scenes 
and objects. Although there are fewer studies in this area, it is possible to find 
experiments which have investigated the influence of the potential and preparation for 
action on the representations, and how the execution of a task can influence memory 
both during and after the action. 
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1.5 Action Influencing Memory Representations 
1.5.1 Influence of the potential for action on memory representations. 
Studies investigating the influence of placing the hands close to object displays have 
also investigated the effect on memory representations. As mentioned, the influence of 
the hands has been shown to have a functional link, increasing attention in order to aid 
possible future actions, but does not necessarily depend on an intention to act with the 
objects in question. Thus, we can differentiate it from the investigations into the effect 
of task mentioned above; participants do not directly interact with the objects, but they 
are perhaps more engaged with the display than when simply viewing the objects to 
memorise them.  
In terms of memory, if the presence of the hands biases attention towards 
proximal objects, then this increased attention might be expected to influence memory 
in favour of these nearby objects, perhaps at the expense of more distant items. 
However, the results of these studies have been rather mixed in their support of an 
action influence from proximal hands. Tseng and Bridgeman (2011) found that the 
presence of the hands increased participants VWM capacity, enabling them to hold 
more items in shorter term store. Studies looking at the hands’ influence over longer 
time scales actually suggest a less facilitative outcome. Davoli, Brockmole and Goujon 
(2012) used an implicit memory test in the context of a visual search task, to determine 
if participants would show greater improvement in finding targets in repeated scenes 
when the hands were proximal to the screen. Instead, long term memory for the items 
was not improved by the presence of the hands compared to the hands absent condition. 
Furthermore, memory was worsened in the proximal hand condition if the repeated 
scenes changed their details (e.g., colour) but not the overall structure (i.e. spatial 
layout). Davoli et al. (2012) suggested that the presence of the hands led to a bias 
towards details, and a reduction in extracting common information. This would be in 
line with previous suggestions regarding the hands: if objects near the hands are 
potentially manipulable, then attention to their details is more useful to inform the later 
actions. Thus, this leads to memory being similarly biased towards item details when 
the hands are present, possibly biasing the representation to later action. 
1.5.2 Influence of action preparation on memory representations. Similar to 
the logic behind the proximal hand studies, and the investigations into on-line effects, it 
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might be expected that the preparation of an action will lead to attention being biased 
towards the task relevant items and features, and so a stronger representation of such 
objects in the memory representation. However, there are very few studies that have 
used such a manipulation. Vishton et al. (2007) investigated how action planning might 
influence perception of visual illusions, and in particular how strongly the illusion was 
perceived. The planning of the action was found to reduce the strength of the illusion in 
an equivalent manner to actually carrying out the action, and this effect continued to 
persist after the illusion was removed, and participants were recalling the test items for a 
later judgement. Thus, there is some evidence that action planning can affect object 
representation, but this area is currently lacking in studies. 
1.5.3 Influence of action execution on memory representations. In 
considering the influence actually performing actions might have on the memory 
representations we form, it is important to make a further distinction here. There are 
studies indicating that we rely on memory representations during the task being carried 
out; and those that investigate how the representation is affected after the task has been 
completed. The use of memory during a task is itself task dependent. Typically, the 
actor can rely on the information they require being directly available to them in the 
external world, that is, using the world as an outside memory store (similar to O’Regan 
and Noe’s (2001) suggestion). As a result, the representations may be fairly sparse in 
comparison to a task that is solely a memory test. However, the circumstances of the 
task may change how the actor relies on memory and vision. If visual information is 
degraded in some way, for example, then memory may provide a more reliable source. 
Even if there is not such a drastic change to the visual information, in a larger 
environment, not all items will be within view at any one time. As a result, memory will 
be required to inform the direction of saccades to locate the next relevant object for the 
task. There are various real world studies that have shown memory and vision work 
together during a task, each acting to supply information when the other process may be 
less reliable. 
In particular, several of these real world studies show that spatial information 
regarding the location of objects is typically preserved. Land et al. (1999) found that 
participants making tea were able to find the next required object more easily if they 
had previously fixated it. Hayhoe et al. (2003) also note that participants would scan the 
work area before beginning a task, which they suggest indicates the acquisition of a 
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rough scene representation for guiding subsequent fixations (although this could equally 
indicate a more aimless scanning of the scene during free time in the task).  
Studies by Karn and Hayhoe (2000) and Aivar, Hayhoe, Chizk and Mruczec 
(2005) examined the involvement of memory during a more controlled, lab based task. 
Here, a block copying paradigm was used, in which participants recreated a displayed 
pattern of coloured blocks by selecting the appropriate items and arranging them in the 
correct pattern. However, changes to the overall display were made at certain points, by 
removing a target block from the display during the preceding display. Subsequent 
saccades to the target had to be made without a visual guide. In both cases, participants 
made fixations to the location of the missing block, and were often unaware of the 
change being made, indicating that the spatial information was being retained across the 
saccades to inform the eye movements to the targets. When visual information was 
removed or changed, the representation of the scene supplied the correct information 
required to allow for the task to be completed. Brouwer and Knill (2007) added to this 
by showing that participants would use both direct visual information and stored spatial 
information in the course of a task, but vary the amount by which each part contributed 
to the process. When the location of future targets was changed, participants would still 
show a bias towards guiding their saccades to the remembered location. This bias was 
increased when the contrast of the target information was decreased, indicating that it is 
normal for us to use both the immediate visual information and the spatial 
representations, and use whichever source of information is most reliable at that point. 
Beyond spatial memory, there is evidence that featural information specific to 
the task may be prioritised during the action. This has been shown clearly in studies by 
Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan (2003), and Droll and Hayhoe (2007). In both 
studies, participants performed a virtual reality block-sorting task, where blocks had to 
be sorted onto particular conveyor belts, depending on their properties, and the rules the 
participants had been given. In Triesch et al.’s (2003) study, the height of the blocks 
determined where blocks were placed, and the rules determined when in the task this 
feature was relevant; that is, whether it informed the block selection, informed both 
selection and set-down, or was irrelevant to both parts of the task. On a subset of trials, 
the size of the block being used was changed while it was handled. Change detection 
was dependent on the relevance of the changing feature to the task. When it was 
irrelevant to both pick-up and put-down, detection was low. Participants were better at 
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detecting the change when it was made to a feature which informed the pick-up stage, 
but performed the best when the changing feature was relevant to both pick-up and put-
down. Thus, while there is some advantage in recall for a relevant feature that was 
involved in the task at some stage, when the feature is known to be relevant to the 
upcoming stage, then it is preferentially maintained in memory. Task relevance and the 
ongoing dynamics of the task therefore both influence the task representations. Droll 
and Hayhoe (2007) used different features of the blocks, such as colour, size and 
texture, and varied the predictability of the sorting cue. Thus, the cue to pick-up the 
object could always be the same as the set-down condition; different, but predictable, or 
different and unpredictable. Examining re-fixations on the blocks when they were being 
carried to the put-down location showed that participants were less likely to make these 
re-fixations when the pick-up and put-down cues were the same, but when the put-down 
cue was unpredictable, re-fixations were much more common. This was so even if the 
pick-up cue was the same as the put-down cue. Thus, both studies demonstrate that the 
on-going task demands determine what information is retained. If participants are aware 
it will still be useful to the later part of the task, they will maintain it in their 
representation, and so will be able to notice changes to this feature. However, if they 
cannot be certain this feature will still be informative in the later task, the information 
will not be stored, but sampled from the environment when needed. These findings 
imply that the representations we form during tasks contain spatial information to aid 
locating items, but that more detailed information may only be retained based on the 
task requirements. 
Studies such as Williams et al. (2005) and Tatler and Tatler (2013) have shown 
an influence of task on memory tested after the task is completed, although they do not 
involve direct interaction with the objects. Other studies have investigated how 
representations are influenced after task completion, when participants have been 
instructed to interact with the objects. As found in the studies into representations 
during action, spatial information appears to be the most affected by prior interaction, 
across several different manipulations. For example, Thomas, Davoli and Brockmole 
(2013) tested participants’ memory for the environment and position of objects within 
it, by comparing their recall of positioning and layout after they had looked at the 
objects without touching them, or interacted with them as they learnt. Thomas et al. 
(2013) found that interacting with the objects led to participants recalling them as closer 
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together or within smaller environmental boundaries than if they had not interacted. 
This was interpreted in terms of the action-specific view, that by interacting 
successfully with the objects, they were represented as closer in memory, to encourage 
future interactions.  
Interestingly, recent suggestions have been made that influences on perception 
due to action-specific effects (see e.g., Witt, 2011) are in fact all based in memory, so 
that our ability to interact successfully with the world actually influences how we recall 
the items, rather than how we perceive them. Cooper, Sterling, Bacon and Bridgeman 
(2012) found that after participants had made successful throws of a marble into a 
target, they only judged the hole to be bigger when they were making the judgement 
without the visual stimulus of the hole being present. This suggests that the memory 
representations of size can be affected in a post-hoc manner, after an action has been 
completed successfully. Cooper et al. (2012) further suggest that other studies in the 
action specific perception literature may actually indicate an effect on memory 
representation. While it is not yet clear whether all such effects are located in memory 
Cooper et al. (2012) certainly provide evidence that the memory representations can be 
affected by the participants’ ability.  
Further evidence for an influence of active tasks on subsequent memory 
representations was shown by Plancher, Barra, Orriols and Piolino (2013), using a 
virtual reality task. This manipulated how much interaction occurred with the virtual 
environment, by placing participants in a driving simulator, where they were either a 
passive passenger; a passenger, but engaged in planning the route, or the driver, 
following a previously fixed route. Both the planning and the interaction conditions 
were associated with improvements in participants’ spatial memories, but not their 
factual memories. Plancher et al. (2013) suggest that the participant’s active control of 
the car aided the encoding of information which was connected to motion. In this case, 
the spatial information benefited from the movement they experienced, and so was 
better recalled at retrieval. This increased the specificity of the trace and so benefitted 
recall. Factual information was not recalled as well in the active condition, possibly 
because the required motor control for the task was an extra load on the attentional 
resources, impairing memory for this type of information. The spatial information was 
not affected in the same way due to being more directly and automatically encoded 
during the participants’ movements through the environment. The use of a virtual reality 
43 
 
task in Plancher et al.’s (2013) study enabled a more controlled look at how action 
could affect memory in a wider environment. However, this was not a fully immersive 
event, as participants were not present in the virtual world, but only viewing on a 
screen. Furthermore, there was no interaction with actual objects in the scenes. Tatler, 
Hirose, Finnegan et al. (2013) provided further evidence for action influencing memory 
in a real-world task where participants were eye-tracked as they either made cups of tea, 
or only watched first person perspective videos of tea being made. Memory for the 
objects involved indicated that active manipulation of the objects led to better memory 
for their spatial information, again suggesting a prioritisation of position information 
that persists beyond the end of the task. 
The studies reviewed here show clearly that action continues to influence 
memory representations throughout all its stages. Action cannot be ignored when 
considering visual representations, as they are often created in the service of an actual 
task. Furthermore, it seems that findings from studies of how action affects on-line 
perception may apply when examining off-line representations. Although there has so 
far been less consideration of this area, it seems that it would be interesting to use 
adaptations of some of the action-perception paradigms in considering further how 
memory might be affected. 
1.6 Perception Influencing Memory Representations for Action 
Just as there is evidence for action-perception link influencing the 
representations we form, there is also work on whether our initial perception of an 
object can influence the action performed later, when the object itself is no longer 
visually present. This forms a smaller part of the literature on affordances, with fewer 
studies focusing on specific conditions under which these effects occur, and instead 
determining which affordance effects will persist in memory. It is still an important area 
to be considered, as it provides off-line evidence for the perception-influencing-action 
side of the perception-action link, just as the previous section shows how action can 
influence perception without visual stimuli physically present. 
The main importance of this area is that it provides more information on how the 
actions associated with objects are stored. In line with the original proposals of Tucker 
and colleagues, and the TEC’s common-coding principles, the action information is 
equivalent to the perceptual information, and so should be part of the object 
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representation. As a result, even brief viewing will activate this information, and should 
allow affordance effects to persist after the object stimulus has been removed. Indeed, if 
this is not the case, and affordance effects are absent under memory conditions, then this 
may suggest that the action information is the result of purely on-line processing, 
arising from the immediate processing of the visual stimulus by areas of the brain 
responsible for detecting affordances (e.g., the dorsal stream, Goodale and Humphrey, 
1998). Thus, it is important to the proposals of these theories that an influence of 
affordance be found when the visual stimulus is no longer available.  
Some early evidence from Tucker and Ellis (2001) suggested that affordance 
effects may be restricted to on-line processing, when it showed that the strength of the 
affordance effect decayed over time after the visual object was removed. This finding 
implies that the effects were transient, and therefore could indicate a separation between 
visual representations and action information which would go against the idea of 
common representations containing both action and feature information. 
However, later studies have shown that this is not the case. Tucker and Ellis 
(2004) used grip micro-affordances to examine how the absence of visual stimulus 
would affect the development of the effect. The standard affordance effect (faster 
execution of responses when the grip matched the size of the target object) was found 
both when the stimulus remained visible, and when it was presented for only a brief 
time period. The authors suggested that the difference between the 2004 and 2001 study 
came about because only in the later study were participants required to maintain a 
mental image of the stimulus, in order to select the right response. In their 2001 study, 
Tucker and Ellis used a Go/No-Go paradigm, where the nature of the task meant there 
was no need to maintain the object in memory. Thus, action associated effects could 
still arise and affect on-going action, despite the stimulus no longer being physically 
present. 
Derbyshire, Ellis and Tucker (2006) further extended these findings by using 
different aspects of the affordance effect: grip compatibility, as in Tucker and Ellis’ 
(2004) study, and the handle orientation of the target object. Again, it was found that 
grip compatibility effects would still emerge when responding to the mental image of an 
object, but the effects were absent in the handle orientation condition. To account for 
these findings, Derbyshire et al. (2006) suggested that this difference comes from the 
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different natures of the two properties used. Grip compatibility relates to the size of the 
object, and so is an invariant object property which will always occur in that way, with 
that object (e.g., grapes will always be small, and compatible with precision grips). 
Handle orientation, on the other hand, will depend on the way the object has been 
placed for that particular occasion. Derbyshire et al. (2006) propose that properties such 
as size are ‘intrinsic’, and so stored in the representation of the object, while orientation 
is ‘extrinsic’, and depend on the situation, and the viewer’s position relative to the 
object. Thus, these properties must be taken directly from the environment. Both these 
studies provide evidence that the action information is stored along with the visual 
information relating to objects, in a shared representation. Affordances do not merely 
arise on-line, during the action execution, but are activated when we recall or visualise 
objects in order to carry out a task. Of course, it is very rare that we would ever carry 
out a real action on an object that we could not see, and Tucker and Ellis (2001) suggest 
that there will be other on-line effects throughout the course of a real action, but 
evidence for affordance effects persisting in memory indicates that they may be 
involved in the earlier stages of action planning.  
Similar to the affordance effect, the Simon effect has been found to persist in 
memory. Studies by Tlauka and McKenna (1998) and Hommel (2002) found that the 
location of the stimulus objects still facilitated the production of responses when 
participants were retrieving the information from memory. In these studies, it is 
suggested that the spatial information is automatically integrated with the feature 
information, and the retrieval of the information necessary for the response leads to the 
reactivation of the spatial information alongside it. It is interesting to link these findings 
to higher-level memory studies involving real world tasks, where spatial information is 
also maintained in the memory. Under memory conditions, object location is one of the 
most important pieces of information to retain, to guide attention back to an object 
currently out of sight. Indeed, Hommel (2002) suggests that the maintenance of spatial 
information regarding objects allows actors to continue planning actions towards the 
items before they are fixated again. However, an interesting difference was observed: 
when conducted with the stimulus still present, many studies have shown that the Simon 
effect will decay over time (e.g., Eimer, Hommel and Prinz, 1995). In Hommel’s (2002) 
memory study, the effect instead strengthened over time. Other studies have confirmed 
this finding (e.g., Zhang and Johnson, 2004), which seems to indicate a different 
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process involved in the Simon effect under memory conditions. It remains unclear 
whether memory-based Simon effects will behave differently to visual versions of the 
effect in other ways, but these studies do again show that action processes can be 
activated from recalled information in an objects representation. 
1.7 Object Properties 
The previous sections have considered the interactions between action and 
perception, and within these areas, the findings have been tested and demonstrated with 
the use of objects, both realistic, or created for the purpose of the study. Frequently, 
these effects have been shown not only on the object as a whole, but its individual 
properties. The definition of object properties has varied depending on its context, but 
for the purposes of this thesis, the properties of objects are considered to be their 
tangible features, which can be easily quantified. This is in contrast to the more 
Gibsonian ideas of affordances and properties, where aspects such as ‘sit-ability’ are 
proposed. Thus, object properties include aspects such as the colour, shape, size, 
position, orientation and weight. 
This idea of object properties as separable aspects is important to many of the 
studies presented in the earlier sections, where there is a frequent assumption that the 
features are separate from each other, and so can be used as individual measures of 
perception (when action contexts are manipulated), or as manipulated variables 
themselves (as in affordance studies where the different properties attended are cues to 
the response). These assumptions show two aspects of object properties which need to 
be considered when they are used in these ways. First, are the individual object 
properties truly separate, and how far does this separation go? And secondly, if they are 
independent, are they equivalent? For both these considerations, the studies presented 
above tend to make the assumption that object properties are both largely independent, 
and non-equivalent. In this section, the evidence for these views is considered. 
How independent properties are has been explored most thoroughly in the memory 
literature. Studies have been conducted to determine whether object information is 
stored in memory as object-based representations, where memory capacity is limited by 
the number of complete objects that are stored; or feature-based representations, where 
it is individual object properties that limit the memory capacity.  
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Kahneman, Treisman and Gibbs (1992) first proposed the idea of object files, in 
which separate object properties were bound into one file to represent a particular 
object. This idea was highly influential; the event files of the TEC (Hommel et al., 
2001) are similar to object files, with the addition of action information. Irwin (e.g., 
1992; Irwin and Andrews, 1996) proposed that the object file was the unit of storage in 
visual short-term memory, and that it was the number of objects that limited memory 
capacity, rather than the number of features within each object. Further research 
supported this view e.g., Luck and Vogel (1997) found that visual memory was limited 
to 3-4 items, but that increasing the number of relevant features that defined these 
objects did not reduce memory performance. Based on these findings, it would appear 
that objects are stored in memory as integrated units. 
However, Wheeler and Treisman (2002) found evidence to support the 
alternative view of feature-based memory. In their study, they failed to replicate the 
findings of Luck and Vogel (1997), and instead found that memory performance was 
limited by the number of features, not objects. It was suggested that it was the binding 
information that was vulnerable to decay, and that different paradigms resulted in 
findings that could either support or contradict the idea of object-based representations. 
Thus, studies in which there was less competition for attentional resources meant that 
binding between object features could be maintained, providing evidence for object-
based representations, as shown by Luck and Vogel (1997). In studies where there was 
more attentional competition, the binding mechanism decayed, and so provided 
evidence that object memory was feature-based. Wheeler and Treisman (2002) 
suggested that object features were stored in dimension-specific caches, within which 
there is a limited capacity (so that a large range of colour values might fill the colour 
feature store), but that there is no competition between these stores (i.e. many colour 
values would not affect the capacity in the shape feature store). Binding occurs by a 
separate mechanism, and the integration of the features is particularly vulnerable to 
interference from distractors. 
There are also several studies showing that not all object information is 
necessarily encoded e.g., Xu (2002a), found participants were worse at recalling 
features if they occurred on the same object, but on different parts of the object. Fougnie 
and Alvarez (2011) found that participants forgot features of objects independently of 
other features of the same object. For example, if participants failed to recall the colour 
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of an object, this did not predict that they would fail to recall the objects’ orientation. 
However, this was only so for those object properties that were separable, or supported 
by different neural populations. Thus, while the properties of colour and orientation 
were independent, height and width, which draw on overlapping groups of neurons, did 
not fail in memory independently of one another. 
In contrast to the fairly strong evidence for very independent properties, there 
are other studies which challenge the idea of pure feature-based representations, as this 
approach is not able to account for all memory findings either. In particular, there is 
strong evidence that it is easier for participants to recall multiple features if they are 
grouped into a single object, rather than across several different objects (e.g., Olson and 
Jiang, 2002; Xu, 2002b). Based on these and other findings, Brady, Conkle and Alvarez 
(2011) proposed a model of short-term memory which incorporated both object and 
feature based characteristics in the representations. In this, the unit of visual memory is 
a hierarchical structured feature bundle. At the lowest level, individual object properties 
are maintained by independent neural populations (although some properties are 
integral, and so share neural groups), while at the top level, the features are incorporated 
into the object representation. Memory for the individual properties can fail 
independently, but there is still an advantage for recalling features as part of a single 
object, as features that are part of different objects will require another feature bundle to 
be created, which increases the demands on memory, and so leads to the encoding cost. 
Support for this proposal has been shown by Fougnie, Cormiea and Alvarez (2013), 
who found evidence for both a same object benefit (participants could more easily recall 
10 features in 5 objects than the same 10 features across 10 objects), and independent 
recall of the features (recall performance for one feature could not predict recall for 
another feature of the same object). Thus, it seems that object properties are maintained 
in memory with a level of independence. These findings therefore match with 
suggestions from other related areas, in which there is similar evidence for object 
properties being differentially affected by the situation in which they are searched for, 
or encoded. 
While most of the earlier studies of memory for object properties have 
concentrated on sparse memory displays of simple coloured shapes. Other studies have 
shown that this independence is present in the representations we form of real-world 
objects and scenes, despite the higher levels of familiarity and stored knowledge 
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associated with such items compared to simpler displays. Tatler et al. (2003) showed 
that when gathering information about a scene, the gist and spatial information is 
extracted quickly, while information about more specific object properties are acquired 
over several further seconds. Furthermore, this acquisition time varied across the 
properties, with colour assimilation apparently completed after 4 seconds, while shape 
and presence information was not entirely complete by 10 seconds. Tatler et al. (2005) 
added more detail to these findings by showing that the individual properties had 
different time scales not only for acquisition but also for their stability. While some 
properties were accumulated over multiple fixations to the object, others could be 
acquired without a direct fixation on the object. Similarly, some properties were 
maintained stably over time when the scene was recalled, but others decayed rapidly 
over the course of several seconds. Brady, Konkle, Alvarez and Oliva (2013) examined 
the independence of real-world object properties across longer time scales. In their 
studies, they found, once again that certain properties were forgotten more rapidly than 
others. At shorter delays, properties were more likely to be recalled or forgotten 
together, but this decreased at the longer delay periods, suggesting that the initial 
presentation of all the features in one object aids recall at first, but that the properties are 
essentially independent, and so can be recalled or forgotten separately from one another. 
Thus, the findings originally shown in more lab-based paradigms with less realistic 
stimuli are still found when real-world objects and more complex scenes are used. 
While there are advantages to memory if properties are presented within the same 
object, the individual properties have their own time courses.  
The second assumption of many of the previous studies is that the individual 
properties are not equivalent. Studies of action influencing perception have 
demonstrated how particular properties can be facilitated (or not) by a prepared action 
(e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007). On the other side of the perception-action loop, attention to 
different property cues can influence whether the affordance effect is present in the 
action response (e.g., Tipper et al., 2006).These findings all show that object properties 
are not identical in the way they are processed, although this variation could be due 
either to the nature of the properties themselves, or the current situations of the task.  
A division that suggests properties are non-equivalent was proposed by Glover 
(2004), in the context of the planning-control model. For this, properties are divided 
into spatial and non-spatial groups. Spatial properties include the size, shape and 
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orientation of the object, while the non-spatial properties include the object’s weight. 
During the planning stage of an action, both property types are relevant, to allow for 
processes such as the selection of a target, and the grip type necessary to deal with it. 
During the control stage, when the action is executed, only information relating to the 
spatial properties is required. Thus, spatial properties here are those that can be 
determined visually, and are thus available during the execution of the task. Information 
about non-spatial properties comes more from stored information and previous 
experience. Derbyshire et al. (2006) drew on a similar idea in considering intrinsic vs. 
extrinsic object properties, considered in the previous section. According to their 
findings, intrinsic properties (e.g., shape) can be maintained in the representation, as 
they will not change, but extrinsic properties (e.g., handle orientation) do not have an 
unchanging value, and so are not maintained as a part of the representation. 
Jeannerod (1994; 1997) suggested a more flexible division of properties based 
on whether they are typically required for either pragmatic or semantic representations. 
Pragmatic representations are constructed when interacting with the objects. In 
particular, the task relevance of the object is important, and how this will affect the way 
in which the actor interacts with and uses the object. Semantic representations are used 
to create a higher order representation of the scene, in which the different properties are 
bound together to create a meaningful entity overall. Importantly, Jeannerod (1997) 
further states that most properties are not only used in constructing one representation; 
rather, they are both semantically and pragmatically relevant, depending on the 
situation. Very few properties are purely only in one category: Jeannerod (1997) 
suggests that colour is a purely semantic property, while weight is a purely pragmatic 
property, but all others may exist on a continuum between the extremes. Their 
placement on this scale may depend on the particular task or situation, and the relevance 
of the property to that situation. 
In line with Jeannerod’s proposal, in the context of the areas previously 
discussed, the importance of object properties has largely been in terms of their task 
relevance. Indeed, the weighting process suggested in the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001) 
operates in terms of how relevant a feature is to the current event, and there are several 
studies which provide evidence for this (e.g., Bekkering and Neggers, 2002; Fagioli et 
al., 2007). Bekkering and Neggers (2002) study is particularly relevant in terms of the 
property types. While search for orientation defined targets is speeded by grasping, 
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colour defined targets do not receive this bias. As a more strongly visual property, 
colour is not relevant to the task of grasping, and is not benefitted by the preparation of 
the gesture. Similarly, in studies of object affordances, Tipper et al. (2006) showed that 
attending to colour did not prime actions in the same way that attention to shape did 
(although these findings may be confounded with the type of gesture employed when 
responding, as suggested by Bub and Masson, 2006; 2010). Also, in memory studies it 
has been shown that it is the relevant object properties that are best recalled both during 
and after the task (e.g., Triesch et al., 2003; Tatler et al., 2013). From these studies, it is 
clear that object properties are not equal. Even without a specific task instruction, they 
are accumulated and held over different time periods, and stored independently of one 
another. When task constraints are introduced, there is evidence to suggest that this will 
also affect how they are processed and stored. Object properties therefore provide a way 
of measuring the influence of action and perception on the object representations we 
construct, with relevant properties fixated or maintained while irrelevant ones are 
ignored, or decay. Within this thesis, object properties will be used to both manipulate 
and measure the influence of action on memory representations.  
1.8 Current research 
The research presented in this thesis further investigates the interaction between 
perception and action, following the grounded cognition proposal that the two processes 
are equivalent, and closely linked, each able to influence the other via intentional or 
attentional weighting. In particular, we seek to address the areas in which there is little 
investigation, namely determining the influence of both action and perception on the 
resulting memory representations, or actions performed on the basis of these 
representations.  
The TEC is used as a framework to design and interpret these studies, due to its 
specific focus on how both perception and action can interact. The nature of the TEC is 
that it is a cognitive model, rather than an ecological one, and therefore incorporates the 
use of internal representations. The situational weighting, which is a central component 
of the theory, is suggested to arise from the stored memories of previous encounters 
with objects in particular task settings (Hommel et al., 2001). Thus, it is consistent with 
the model that weighting of memory representations should be possible, and 
measurable. Such weighting, particularly in situations where there is a potential for 
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action, should occur in order to prepare the observer for possible upcoming actions, 
despite the fact the objects are currently not in view. If no such off-line biases are 
present, then it may suggest that such weighting of the representations is only present 
on-line, and that memory representations are more in line with the purpose-neutral 
construction proposed by Wilson (2002).  
In addressing this problem, we have taken a slightly different approach for the 
two sides of the action-perception loop, based on the information already established by 
previous studies. For the perception-influencing-action affordance effects, there is 
research to show that the effect can be found when participants must recall the presented 
object in order to make their response. However, there is no further investigation into 
the boundary conditions that may influence this effect; that is, the context which might 
affect the situational weighting of the constructed representation. This, then, is our main 
focus in investigating this side of the loop. 
In contrast, for the investigations of action-influencing-perception and memory, 
there is a little more work, found in studies which have examined the influence of active 
tasks on the resulting memory. However, there is almost no work on how the simple 
preparation of action can affect the representation, in contrast to the large body of work 
showing how action preparation can affect perception in visual search tasks, for 
example. Again, finding evidence for action preparation influencing the construction of 
the representation would be important for establishing that situational weighting affects 
off-line event codes, but it would also provide insight into the way in which the realism 
of the situation might affect construction. That is, will the presence of action preparation 
lead to an influence on memory similar to that found when participants are able to 
directly interact with the objects, or will the absence of this direct interaction result in 
weaker situational weighting of the resulting representation? Investigating this 
particular aspect of action preparation on perception therefore forms the main focus of 
the studies conducted to investigate this side of the loop. 
The structure of the present thesis is therefore to concentrate on the two sides of 
the action-perception loop in turn (although based on the findings and the natures of the 
experiments, rather more studies are conducted to investigate the influence of action on 
perception and memory than the affordance studies). In order to address these issues, 
the studies incorporate the idea that object properties may be processed and encoded 
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differently from one another. As outlined in the final section of the literature review 
above, there is much evidence to suggest that object properties are (relatively) 
independent of one another, and may be qualitatively different as well, in terms of their 
relevance to different aspects of a task. Object properties are also central in earlier 
research, acting as attentional cues, or perceptual measures in both affordance and 
search studies. Furthermore, much of the research which has established them as 
separately stored aspects of objects has been conducted in the context of memory. Thus, 
there is good reason to expect that, if memories or actions are affected by the task 
context, the object properties will be able to reflect this influence. In the following 
studies, therefore, object properties are used both as cues to action, and measures of 
actions influence. The object properties selected to be used are those which are judged 
to be either particularly related to either action or particularly unrelated to action (thus 
only primarily relevant to perception). 
In the majority of the studies presented, we also employ eye-tracking as a 
measure of on-line perceptual behaviour, although we are largely interested in the 
influences on memory. Eye movement data is vital, however: given the link between 
fixations and memory, it is important to know where participants are looking during a 
task. Not only does this allow for us to determine if the manipulations are influencing 
the initial perception of a scene, it also allows for the removal of non-fixated objects 
from the subsequent analyses. 
 Figure 1.6 presents a diagram of the TEC, adapted to incorporate the goals of 
the thesis. The diagram shows that both action and perception are able to influence the 
formation of the memory representation, and so may be affected by the representation 
formed (the specific event file for the task). That is, the preparation of an action may 
drive attention to certain relevant items in a scene, while the focus of attention on 
particular object features may prime the performance of the actions required to act with 
an object. The manipulations of action and perception are predicted to change the way a 
scene or environment is viewed (measured by the recording of eye-movements) and 
represented (measured by tests of recall). Thus, the objects and their features are 
predicted to be prioritised differently within the representations formed, due to the 
influence of the present task or situation. 
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Figure 1.6 Diagram of the TEC’s proposals influenced by the manipulations of 
perception and action in the current thesis 
The initial study of the current thesis examines the influence of perception on 
action in memory conditions, in the context of the affordance effect. Using different 
property cues and response gestures, this study aims to determine if boundary 
conditions will influence off-line affordances in a similar pattern to that shown by on-
line affordance studies. Chapters 3-5 all use the same paradigm, focusing on the 
influence of action preparation on the perception and memory for a scene. As the 
studies focused on memory, it was thought important to address both the input and 
output processes of memory, encoding and retrieval, as it was likely that the 
presentation of an action posture at either of these stages could lead to different effects 
on the recall performance. Thus, Chapter 3 presents a study in which action postures are 
maintained at encoding, while in Chapter 4, action postures are presented at retrieval. In 
Chapter 5, action postures are maintained throughout both stages.  
Given our interest in how the realism of the situation might affect weighting in 
representations, for the final studies of this thesis, the veracity of the experimental 
situations were increased, in order to determine if this would influence the outcomes. 
Thus, Chapters 6 and 7 both present studies located in a real-world environment. In 
Chapter 6, the study is a replication of that in Chapter 3, but with the participants and 
objects sharing the same environment. In Chapter 7, an everyday real-world task is 
used, in which participants directly interacted with the items presented, in order to 
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determine how acting with objects of differing relevance could influence both 
perception and memory. 
The main goal of this thesis, therefore, is to establish further how the bi-
directional link between perception and action may operate under off-line conditions. 
According to various theories of grounded cognition, perception and cognition have 
developed to serve action. There is strong evidence to show this is the case when 
participants are directly observing the objects and items involved in a task. However, it 
is still necessary to determine whether memory representations will also be influenced 
by our goals and intentions, and similarly help to serve our actions. 
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Chapter Two- The influence of the 
potential for action via attention to 
action relevant properties 
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2.1 General Introduction 
The link between perception and action appears bi-directional with each process 
able to influence the other and bias it in favour of a potential action, as expressed by the 
TEC (Hommel et al., 2001). Evidence for the perception-action side of the loop is 
shown by the affordance effect (and its variations), demonstrating that the perception of 
an object can lead to the facilitation of the associated actions. While initial studies of 
this phenomenon suggested that this action activation was automatic, more recent 
findings have suggested there are particular boundary conditions to the effect: 
conditions which must be present in the experiment in order to allow the affordance 
effect to emerge. While not an exhaustive list, earlier studies have suggested that 
conditions such as the participant’s focus of attention (e.g., Tipper et al., 2006), the type 
of response they make, (e.g., Bub and Masson, 2010) and the general task context (e.g., 
Yang and Beilock, 2011) may all be factors in whether the expected effects emerge. 
However, thus far all these effects have been demonstrated in on-line versions of 
the study, where the object remains visible throughout the performance of the task. 
Beyond the initial studies which showed that it was possible to obtain affordance effects 
when recalling the object images, investigations of how boundary conditions might 
affect off-line versions of the affordance effect have been rather lacking. Yet the fact 
that affordance effects will emerge when the visual stimulus has been removed (see, for 
example, Derbyshire et al., 2006) is of importance to the more grounded views of 
cognition, since it indicates that the action information is an integral part of the object 
representation, rather than being generated during on-line perception only. Thus, if the 
representation contains all the necessary information, it seems likely that similar 
boundary conditions will apply when the effects are shown off-line, and it is important 
to investigate this, in order to further demonstrate the inclusion of action information 
into the object representation. 
Two boundary conditions are particularly important to the areas investigated in 
this thesis: the focus of attention (i.e. which object property participants are instructed to 
attend), and the response type (i.e. whether it is a realistic action, or a button press). 
Object properties have been shown to be of particular importance in constructing a 
representation biased in favour of an action, for studies examining both sides of the 
action-perception link. In studies of the action-influencing-perception side of the loop, 
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object properties (and their relevance to action) are used as measures of the influence of 
the action, (i.e. by demonstrating that the relevant object features are prioritised in tasks, 
allowing for faster detection times in search tasks, e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007) but in 
affordance studies, they are used to demonstrate the reverse effect, by influencing the 
production of the action. Earlier studies by Tipper et al. (2006) and Loach, Frischen, 
Bruce and Tsotsos (2008) have shown that when attention is focused on an action 
relevant property (shape or texture) then the affordance effect will emerge: that is, the 
actions made towards the target object will be facilitated in terms of speed of production 
or response accuracy. The effect is absent when attention is on a more visually relevant 
property such as colour. Attention to a property that in some way informs the potential 
actions is enough to activate the action response, and so prime participants for acting 
with this object. However, other studies are less clear as to how important the object 
properties are, particularly when used in conjunction with the second of the two factors: 
the nature of the response. 
Typically, responses to the objects in affordance gestures are simple, abstract 
button presses, (e.g., Ellis and Tucker, 2001; Symes et al., 2005) making them rather 
removed from the natural action that would be performed on a particular object when 
used in the real world. Bub and Masson (2006; 2010) examined the compatibility effect, 
in which participants produced a pantomime gesture in response to stimuli, and found 
that this influenced the emergence of the effect. Gestures compatible with the object 
were facilitated; those that were incompatible were not, indicating that perception of an 
object does not lead to a general facilitation of all actions, but can be specific to the 
actions that are known to be appropriate for the use of the stimulus object. Importantly, 
the property cue used (always colour) seemed to be completely irrelevant to the 
emergence of the effect, in contrast to Tipper et al.’s finding that attending colour 
information is not enough to facilitate action. This may suggest that boundary 
conditions are in some way hierarchical, and the response gesture is a more powerful 
modifier than that of the property cue, but this remains to be confirmed. Indeed, studies 
using more realistic response gestures have suggested that property cue is irrelevant. 
Bub and Masson (2010) compared the emergence of affordance effects cued by the 
object colour for tasks where the response was a button press, and tasks where 
participants produced compatible/incompatible handle grasping gesture. While 
affordances were not seen for colour cued button responses, replicating Tipper et al. 
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(2006), they emerged strongly for colour-cued gesture responses, leading to a 
suggestion that the use of a compatible gesture over-rode the participant’s initial focus 
on a non-action-relevant property. However, this study only demonstrates this using the 
colour cue, therefore leaving unanswered the question of how the effect might emerge if 
the action appropriate response is cued by an action relevant property, such as shape. If 
the realism of the response does supersede the property cue, then the affordance effect 
with such responses should be the same, regardless of the cue used. The use of an 
action-relevant cue might interact with the realistic response gesture, changing the 
affordance effect that is seen. 
There are therefore two main aspects which this first study aims to explore. 
Firstly, the current studies aim to compare and contrast the emergence of affordance 
effects for visible and remembered objects directly. Given that the previous off-line 
affordance studies have shown that action information is indeed part of the 
representation, it is likely that the same patterns of behaviour should result from the use 
of the same cues and responses as has been found for online affordance effects. 
However, at least one affordance effect- the Simon effect- has been found to act 
differently under visual and memory conditions (see e.g., Zhang and Johnson, 2004), so 
that it is possible that different patterns of response will be seen for the two conditions. 
Secondly, and more specifically, these studies will investigate the way in which 
the initial property cue and the subsequent response may interact: that is, how attention 
to an object property, and intention to produce an action might together influence how 
the effect emerges. According to the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001), both these processes 
are means of weighting an object representation in order to prepare it for a task. What is 
less clear from the theory is how intention (to act) and attention (to object properties) 
might work together, under conditions where responses are either less specific (a button 
press) or more specific (a gesture) to the use of an object. 
One possibility is that the goal of acting with the object, shown by asking 
participants to produce a more specific action, will always over-ride the attentional 
focus of the participant. Therefore, when the response is cued by either colour or shape, 
whether or not the effect emerges should be the same, as only the goal intention (the 
action produced as a response) is important for the emergence of the effect. 
Alternatively, the combination of focus on an action-relevant property and a goal 
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towards acting with the object may lead to an interaction, so that the combination of 
both leads to a faster response than when a colour cue and an intention to act are 
combined. 
Experiment 1 uses a paradigm similar to that used by Derbyshire et al. (2006) in 
their investigation of affordances in memory, but the cues used are the action- and 
visually-relevant properties of shape and colour, as in Tipper et al.’s (2006) study. In 
order to compare on-line and off-line versions of the affordance effects, two versions of 
the study were created. One, (the memory version) followed Derbyshire et al.’s (2006) 
original version by presenting the visual stimuli briefly, before removing them from 
sight, requiring the participants to make their response from memory. The on-line 
version of the paradigm simply kept the objects visible throughout the trial. 
For both memory and visual versions of the paradigm, there were two methods 
by which participants could respond, allowing us to compare abstract button press 
responses, and object-specific response gestures, carried out by pantomiming the use of 
an object (as in Bub and Masson’s 2006 compatibility effect study). These pantomime 
gestures are described in more detail in the Methods section, but were selected to be 
either compatible or incompatible with the use of the object stimuli. 
For the simple button press response, the affordance measure needed to be changed. In 
earlier studies (Tipper et al., 2006; Derbyshire et al., 2006), the effect was based on the 
correspondence between handle alignment and the responding hand. However, when 
Derbyshire et al. (2006) used this affordance effect under memory conditions, it was 
found that handle alignment effects were not reliably obtained. Given that a key aim of 
the current study is to investigate affordance effects and boundary conditions in 
memory, the use of an affordance effect which might not be seen under this condition 
was considered unwise. Instead, the Simon effect (e.g., Simon, 1969) was used as the 
affordance effect, as this can be responded to with the more abstract button press 
response and, most importantly for this study, has been shown to persist in memory 
(e.g., Hommel, 2002), thus allowing any effects of cue to be seen. Thus, Experiment 1 
consists of four groups: participants responding to visual stimuli with a button press; 
participants responding to visual stimuli with a pantomime gesture; participants 
responding from memory with a button press, and participants responding from memory 
with a pantomime gesture. 
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Four objects were displayed on the screen per trial. Typically, earlier studies of 
affordance effects have used simpler scenes, with either single objects, or two at most 
when testing for the location-based Simon effect. While these scenes offer interesting 
insights into the tight link between perception and action, it is less clear how the effects 
generalise across more complex settings. In a real world environment, there are often 
several objects in view, from which the target must be selected. While the presentation 
of objects in the current study remains removed from the real world, increasing the 
number of objects makes the display scene more complex, and so allows for 
examination of these effects across a broader range of settings. It is necessary to 
establish whether the effects are robust enough to be maintained when the scene 
increases in complexity. Otherwise, while the effects remain interesting, they may be 
less informative for, and representative of, the link between action and perception in 
more real-world settings.  
It is hypothesised that when participants are cued to respond with a button press 
to objects by focusing on an action relevant property such as shape, this will prime them 
for acting with the object. As a result, the responses made that match this preparation 
for action (i.e. that are congruent with using the object, due to the response location 
matching the target object location) will be produced faster than those that do not match 
(i.e. when response and stimulus are located at opposite sides of the screen). These 
effects will not be present for responses cued by the more visually-relevant cue of 
colour (Tipper et al., 2006). Such effects are expected to be seen in both on-line and off-
line versions of the study, following previous work showing that they persist after the 
visible stimulus is removed (e.g., Hommel, 2002; Derbyshire et al., 2006). In contrast to 
the Simon effect, when participants are cued to respond using a pantomime gesture that 
is compatible with the actual use of the object, then the affordance effect should be 
observed for both property cues, as shown by Bub and Masson (2010). However, it is 
possible that while the compatibility effect will be present for both property cues, it will 
be stronger for the shape-cued gestures, because in that situation, attention to a cue and 
intention to act are in agreement, with both focused on aspects relevant to acting with 
the object (a shape cue and a compatible intention). Again, these effects will be 
investigated for both visual and memory versions of the task. There are no previous 
studies that consider the compatibility effects under memory, and so the present study 
also allows us to examine if object representations constructed under fairly brief 
62 
 
viewing conditions will continue to facilitate the production of specific gestures, as 
shown in on-line studies of the effect. 
The findings from the present study will allow us to consider more closely the 
idea of perception influencing action, by determining what factors, both attentional and 
intentional, are necessary for the influence to emerge. Furthermore, if similar effects are 
found for responses performed under memory conditions, then this will show that the 
representation of an object can be primed by a task and maintained over time, even after 
the removal of the visual object. 
 
2.2 Experiments 1a and 1b: Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 32 University of Dundee students (5 males), aged 18-25. Three 
participants were left-handed (measured by self-report), and with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Half of this group participated in the Simon effect version of the study 
(Experiment 1a), and half in the compatibility effect version (Experiment 1b). Within 
each group of 16, half participated in the visual version of the study, and half in the 
memory version. Participants were recruited using the on-line SONA recruitment 
system, and each received course credits upon completion of the study. 
2.2.2 Apparatus and Materials 
2.2.2.1 Stimuli. The stimulus set was composed of 32 colour photographs of 
individual mugs. Four mug shapes were used, (named tall, round, square and curved). 
Figure 2.1 shows grayscale examples of these four shapes. All mugs were photographed 
against the same uniform background in one orientation. Copies of each photo were 
then reversed in Photoshop, so that a mirror image of each shape was created, producing 
versions that were compatible with both left-handed and right-handed handle grasps. 
Coloured filters were applied to copies of each shape variation, so that each shape was 
represented in each of four colours (red, green, blue and yellow). In total, 8 versions of 
each mug shape were thus created. 
2.2.2.2. Apparatus. Stimulus presentation and response collection was 
controlled by scripts written in MatLab, using the PsychToolBox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
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1997) extension. Participants viewed the stimuli on a monitor (pixel dimensions 1920 x 
1200). The images were displayed at a size of 400x400 pixels. 
 
Figure 2.1. Examples of stimuli shapes used (from left to right, shapes defined 
as tall, round, square and curved) 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were first given an association to learn between a cue (colour/shape) 
and a response. In Experiment 1a the response was to press a particular key. In 
Experiment 1b the response was to perform a particular gesture. These two types of 
response allowed us to consider two affordance effects: the Simon effect (Experiment 
1a) and the compatibility effect (Experiment 1b). 
In Experiment 1a, participants made their responses using the keyboard of the 
computer presenting the stimuli, The response keys were the ‘A’ and ‘Z’ keys (as they 
were the leftmost keys on a standard keyboard), and the ‘apostrophe’ and ‘forward 
slash’ keys (as the rightmost keys on a standard keyboard). All response keys were 
marked with stickers, so that the irrelevant identity of the key could not be seen by the 
participants. Orange stickers were used, as this colour did not appear as a stimulus 
option in the experiment.  
In Experiment 1b, participants made their responses by pantomiming a gesture 
that was compatible or incompatible with the use of the mugs presented. The 
incompatible gestures were ‘pressing a button on a calculator’ and ‘squeezing the 
trigger on a spray gun’; while compatible gestures were ‘lifting a mug by the handle’ 
and ‘lifting a mug by the body’. Participants used the ‘H’ key (chosen due to its central 
location, also labelled with a sticker) after they had performed the gesture in order to 
end each trial and move to the next one. 
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In both experiments participants were encouraged to spend a small amount of 
time rehearsing their responses before the experiment began, and also practised 
producing the responses in 10 practice trials at the beginning of each block.  
In both Experiments 1a and 1b participants were divided between a visual 
condition and memory condition. In all versions, participants began each trial holding 
down the space bar with their dominant hand. They were presented with a screen 
displaying a central fixation point. This was presented for 900 ms, before being replaced 
by a screen displaying a set of four mugs. In the visual condition, this screen was 
presented for 1500 ms before the central point was replaced with a letter (A, B, C or D). 
This indicated in which quadrant of the screen the target mug was located (A= Top left, 
B= Top right, C= Bottom left, D= Bottom right). Participants then released the space 
bar to make their response (pressing the correct response button in Experiment 1a or 
produce the correct gesture for the cue in Experiment 1b). 
In the memory condition, the scene disappeared after the 1500 ms period, and the screen 
remained blank for a further 700 ms. After this point, the letter cue appeared in the 
centre of the screen, prompting participants to make a response to the recalled object 
that had occupied that space, as described above. See Figure 2.2 for the events sequence 
in the visual and memory conditions. 
 
Figure 2.2. Diagram of stimulus display and time course for Experiment 1 
(Visual and Memory) conditions 
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After the response was made, in all conditions, the screen was blanked, and a 
message was displayed to the participant to press the space bar when they were ready 
for the next trial. After they did this, another message was displayed, reminding them to 
press and hold the space bar to start the next trial.  
If participants released the space bar too early (before the presentation of the 
letter cue), the trial was aborted, and a message was displayed to remind participants to 
hold the space bar down. They then pressed the space bar to continue onto the next trial. 
In order that no trials were lost from this, the aborted trial was added to the end of the 
block, so that all participants saw the full 80 trials per block. Errors caused by pressing 
the incorrect button were recorded. 
The experiment blocks contained 80 trials, and participants performed two of 
these blocks, responding to shape cues in one block, and colour cues in the other. The 
association participants learnt between the response and colour/shape cue was 
counterbalanced using a Latin Square design, and the order in which the cue blocks 
were presented was also counterbalanced, so that half the participants began by 
responding to colour cues, and half began by responding to shape cues. Thus, 
participants performed 160 trials in total, plus 10 practice trials at the beginning of each 
block. 
Stimulus photographs were presented in sets of four, such that each shape, 
colour and handle position appeared as part of the target object at each of the four 
locations on the screen across the trials. The remaining three areas were filled with 
distracters, which were selected so that they showed the remaining colours and shapes 
not shown by the target, preventing duplicates of the target’s properties appearing in the 
same screen display. Presentation order of the targets was randomised. Half the trials in 
each block were congruent, so that either the response and target side matched (Simon 
effect) or the gesture was congruent with the use of a mug (compatibility effect). In 
incongruent trials, the response and target side were opposites, or the gesture was 
incompatible. 
2.2.4 Design 
The experiment manipulated two independent variables: the property of the 
object which cued participants to respond (colour or shape), and the congruency 
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between the response and the object. In Experiment 1a (the Simon effect), congruency 
referred to whether the position of the target mug on the left or right of the screen 
matched the side of the keyboard on which the required response was made. For 
Experiment 1b (the compatibility effect) congruency referred to whether or not the type 
of gesture required matched an action that could be involved in the use of the mug.  
The dependent measure of the study was the response time to initiate a response 
to the target stimulus. That is, the time from the presentation of the cue letter to the 
participant releasing the space bar. We used this measure of RT for three reasons. First, 
execution time for different actions cannot easily be equated in Experiment 1b and as 
such may confound response time measures once the response is under way. Second, 
this RT measure can allow comparisons between Experiments 1a and 1b despite the 
difference in response types. Third, we are interested in how accessing visual or 
remembered information influenced the preparation to act and as such the time to 
initiate the response is a suitable index of this.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Experiment 1a: Simon effect under visual and memory conditions 
Experiment 1a examined the emergence of the Simon effect in response to two 
property cues (colour and shape).  
Error rates within the conditions are shown in Table 2.1 and were examined 
using a 2 (cued property: colour, shape) x 2 (response congruency: congruent, 
incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA. Overall, error rates were low, although there was 
a significantly higher rate of error in the responses to colour cues, F(1,7)=14.91, p=.006, 
ηp
2
=.68. No other effects were significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Table 2.1 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded incorrectly to visible 
objects when cued by shape or colour. 
Congruency 
Cue Congruent Incongruent 
Colour 1.09 1.87 
Shape 0.312 0.468 
 
After removing the incorrect trials, a similar 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted on the measure of response initiation times, and revealed a main effect of 
cued property, F(1,7)= 5.91, p=.045, ηp
2
=.46, such that responses were faster to the 
colour cued target than a target cued by shape. However, no significant effect of 
response congruency was found (F<1), so that responses made on the same side as the 
target’s position were made no faster than those on the opposite side. There was no 
significant interaction between property and congruency (F<1). 
Figure 2.3 shows the mean response initiation times for participants when cued 
by shape or colour. 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean Release RT for the Simon effect under visual conditions 
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The emergence of the Simon effect was then examined when images were 
removed before the response was cued (i.e. in the offline condition). In this condition, 
therefore, the response required the participant to access stored information about the 
previously seen objects.  
Error rates were examined for the memory condition using a 2 x 2 within-
subjects ANOVA. The error rate was significantly higher for the participants in the 
shape cued condition, F(1,7)=14.06, p=.007, ηp
2
=.66, although there was no difference 
between incongruent and congruent responses. These error rates are presented in Table 
2.2. 
Table 2.2.  
Percentage of trials on which participants responded incorrectly to remembered 
objects when cued by shape or colour. 
Congruency 
Cue Congruent Incongruent 
Colour 2.34 0.781 
Shape 14.21 15.15 
 
For time to initiate the response, a 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of cued property, F(1, 7)=12.25, p=.010, ηp
2
=.64, with faster response 
initiation times to colour cues than to shape cues. There was no main effect of 
congruency, F(1, 7)=2.79, p=.14, ηp
2
=.29. However, there was a significant interaction 
between property and congruency, F(1, 7)=13.27, p=.008, ηp
2
=.66, (Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4. Mean Release RT for the Simon effect under memory conditions 
As a strong main effect of property was observed, the interaction was broken 
down by examining congruency effects in response to each property cue separately, 
using paired-sample t-tests. For responses to colour cues, there was found to be no 
significant effect of congruency, t(7)=.47, p=.65. However, for responses to shape it 
was found that responses made on the side congruent to the position of the target object 
were faster than those made to objects positioned incongruently with respect to the 
response position, t(7)=-2.65, p=.03. 
2.3.2 Experiment 1b: Compatibility effects under visual and memory conditions 
Experiment 1b examined the emergence of the compatibility effect for the two 
different property cues, under either visual or memory conditions.  
Error rates when performing gestures in response to visible targets are shown in Table 
2.3. Overall, error rates were higher than those for Experiment 1a, indicating that the 
use of gestures was harder for participants, however these errors do not show strong 
biases towards a particular condition. No significant effects or interactions were found. 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 2.3. 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded to visible objects with an 
incorrect gesture when cued by shape or colour. 
Congruency 
Cue Compatible Incompatible 
Colour 2.34 0.938 
Shape 1.09 0.625 
For response initiation times, a 2 (cued property: colour, shape) x 2 (response 
congruency: congruent, incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA revealed that responses 
to colour cues were initiated significantly faster than those to shape cues, F(1,7)=16.30, 
p=.005, ηp
2
=.70. There was no main effect of gesture compatibility, (F<1), but there was 
a marginally significant interaction between gesture compatibility and property cue, 
F(1,7)=4.14,p=.081, ηp
2
=.37. 
Due to the strong main effect of property and our a priori interest in whether 
property cues differentially influence the emergence of any compatibility effect, the 
marginally significant interaction was explored by examining the responses to each 
property separately, using paired sample t-tests. For responses in this condition cued by 
colour, there was a marginally significant effect of compatibility, t(7)=2.05, p=.080. 
This was such that incompatible responses were produced faster than compatible 
responses when cued by the colour of the object. There was no significant main effect 
for responses cued by shape, t(7)=-1.62, p=.15. Thus, there was no difference between 
response times when producing compatible or incompatible gestures for the more action 
relevant property cue. 
Comparing incongruent and congruent responses between the two different 
property cues showed that while there was no significant difference in the speed that 
people responded to colour and shape with congruent gestures, t(7) = -1.05, p= .328, 
they were significantly slower to produce incongruent responses to shape cues than 
colour cues, t(7) = -4.04, p=.005. 
71 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the mean response times for the compatibility effect when 
responding to visible objects 
 
Figure 2.5. Mean Release RT for the compatibility effect under visual 
conditions 
The compatibility effect was also examined when the items were no longer 
present at the time that the participants were cued to make a gesture (the offline 
condition). Here correct responses required participants to access stored memory 
representations of the previously-seen objects.  
Error rates when responding to remembered objects with gestures were higher 
than those for Experiment 1a in general, but, like Experiment 1a, showed a significantly 
higher error rate for the shape cued conditions, F(1,7) = 15.22, p=.006, ηp
2
=.69. 
Furthermore, higher error rates were found in the incompatible responses to shape, 
F(1,7) =6.73, p=.036, ηp
2
=.49, (Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4. 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded to recalled objects with an 
incorrect gesture when cued by shape or colour. 
Compatibility 
Cue Compatible Incompatible 
Colour 0.781 1.36 
Shape 0.195 0.977 
For response initiation times to produce gestures for remembered objects, there was no 
main effect of cued property, F(1,7)=1.64, p=.24, ηp
2
=.19; thus reaction times to shape 
cues and colour cues did not significantly differ. There was also no main effect of 
compatibility, (F<1). There was however a significant interaction between cued 
property and compatibility, F(1,7)=7.17, p=.03, ηp
2
=.51.  
 
Figure 2.6. Mean Release RT for the compatibility effect under memory 
conditions 
This interaction was explored by first looking at compatibility effects for each 
cued property.  There was no significant difference between compatible and 
incompatible responses to the target objects when cued by colour, t(7)=1.41, p=.200. 
There was also no significant difference between compatible and incompatible 
responses when cued by shape, t(7)=-1.32, p=.23. When considering cued property 
effects for congruent and incongruent responses separately, there was no significant 
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difference between colour and shape cued targets for congruent responses, t(7) = -.883, 
p = .407, or for incongruent responses, t(7) = -1.57, p=.161. While the memory-based 
responses to the mugs showed no significant differences within the interaction, it is 
worth noting that the pattern of responses is similar to that for the visual responses, with 
incompatible responses made faster for colour cues, while compatible responses show 
this advantage for shape. 
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2.4 Discussion 
For Experiments 1a and 1b, it was hypothesised that the cue type (shape or 
colour) would influence the emergence of both Simon and compatibility effects, in 
visual and memory conditions. The Simon effect was found when responses were made 
to remembered stimuli, but only when cued by the shape of the object. No Simon effect 
was found when responses were made to visible objects. For the compatibility effect, an 
interaction between cued property and response congruency emerged in both visual and 
memory conditions for the shape cue, although the interaction was stronger under visual 
conditions.  
2.4.1 The Simon effect under on-line and off-line conditions (Experiment 1a) 
No Simon effect was found in Experiment 1a, when participants made property 
cued responses to visible stimuli. Given that the Simon effect is fairly robust, this 
absence is unusual, but the most likely explanation is the nature of the experiment. 
Previous studies have found that the strength of the Simon effect will decrease and 
eventually disappear over a long period of time (see e.g., Hommel, 2002; Eimer et al., 
1995). Hommel (2002) suggested that this is due to the way in which the information is 
represented, with position and featural information held in parallel, rather than being 
bound into a single representation. As a result, the position information is more 
transient, and any increase in the time taken to make the response will decrease the 
strength of the Simon effect. Previous studies examining this have suggested that the 
decay of the affordance effect will occur rapidly within a few hundred milliseconds 
(typically 300-400 ms, De Jong, Liang and Lauber, 1994; Zhang and Johnson, 2004). 
The response times for Experiment 1a, show that even in the faster condition (when 
responding to colour) participants take, on average, over a second to begin acting. Given 
the time period for the Simon effect suggested by earlier studies, the current response 
times are clearly long enough for decay to set in. By using four items in each screen, the 
present task was more complicated than the standard affordance study set-up, and it 
seems likely that this extra complexity had an influence in increasing the participants’ 
response times.  
As a consequence of this null effect, it is not possible to determine whether the property 
cues had any influence on the emergence of the effect. It is possible that differences did 
emerge, but decayed before they could be measured. 
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In contrast, there were rather different findings for the Simon effect conducted 
under memory (off-line) conditions. Firstly, the effect did emerge, adding further 
support to previous findings that affordance effects in general (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 
2006), and the location-based Simon effect in particular (e.g., Tlauka and McKenna, 
1995) will persist when participants are responding to a mental image rather than a 
visual one. These findings therefore continue to support the idea that object 
representations contain both action and visual/feature information, supporting more 
grounded theories of cognition (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001). 
While our findings for off-line conditions are in line with earlier studies, 
considering these results in relation to the on-line version of the current study shows a 
potential difference between the processes that occur in visual and memory versions of 
the task. Under off-line conditions, participants still take over a second to respond 
(indeed, the responses to colour cues show an average production time of 1.4 seconds, 
longer than that for the visual responses to these cues). Despite this, the Simon effect is 
still found under memory conditions. However, this apparent discrepancy between on-
line and off-line investigations into the Simon effect has been noted and examined in 
previous studies, and appears to be a consistent finding (see e.g., Hommel, 2002; Zhang 
and Johnson, 2004). Zhang and Johnson (2004) showed that, under memory conditions, 
Simon effects could be found after a delay of up to 2400 ms, and make the suggestion 
that this is due to a different treatment of the spatial codes when working off-line. While 
spatial codes are suggested to be formed in parallel to the featural information when the 
Simon effect is produced under on-line conditions, in off-line conditions it is thought 
that the spatial information is coded into the memory representation, providing 
information on the context of the effect. Once bound into the representation, the spatial 
information is no longer susceptible to decay, and the effect is maintained. Thus, our 
results regarding the off-line version of the memory effect are consistent with previous 
studies demonstrating the different time courses of this effect, depending on the off-
line/on-line state under which it is performed. 
Of more interest to the aim of the current study is the finding that the Simon 
effect only emerged when cued by the object shape, and was absent for the colour cue. 
This is surprising, given that previous investigations of the Simon effect have suggested 
that it is largely unaffected by boundary conditions such as these. Indeed, Pellicano et 
al. (2010) compared the circumstances necessary for Simon and affordance effects to 
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emerge, and found that the Simon effect was robustly present, as long as there was 
overlap between object and response location. Only the object-based affordances (in this 
case, the handle affordance effect) were affected by features of the task, such as the 
action-relevant nature of the property cue. However, this and many other studies 
investigating the Simon effect have been conducted on-line, and, as discussed above, 
there are indications that different processes are responsible for the Simon effect under 
visual and memory conditions Thus, the findings presented here suggest that, under off-
line conditions, when an integrated representation is formed containing position 
information, the context (in this case, the property cue) can have an influence on the 
emergence of the Simon effect. As suggested by Tipper et al. (2006) and Loach et al. 
(2008), it seems that when attention is focused on a property which is integral to 
performing an action, an action is primed (although this is a fairly general action in the 
case of the Simon effect, priming a movement towards a location rather than a more 
specific feature of the object). Actions prepared and performed towards an object are 
facilitated and the expected position congruency effect emerges, but only in conditions 
using an action-relevant cue. It is possible that, when the position information is bound 
into the object representation, as is suggested to occur for the Simon effect in memory, 
then the Simon effect itself becomes more susceptible to boundary conditions, due to 
the integration of the spatial and feature codes. 
2.4.2 The compatibility effect under on-line and off-line conditions (Experiment 
1b) 
For Experiment 1b, the compatibility effect was examined, under both visual 
and memory conditions. For both these conditions, there were similar patterns; colour 
cued responses showed a small (non-significant) advantage for the incompatible 
gestures, while shape cued responses showed a similarly non-significant advantage for 
the compatible gestures. In both versions, significant interactions between gesture and 
property cue were found, with participants taking longer to respond with incompatible 
shape-cued gestures than incompatible colour-cued responses; although further 
investigation showed this was only significant in the visual version of the study. 
The fact that the visual and memory effects were so similar indicates that compatibility 
effects, like other affordance effects, persist beyond the removal of the visual image of 
an object. However, it appears the visual effect is stronger, indicating that there is an 
extra advantage if the object remains in view. 
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More specifically, it seems that the property cue is again important for the effect, 
as it leads to different outcomes in response; and again, only the shape cued responses 
show an influence in the expected direction. This is not in agreement with the findings 
of Bub and Masson (2006; 2010), where the more specific responses appeared to 
remove or override the influence of the cue.  
One possible reason for this difference between the present results and Bub and 
Masson’s (2010) findings is the design of the two studies. Bub and Masson (2010) used 
colour cues to inform participants which hand they should use to make the gesture, but 
the gesture itself was a constant for each participant. This is a reversal of the current 
study, where the hand used was fixed, but the particular gesture was informed by the 
colour or shape. Such a difference makes Bub and Masson’s (2010) study more similar 
to the intentional studies of Fagioli et al. (2007) and others, where the gesture or grasp 
type is prepared before the target object is seen. The differences in compatibility effect 
between the present study and Bub and Masson (2010) may, therefore, be used to 
suggest that the order in which the processes are carried out is important. If the intention 
to perform an action is formed before the cue is detected (as in Bub and Masson’s 
studies), then the cue is irrelevant to this action preparation, but if the property cue must 
be determined first (as in the present study), then the nature of the cue has more of an 
effect. 
However, while the pattern of behaviour is as expected for the shape cue, 
attending to the colour cue facilitated the incompatible responses. One possible (if 
rather speculative) explanation for this pattern is that the attention to the two different 
cues leads to different processes being set in motion. When attending to an action 
relevant property such as shape, this facilitates the preparation of actions, and leads to 
the expected facilitation effects. However, attention to the more visual property cue of 
colour is not thought to do this. As a result, when responding to colour cues, the 
participants might simply learn the association between colour and gesture, without 
associating it with the identity of the object itself. For incompatible gestures, this would 
be enough, as the gestures themselves do not connect with the object presented. 
However, for the compatible gestures, their production might be delayed by the relevant 
action (and its association with the object), leading to a deeper processing of the target 
object beyond the initial examination of the item to extract the colour information.  
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Such an explanation could also account for why the memory version of the study 
shows a weaker effect for the memory conditions: when the target remains visible, the 
participant is able to engage in continued processing of the mug, delaying the 
production of the gesture, and so increasing the response time in this condition. Taking 
this into account, Experiment 1b therefore could be used to suggest that attention to a 
particular property influences the representation separately to the intention of the 
observer, but must come prior to the formation of the intended gesture to have its 
influence. However, it should also be noted that the complexity of the experimental set-
up might also have an influence. Previous work has not investigated how compatibility 
effects might be affected by the complexity of the situation (although studies examining 
the time course of the effect do not indicate that it decays over time like the Simon 
effect, see e.g., Fischer and Dahl, 2007).Thus, since Experiment 1b did use a more 
crowded scene than previous experiments, this may have contributed to the pattern of 
effects observed here and the differences between the present and previous studies. 
Further exploration of this factor is therefore required, to determine if it is a relevant 
influence on the outcome of the effect. 
Overall, the results of Experiment 1.1 are mixed in their support of the 
hypotheses. The findings from the Simon effect suggest that it can be influenced by the 
property cue that is the participants’ attentional focus before they produce the action. 
However, these findings are limited to the memory condition. The compatibility effect 
seems to show that the property cue is relevant for more specific gestures, for both 
visual and memory conditions, although the visual presence of the object leads to a 
stronger effect. The findings also extend previous work by suggesting that the order of 
the cue and response has an influence on the pattern of results. The property cue may 
have an influence, but only if it is attended prior to the planning for the production of 
the gesture, otherwise it is over-ridden. 
Given that the complexity of the scene may be a confounding factor in the 
emergence of the visual Simon effect, (and possibly also one for the compatibility 
effect), it is important to further investigate this. As a follow-up to Experiments 1a and 
1b, simpler versions of the two designs were created. These reduced the number of 
objects and responses from four to two, in order to determine whether the complexity of 
the task setting had an influence on the emergence of the effects being investigated. 
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2.5 Experiments 1c and 1d: Method 
2.5.1 Participants 
Participants were 32 University of Dundee students (4 males), aged 18-25. Half 
participated in the Simon effect condition (Experiment 1c), and the other sixteen in the 
compatibility effect condition (Experiment 1b). Within each group, eight participants 
took part in the visual version, and eight in the memory version of each study. All 
participants were right handed, and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Each 
received payment upon completion of the study. 
2.5.2 Stimuli, Procedure and Design 
These were the same as for Experiments 1a and 1b, with the following 
exceptions. The stimuli used were reduced to only two colours (blue and yellow) and 
two shapes (tall and round). As before, these were combined to create the different 
targets. On each trial, two images were presented to the left and right of the central 
point. The letter cues used to indicate the target for that trial were either ‘A’ or ‘B’, 
only, where A= Left and B=Right. The two response buttons in the Simon effect were 
the ‘A’ and ‘apostrophe’ keys. For the compatibility effect, the response gestures used 
were also reduced to two: ‘lifting a mug by the handle’ (compatible) and ‘squeezing the 
trigger on a spray gun’ (incompatible). 
As there were fewer positions for images to appear (left and right only), the 
experiment blocks required only 64 trials, to allow each shape and colour to appear as 
the target object in each location. Again, each participant performed two such blocks, 
responding to colour cues in one, and shape cues in the other, leading to 128 trials in 
total (plus the ten practice trials at the beginning of each block). Half of the trials in 
each block were compatible with the response, and half incompatible, as before. 
  
80 
 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Experiment 1c- Simon effect under visual and memory conditions 
Experiment 1c examined the emergence of the Simon effect when cued by either 
colour or shape when the number of targets and possible button press responses were 
each reduced to two. As in Experiment 1.1, the emergence of the effect was examined 
under both visual and memory conditions.  
Error rates for button press responses to visible targets in Experiment 1c are 
shown in Table 2.5 and show that overall, the rates were low. A 2 x 2 within-subjects 
ANOVA revealed that participants did make marginally more errors on incongruent 
responses than congruent ones, F(1,7) = 4.83,p=.06, ηp
2
 = .40. No other effects were 
significant. 
Table 2.5. 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded to visible objects with an 
incorrect button press when cued by shape or colour. 
Congruency 
Cue Congruent Incongruent 
Colour 0.781 1.36 
Shape 0.195 0.977 
For the time to initiate the button press response, a 2 (cued property) x2 
(response congruency) within-subjects ANOVA found that there was no main effect of 
cued property, F(1,7)=.010, p=.925, ηp
2
 = .001, such that responses were no faster to the 
colour cued target than a target cued by shape. There was a significant main effect of 
congruency, F(1,7)=9.29, p=.024, ηp
2
 = .542. Responses made on the same side as the 
targets position were faster than those made on the opposite side to the stimulus. There 
was no significant interaction between property and congruency, F(1,7)=.414, p=.540, 
ηp
2
 = .056. 
Figure 2.7 shows the mean response times for the Simon effect when responding 
to visible objects 
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Figure 2.7. Mean Release RT for the Simon effect under visual conditions 
Error rates for the memory version of Experiment 1.2a are shown in Table 2.6. 
As in the visual condition, participants found incongruent responses more difficult than 
congruent ones, F(1,7) = 6.28, p=.041, ηp
2
 = .47. However, again the overall error rate 
was low. 
Table 2.6. 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded to recalled objects with an 
incorrect button press when cued by shape or colour. 
Congruency 
Cue Congruent Incongruent 
Colour 0.781 0.835 
Shape 0.977 0.410 
A 2x2 within-subjects ANOVA, found no main effect of cued property, F(1, 
7)=.021, p=.889, ηp
2
 = .003 such that responses were no faster to the colour cued target 
than a target cued by shape. There was however, a significant main effect of 
congruency, F(1, 7)=10.83, p=.013, ηp
2
 = .607 so that button responses made on the 
same side as the target’s position were faster than those made on the opposite side to the 
stimulus. The interaction between property and congruency approached significance, 
F(1, 7)=3.71, p=.095, ηp
2
 = .347. As in Experiment 1.1a, we have an a priori interest in 
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how the two property cues might differently influence the affordance effect. Thus, in 
order to further examine this potential interaction, paired samples t-tests were conducted 
on the congruent and incongruent responses for each property separately. For both cued 
properties, a significant Simon effect was found (colour, t(7) = -2.45, p=.044; shape, 
t(7) = -3.04, p=.019) so that congruently positioned targets were responded to faster 
than were incongruently positioned targets across both property cues, although the 
significance of the effects do suggest that the effect is marginally stronger for shape-
cued responses. 
Figure 2.8 shows the mean response times for the Simon effect when responding 
to memorised objects. 
 
Figure 2.8. Mean Release RT for the Simon effect under memory conditions 
2.6.2 Experiment 1d: Action compatibility effect under visual and memory 
conditions 
Experiment 1d examined the compatibility effect under visual and memory 
conditions when the number of target objects and response gestures was reduced to two.  
Error rates when responding with gestures to visible targets in Experiment 1d (Table 
2.7) showed an interaction between the property and compatibility, F(1,7) = 5.65, p=.05, 
ηp
2
 = .45. While responses to incompatible cues showed a higher percentage of errors 
for colour cues, for shape cues, it was the compatible responses that resulted in more 
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errors. However, the error rates were again lower than those for Experiment 1b, 
indicating this was an easier task for participants. 
Table 2.7. 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded to visible objects with an 
incorrect gesture when cued by shape or colour 
Congruency 
Cue Congruent Incongruent 
Colour 0.586 0.781 
Shape 0.977 0.195 
For response initiation times, a 2 (cued property) x2 (response congruency) 
within-subjects ANOVA found no significant main effects in this version of the study, 
so that there was no difference between responses to different property cues, F(1,7) = 
1.15, p = .32, ηp
2
 = .14, or between compatible and incompatible responses, F(1,7) = 
1.90, p = .21, ηp
2
 = .214. There was also no interaction between the property cues and 
the compatibility of the gesture, F(1, 7) = .33, p = .58, ηp
2
 = .045. 
Figure 2.9 shows the mean response times for the compatibility effect when 
responding to visible objects 
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Figure 2.9. Mean Release RT for the compatibility effect under visual 
conditions 
Next, the response times to the off-line version of Experiment 1d were 
examined, showing how participants responded when producing gestures according to 
their recall of the target stimuli.  
Error rates for gesture responses made to remembered objects in Experiment 1d 
are shown in Table 2.8. No differences were found between the error rates for property 
or compatibility, and overall, the percentage of errors made in this condition was low. 
Table 2.8. 
Percentage of trials on which participants responded to remembered objects with an 
incorrect gesture when cued by shape or colour 
Congruency 
Cue Congruent Incongruent 
Colour 0.390 0.586 
Shape 0.586 0.195 
For response initiation times, again, no main effects were found to be significant 
in this version, so there was no difference between responses to colour and shape, 
F(1,7) = .47, p = .52, ηp
2
 = .063, and compatible and incompatible responses, F(1,7) = 
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3.22, p = .12, ηp
2
 = .315. There was also no significant interaction between property and 
compatibility, F(1, 7) = .20, p = .66, ηp
2
 = .028. Figure 2.10 shows the mean response 
times for the compatibility effect when responding to visible objects. 
 
Figure 2.10. Mean Release RT for the compatibility effect under memory 
conditions 
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2.7 Discussion 
Experiments 1c and 1d investigated the emergence of the Simon and 
compatibility effects under both visual and memory conditions, as in Experiments 1a 
and 1b. However, here the demands of the task were reduced by presenting participants 
with only two objects to respond to, rather than four. It was thought that by reducing the 
attentional demands in this way, effects that were otherwise absent in the previous study 
would now emerge. The Simon effect was found in both visual and memory conditions, 
but was apparently unaffected by the particular property used to cue it. The 
compatibility effect did not emerge at all, and was unaffected by cue or response type 
used. 
The changes made to the object displays had three clear effects on the 
participants’ performance. Firstly, the main effect of property that was present 
consistently in Experiments 1a and 1b was no longer found in Experiments 1c and 1d. 
Participants responded to colour and shape cues within the same amount of time, 
consistent with our suggestion that the longer response times to shape cues in 
Experiments 1a and 1b were due to a greater difficulty either processing or maintaining 
the four shapes that were viewed or recalled. When the number of shapes was reduced 
in Experiments 1c and 1d, RTs in response to shape were no longer than for the colour-
based responses. Indeed, response times in general were faster in Experiments 1c and 
1d, while error rates were lower. These factors suggest that the less complex 
presentation of the stimuli did successfully reduce the difficulty of the experimental set-
up. 
Secondly, we found a difference in participants’ responses to the Simon effect. 
The visual version of the Simon effect (Experiment 1c) gave clear results, with the 
effect emerging in both the on-line and off-line versions of the study. Given that the 
RTs in Experiment 1c are shorter than those in Experiment 1a, this finding is consistent 
with our earlier suggestion that the emergence of the effect might depend upon the time 
taken to make the response. Previous studies (e.g., Hommel, 2002) have shown the 
Simon effect decays over time, and we speculated that this was the case in Experiment 
1a, with the response times too long for the Simon effect to remain. With the reduction 
of response times in Experiment 1c, perhaps due to the reduced complications in the 
task, the Simon effect emerged.  
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Under off-line conditions, the Simon effect continued to emerge, as it did in 
Experiment 1a. We suggested in Experiment 1a that the memory version of the Simon 
effect was not affected by time taken to respond (in line with earlier studies e.g., Zhang 
and Johnson, 2004), and so would not have expected changes in response times to have 
a particular influence on the off-line version of the effect. This result is therefore in 
agreement with our assumptions.  
However, a difference emerges when considering how the participants’ focus on 
a particular property cue influenced the emergence of the Simon effect. Both on-line 
and off-line versions of the study showed no influence of the property that cued their 
responses, with the standard Simon effect emerging for both shape and colour cues. For 
the visual version of Experiment 1c, this can be explained with reference to the earlier 
studies suggesting that the Simon effect is driven only by the presence of an overlap 
between the stimulus location and the response location, and is impervious to other 
contextual factors, such as cues (see, for example, Kornblum et al., 1990; Pellicano et 
al., 2010). Our on-line results for the effect are therefore in agreement with previous 
work, and add further support to the suggestion that the Simon effect is not affected by 
boundary conditions in the way other affordance effects are. 
The finding is less clear, however, for the off-line version of the Simon effect in 
Experiment 1c, given that the off-line version of Experiment 1a did show an influence 
of the property cue, with only shape-cued responses showing the typical facilitation 
when stimulus and response locations matched. The findings of Experiment 1c seem to 
suggest that memory based Simon effects act like visual ones, at least in terms of the 
contextual influence, in direct contradiction of the findings from Experiment 1a, and 
other studies indicating a difference between on-line and off-line effects (e.g., Hommel, 
2002; Zhang and Johnson, 2004). However, it is interesting to note that there was a 
small interaction between property and response in this condition, which appears to 
come from a stronger effect in the shape cued responses, indicating that there is perhaps 
some difference in the way the cues influence the processes under memory conditions.  
Thirdly, there was also a difference between the patterns of response seen in the 
Experiment 1d, and those found in Experiment 1b for the compatibility effect. While the 
faster overall response initiation times again suggest that the task is easier for 
participants, the influence of the property cues found in Experiment 1b was no longer 
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present, and the compatibility effect itself was also absent. One possible explanation for 
this could be the reverse of the decay effect suggested as an explanation or the pattern of 
results for the Simon effect in Experiment 1a. That is, the simpler study procedure 
allowed people to respond sooner, before the compatibility effect could fully develop. 
There is some evidence that, like the handle affordance effect, the compatibility effect 
increases across the time course of an experiment (e.g., Bub and Masson, 2010). 
However, this does not seem a likely explanation for the present results. The time 
course of Experiment 1d was the same as that of 1b, with the same amount of time 
allowed for the presentation of items and cue to act. This total time was over a second, 
long enough to allow the effect to develop. An alternative explanation is that the 
participants were able to learn the associations between the objects and response 
gestures more easily when there were only two possibilities. As a result, they no longer 
needed to process the objects as deeply, and could produce the correct response easily 
after a cursory examination of the stimulus that was presented, without demonstrating 
action-based effects. 
It would appear that for both Simon and compatibility effects, there was an 
effect of the set size used. Essentially, with larger object sets, where more objects were 
present, the influence of the cued property was strongest. When the set size was 
reduced, the cued property (and, for the compatibility studies, the effect itself) was lost. 
This may suggest that in more complex environments, where there are several potential 
objects, the influences of the property and intentional response are most pronounced, as 
perhaps this is when they are the most useful. 
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2.8 General Discussion 
Across two sets of studies, the influence of property cues on the emergence of 
affordance effects was examined. Two main areas were studied: the condition under 
which the response was generated (from memory, or with the stimulus object still 
visible), and the cue and response requirements (action or visually relevant cues, and 
abstract or specific response gestures). 
When the experimental set-up contained four items (three distractors and one 
target), there was an influence of the property cue on the compatibility effect in both 
visual and memory conditions, and for the Simon effect under memory conditions only. 
When the set-up was simplified to two items (one target, one distractor), the Simon 
effect was present under both memory and visual conditions, but unaffected by the 
property cue. The compatibility effect was absent completely under these less 
demanding conditions, for both visual and memory settings. We consider these findings 
in terms of three sets of comparisons: between the two types of affordance effect used 
(Simon and compatibility); between the number of object stimuli used (four or two), 
and between the two study conditions (on-line or off-line responses to stimuli). 
2.8.1 Comparison between the Simon effects and compatibility effects 
The Simon and compatibility effects differ both in the type of response they 
require and the feature that is assumed to drive the effect. While the compatibility effect 
depends on the relationship between a specific gesture and the object identity (e.g., Bub 
and Masson, 2006), the Simon effect depends on the object’s location in relation to the 
location of the response (e.g., Symes et al., 2005), and requires only a button press in 
response. There is some debate as to how equivalent the two effects are and, indeed, in 
the present study, the two effects do show clear differences in how they emerge under 
the conditions investigated.  
Previous studies have shown that Simon effects may emerge independently of 
the property used to cue the response (Kornblum et al., 1990; Pellicano et al., 2010), 
which agrees with the findings from Experiment 1c, but not those of Experiment 1a. In 
terms of the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001), it is suggested that preparation of an action 
towards a location leads to weighting of location as a relevant feature. Hommel (2011) 
suggests that attention towards a particular location, such as the left side of a display 
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screen, will lead to activation and facilitation of actions towards the left side, as the 
codes for the location of stimulus and action overlap within the representation. As such, 
the attentional focus on location is enough to lead to weighting, and the nature of the 
object at the location is less relevant. However, there is a little evidence to suggest that 
some contextual factors can influence the emergence of the effect. For example, 
locating the targets in the right or left eye of a face led to Simon effects for the right and 
left, even when the picture was rotated by 90° (Hommel and Lippa, 1995). This was 
considered to indicate that the familiarity of the visual context (a face) influenced the 
coding of locations based on the viewer’s typical experience with the context (that is, 
the eyes are coded as left and right, even if on this occasion they are presented as being 
located up and down).Thus, it is not entirely unlikely that some influence of context 
could emerge, under the right conditions. For Experiment 1a, attending to the shape of 
the objects prior to making the response might have weighted the representation in 
favour of acting with the object, along with the weighting of the location, and so led to 
the facilitation of responses on the congruent side, which might be a precursor to acting 
with the object. Given that this effect occurred only for the memory condition in 
Experiment 1a, there is also the suggestion that the difference in how position 
information is thought to be maintained in memory (i.e., integrated into the 
representation) might be responsible for this effect. However, this explanation cannot 
adequately account for Experiment 1c, where even under memory conditions, any 
influence of the property cue is absent: instead these findings suggest a reduced 
influence for the task context, at least in terms of the cue to produce an action. As this 
effect occurs when the number of stimuli is reduced, it may be linked to the complexity 
of the study, and this is considered in the next section, which compares the results based 
on this factor. 
The compatibility effect, like the Simon effect, does not emerge under every 
version of the study. However, when the effect is present (in Experiment 1.2), then the 
pattern of results can be more easily explained in terms previous findings (e.g., Bub and 
Masson, 2010) and in terms of the action-relevance of the property, in accordance with 
the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001). Focus on the shape of the object leads to the activation 
of shape related actions, such as lifting, in the representation. This activation weights 
the representation in favour of acting with the object, and so influences the production 
of the associated action. Producing un-associated actions is slowed when previously 
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attending to object shape and attending to object colour is suggested to lead to no initial 
priming of the relevant gesture. 
The difference between the Simon effect and the compatibility effect may come from 
the specificity of the relationship between the action response, and the form or use of 
the target object. The Simon effect is referred to as a ‘space-based affordance’ in some 
discussions of the effect, in contrast to ‘object-based affordances’ such as the 
compatibility effect, which involves gestures strongly linked to the shape and form of 
an object, unlike location (e.g., Symes et al., 2005). While the Simon effect seems 
therefore to be (largely) dependent on the overlap between stimulus and response 
locations, we can suggest that the compatibility effect is more dependent on the nature 
of the cue to act. The action-relevance of the cue (e.g., shape information informing 
gesture forming) may therefore be more important to this affordance effect.   
2.8.2 Comparison between four and two item studies 
The finding that the simpler versions of the studies had a considerable impact 
upon the emergence of the Simon and compatibility effects was unexpected. In 
Experiment 1a the Simon effect was found only for remembered objects cued by shape. 
When the number of objects, properties and responses were reduced, in Experiment 1c, 
the Simon effect was found both when making responses to visible and remembered 
objects, and was found irrespective of the property used to cue the response (although 
there is an indication that the effect when cued by shape was larger than that cued by 
colour).  
The absence of the Simon effect in Experiment 1a under visual conditions is 
most likely due to the previously established decay of the effect when the responses are 
delayed (Zhang and Johnson, 2004). The emergence of the effect in Experiment 1c is 
therefore an indication of the influence of the reduced complexity, allowing participants 
to form their response before decay occurs.  
However, the difference between the four-item studies (Experiments 1a and 1b) 
and two item studies (Experiments 1.c and 1d) in terms of the influence of property cue 
is a little more complex. A likely explanation for these findings is the distribution of 
attention, in combination with the cue types in each of the two versions. For Experiment 
1c, there was more time to examine each object (as there were only two), while in 
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Experiment 1a the examination of the four items might have to be more cursory. 
Presentation time for items in both Experiments 1a and 1b and Experiments 1c and 1d 
were the same, thus, under the conditions of Experiments 1a and 1b, participants did 
have less time available per object. This could affect the shape cues in particular: while 
colour names would be well known to participants, it was less likely they would have 
previously encountered the shape names as labels applied to the particular object stimuli 
used, or the examples of the cups themselves. Cup shapes and their given labels are 
therefore possibly less familiar to the participants. As a result, identifying the colours 
would be quick, but identifying the shapes might require more time to examine each 
item and recall its label, time that was not available under the conditions of Experiments 
1a and 1b.  
In support of this, there is evidence that suggests the amount of attention, as well 
as its focus, is a key factor in the emergence of affordance effects. Vainio et al. (2007) 
reported findings that suggested that some amount of attention to an object is necessary 
for affordance effects to emerge. While the target in the four item display is quite likely 
to be attended at some point in the viewing period, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the time spent on each object would be reduced. Furthermore, studies employing eye 
movement techniques (e.g., Tatler et al., 2005) found that the extraction of colour 
information from objects could occur without direct fixations on the objects, possibly 
suggesting that this information doesn’t require overt attention to obtain it. Thus, for the 
current study, while participants could respond correctly to the colour cues, under the 
more crowded four-item condition, they may have done this without constructing an 
action representation for the object that supported the emergence of the Simon effect. 
For the two-item condition, this smaller study set allowed increased and equivalent 
attention to objects, whatever the cue. Such an account would suggest that the observed 
differences between the findings of Experiment 1a, Experiment 1c and previous studies 
showing no influence of the property cue on the Simon effect might arise from the 
extent of attentive processing of objects, resulting in property-based differences only 
emerging under more demanding task conditions. It might also explain the small 
interaction between cue and location seen in the memory version of Experiment 1c. The 
fact that the items are removed after the short viewing time might again make this task a 
little more difficult (although not as complex as the four item version). As a result, the 
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difference in the focus of attention to colour and shape cues again emerges, and 
influences the difference in strength seen in this version of the Simon effect. 
While the explanation above could account for the Simon effect changing 
between the two Experiments, it is a less satisfactory account for the compatibility 
effect, where the result vanishes altogether under the simpler conditions of Experiment 
1d. One possibility here has already been mentioned: that the smaller set size led to 
participants learning the associations between the cue and gesture quickly, and so being 
able to produce the response before the influence of the object could affect it. Again, 
Vainio et al. (2007) suggested that the repetition of the same target item can lead to pre-
preparation of responses to that target. That study referred to the repetition of a single 
item across the course of the experiment, but while Experiment 1.2 used more than one 
object, across the large number of trials, both would be targets multiple times, and so 
participants might well be able to simply learn the associations for the two objects and 
produce both response types equally quickly. Other studies have shown compatibility 
effects while using smaller set sizes (e.g., Bub and Masson, 2006). However, unlike the 
present study, they used a wide range of objects, not just examples of a single object 
type as we did. As a result, it might have been harder for participants to learn the 
repeated associations between a stimulus and response, as they could not be aware of 
what object would be presented on each trial. 
Due to the nature of this study, measures of the attentional focus were not taken, 
and so there are no empirical data to support these speculations. However, it is 
unmistakeable that the number of objects present in the scene had an effect on the 
emergence of the effects, and that, regarding the effect of property cues, they are at their 
most effective in the more complex version of the scene. This may indicate that more 
complex scenes in general are needed to investigate effects such as this, as sparser and 
less realistic settings may not allow the full influence to be seen. 
2.8.3 Comparison between visual and memory conditions 
Across nearly all the Experiments presented here, it seems that the pattern of 
results present in the visual version of the study was also present for the memory 
version, or, in the case of Experiments 1a and 1b, was found only for the memory 
version. These findings all add further support to the earlier studies which first 
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demonstrated that affordance effects would persist beyond the removal of a visual 
stimulus, and strengthen the concepts of grounded cognition which suggest that both 
action and featural information are maintained together, in equivalent representations. 
The current study extends previous understanding by demonstrating that that the 
compatibility effect persists in memory. This finding suggests that it is not solely the 
recollection of the object that leads to re-activation of the action properties, but the 
situation in which the representation was formed, in terms of what features were 
attended. Studies investigating a more grounded approach to memory, and in particular, 
the retrieval of information can be related to this suggestion (e.g., Ross, Wang, Kramer, 
Simons and Crowell, 2007). These studies have found that the production of actions 
associated with the item when retrieving the information influence the recall. The 
current study demonstrates that the recall of information about the target object can 
influence the production of associated gestures. This is consistent with the idea of 
perceptual and action features sharing the same representational domain, and the bi-
directional link between the action and perception features that the TEC (Hommel et al., 
2001) proposes. Thus, the weighting of representations extends beyond representations 
for immediate performance, and into those conducted under memory conditions. 
2.8.4 Conclusions 
Tipper et al. (2006) showed that the emergence of affordance effects might be 
affected by which properties of the objects were attended. Bub and Masson (2006; 
2010) extended this by showing that the influence of the type of response was also 
important. Together, these studies suggest that both attentional focus and more specific 
intentions to act on an object can influence the processing of the object, leading to the 
facilitation or inhibition of subsequent actions. The current studies further this by 
suggesting that, at least for effects that are dependent on the nature of the object, both 
the property and intention can influence the emergence of action-related effects, but that 
this may depend on the order in which they are considered. Bub and Masson suggested 
that the presence of the intention response would over-ride the property cue that was 
attended, but the results shown here suggest that when the response is dependent on the 
property, then the nature of the property can still affect the emergence of the effect. 
Focusing on colour leads to a delay in preparing the relevant actions, while focusing on 
shape leads to a delay in producing the incompatible actions for the object. 
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The TEC (Hommel et al., 2001) suggests that both attentional focus and 
intention to act can be used as ways to prime an event file and lead to the weighting of 
the representation. In everyday situations, it is likely that both these processes work 
together, but in the experimental situations, the two can be separated. This is most clear 
for the compatibility effect: Bub and Masson (2010) showed that the preparation of an 
action prior to viewing the object led to an advantage for producing the action that 
matched that object, in line with previous studies showing the influence of intention 
preparation (Fagioli et al., 2007). By preparing an action, the relevant features (such as 
handle location) are primed, and weighted within the representation. While the object 
colour informed the hand to be used, it did not affect the preparation of the action, as it 
is not relevant to grasping. This priming affects perceptual detection of the items, and 
also speeds the production of the required response. However, when the property cue is 
given to determine the response, then the type of cue becomes more relevant, as in the 
current study. 
Shape as a property has strong links to the planning of actions with an object, as the 
shape of the object is linked to its identity, and the associated grips that are congruent 
with the object. Thus, preparing an action via attention to shape primes the associated 
action responses in the representation, and again, facilitates their production. Focusing 
only on colour, in the absence of any other indication of what the action required is, 
doesn’t require the early planning that leads to action facilitation. The findings do 
suggest that, for the compatibility effect, there is a difference between object properties 
that may relate to their action relevance: although as Jeannerod (1997) suggests, the 
division into action and visual properties may not be so clear cut. Certain properties can 
be considered as both to one extent or another, while only a few are solely in one 
category. As stated, colour is most likely to be the purest visual property, and this 
distinction may be a factor in allowing the present results to emerge, as the use of two 
clearly distinct properties helps the difference between the action and visually relevant 
properties to be observed. 
Finally, the difference between Experiments 1a and 1b and Experiments 1c and 
1d suggest that these effects are likely to be most present in more complex situations. 
While the reason for this is for the moment unclear, it does point to future studies 
perhaps concentrating on more crowded experimental environments, i.e. those that are a 
little closer to a real world environment. It may be that the facilitation of action 
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preparation is most useful in more crowded environments, so under these conditions, 
the effects are easier to see. 
In conclusion, it appears that under certain conditions, object properties can 
influence the early stages of planning and execution of an action towards an object. 
Thus, the attended property seems to be another factor which can influence the 
weighting of an object representation, along with more specific intentions to act, and the 
complexity of the scene. Action and perception are again shown to be tightly linked, 
with perceptual focus able to influence the production of action as action is able to 
influence the perception of a scene. 
Following these findings, particularly those regarding an apparent influence of 
scene complexity, the next studies conducted in this thesis will increase the amount of 
detail in the stimulus scenes. This will be done by using either photographs of real 
world scenes, with large numbers of objects, or actual real-world scenes. It is hoped that 
such increases in complexity will provide situations in which effects of weighting due to 
the task can be observed.  
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Chapter Three- The influence of 
the potential for action at encoding 
on the formation of object 
representations 
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3.1 General Introduction 
There are increasing numbers of studies of the influence of action on perception, 
demonstrating how the preparation for action can influence the way a scene is viewed 
(e.g., Bekkering and Neggers, 2002, Symes et al. 2008). However, much less research 
has been conducted into whether memory representations are similarly affected. 
Furthermore, studies that do examine influences of action on memory tend to focus on 
the influence either during or after the task, measuring the effect that performing the 
actions might have on the acquisition of information throughout the interaction, (e.g., 
Triesch et al., 2003), or how the completion of the task influences the subsequent recall 
(e.g., Williams et al., 2005). Preparation for an action has been largely ignored in terms 
of its influence on memory, yet there is good reason to expect that it could have an 
effect. Earlier studies such as Bekkering and Neggers (2002) show how an action 
preparation can affect where we look in a scene, and how long it takes to fixate certain 
items. There is also a wealth of evidence that shows how important where we fixate is 
for the inclusion of that item into the eventual representation (e.g., Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 2002). Thus, if action preparation can influence perception, it follows that it 
may also prime the memory representations following that perceptual experience. 
If memory representations can be primed from this action preparation, it is 
important to consider how this weighting might be shown. As with many of the 
previous studies, both for on-line perception and off-line representations, the properties 
of objects (e.g., shape, colour, etc.) offer the best way of determining this. On-line, it is 
the detection of properties (for example, as the defining features of targets in a search 
task) that is affected by the presence of action preparation (e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007), 
while for representations, there is much evidence to show that such properties are 
maintained in memory in a relatively independent manner (e.g., Brady et al., 2011; 
Fougnie and Alvarez, 2011). Thus, an influence of action preparation might be detected 
in participants’ memory for particular properties that are relevant to the situation. 
Following a determination of how any weighting might be detected, it is also 
necessary to consider how the weighting might be achieved in terms of the actions used. 
Previous studies have used a range of approaches, such as preparing particular grips or 
pointing actions; Fagioli et al. (2007) for example, used either pointing or gripping 
actions to weight the detection of single action-related items. For the purposes of a 
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memory study, it was necessary to have a range of objects observed by participants and 
subsequently tested, to prevent the memory task becoming too simple, leading to ceiling 
effects in the responses, and possibly resulting in any effects of action being washed 
out. In terms of the actions that could be used to influence perception, the types 
employed by previous studies have typically been either pointing gestures, or particular 
grasping actions. An object-specific action such as pointing was less ideal for the 
current study, since such an action requires a single particular object as the target, rather 
than a range of objects to be memorised.  
Grip types, however, are more flexible. The preparation of a grip type 
presupposes physical interaction with an object in a different way to that of pointing. 
Furthermore, there are clearly defined grip patterns that have formed the basis for 
previous research: power and precision grips (Napier, 1956). Precision grips are used 
when manipulating smaller objects, or specific parts of larger items, using the thumb 
and index finger, while power grips are used when manipulating larger objects, 
requiring the item to be held between the fingers and the palm of the hand. Of the 
studies into action influencing perception, Symes et al. (2008) specifically used the 
preparation of power and precision grips to influence search for size-related objects, 
thus there is evidence that the grips do reliably influence perception. Furthermore, the 
affordance literature suggests that the grip type associated with an object is an important 
intrinsic property, which may be a part of the object’s representation (e.g., Derbyshire et 
al., 2006). Neurophysiological studies have shown that premotor neurons will respond 
to the presentation of graspable objects, with some neurons activating specifically to 
either power or precision grips (Raos, Umiltà, Murata, Fogassi and Gallese, 2006). 
Thus, given the bi-directional nature of the perception-action link, it is reasonable to 
assume that the preparation and maintenance of particular grip types should lead to 
particular biases towards matching items. 
Another method for weighting representations in favour of action is to use the 
influence that proximal hands have on the viewing of a scene. The presence of the hands 
seems to influence the distribution of attention across a scene, favouring those near 
hand items (e.g., Abrams et al., 2008), and increasing the potential for action with such 
objects by favouring processing via the action linked magnocellular pathway (e.g., 
Gozli et al., 2012). Using proximal hands in this way is therefore a simple method to 
potentially increase the participant’s focus on acting with the displayed items. Also, 
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there is earlier evidence that the presence of the hands can have some effect on 
participants’ memories for a scene (e.g., Davoli et al., 2012). In particular, it is 
interesting that Davoli et al.’s (2012) study seemed to indicate that the presence of the 
hands might lead to a bias towards the detail of the objects close by. When the structure 
of a stimulus scene was repeated over several trials, the presence of the hands slowed 
participants’ ability to extract this information about the broader scene construction, 
despite its repetition. Instead, participants were more focused on the specific detail 
changes of the scene colour. It is unclear, however, whether this bias to detail will be 
seen for object properties besides colour, and whether any such effects will be equally 
strong for all of them. The current study will allow us to investigate the influence of 
proximal hands on the recall of a wider range of object properties. 
A final point to be considered is that of the environment in which the stimulus 
objects are presented. Most of the previous work into perception influencing action has 
been conducted on low-level stimulus arrays, with simple items such as coloured 
squares acting as the target stimuli. However, it is important to determine if these 
effects will still take place with common objects, particularly if the action cues used 
include power and precision grips, which can be more easily associated with specific 
objects. Using every-day objects then means we must consider how the background of 
the scene might have an influence. Previous investigations have studied how the 
consistency between scene and foreground objects affects both perception and memory. 
Eye tracking studies have found that it was the inconsistent objects which received 
longer fixations (e.g., Friedman, 1979; Loftus and Mackworth, 1978), which is 
suggested to indicate that the inconsistent items take longer to process in the unusual 
context. When the goal is to identify the objects, some studies have shown a consistency 
benefit, with more accurate reporting of those objects which matched the background 
(e.g., Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989; Davenport and Potter, 2004), although other 
studies have suggested that object processing is unaffected by the scene context, as they 
fail to find any evidence of such a consistency effect (e.g., Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 1998, 1999). Davenport and colleagues (Davenport and Potter, 2004; 
Davenport, 2007) support the idea of a strongly interactive model of scene and object 
identification, where both background and foreground identification are affected by the 
consistency of the other. This discrepancy has been suggested to be due to the differing 
sensitivity of the tasks used by the studies to explore the consistency effect. Overall, the 
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findings are mixed, but there is certainly reason to suggest that the initial exploration 
and inspection of the objects used in the present task will be affected by the nature of 
the scene behind them. 
In terms of memory, studies have shown that it is the inconsistent items that 
were better recalled than the consistent objects (Lampinen, Copeland and Nueschatz, 
2001; Kishiyama and Yonelinas, 2003). Given the previous studies showing that these 
items receive longer fixations than the consistent items, this is in line with other work 
showing that increased fixations on objects improves the recall for those items 
(Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002). From earlier work, it appears that the influence of 
scene context is an important one in both the initial inspection of, and memory for the 
objects, and so in the present study, the selection of both stimulus objects and their 
backgrounds must be carefully controlled. 
In order to facilitate the selection of object stimuli, both in terms of the object’s 
associated environmental location and their associated grip type, a pilot study 
(Experiment 2.1) was conducted, to determine the grips and backgrounds for potential 
object stimuli. Based on these findings, Experiment 2.2 was conducted using the items 
selected. In this study, the influence of action preparation on perception and memory 
was examined. In Experiment 2.2, the action influence was only present at encoding, to 
determine how the action manipulation at this initial stage of memory acquisition might 
affect the construction of the memory representation. 
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3.2 Experiment 2.1: Introduction 
In order to select objects appropriate for the later studies, it was necessary to 
find items that were strongly linked to a particular location and grip type.  
Earlier studies such as Davenport and Potter (2004) and Lampinen et al., (2001) 
showed the importance of the background information in scene perception and memory. 
According to the interactive link Davenport and Potter (2004) found between 
background and foreground, it is possible that object identification and later recall could 
be affected if the items presented do not match the environment. However, it is also 
interesting to consider whether the background environment will contribute particularly 
towards the object property memory. For example, perhaps by presenting the objects in 
a congruent environment, this will trigger associations with using the object in that 
context. As a result, this might have a particular impact on participants’ memory for 
action-relevant properties in objects that are congruent with the environment. However, 
the typical finding of the memory studies into the influence of object/scene consistency 
has been that it is the inconsistent objects that are better recalled, due to the increased 
time spent fixating these items (e.g., Kishiyama and Yonelinas, 2003). It is therefore not 
clear what effects we might expect from the scene category in terms of the memory 
results. In order to address these possibilities, it was decided to have two separate scene 
types to draw objects from. This allowed for the same objects to be presented both as 
congruent and incongruent with the particular environment, controlling for any 
differences that might come from the individual items themselves. In several previous 
affordance studies (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 2004), tasks have required participants to 
determine whether objects come from a garage or kitchen environment, as these are two 
scene types where the associated objects tend not to overlap. Following this idea, one of 
the aims of this study was to assess whether potential objects were strongly associated 
with one of these two locations, and thus allow us to identify a set of objects which 
were consistently considered to be congruent or incongruent with the background 
presented. 
Objects were also assessed in terms of their association with the two grip types, 
power and precision. These are considered to be the two main categories of grip, even in 
terms of neurological representations (e.g., Raos et al., 2006). While most objects, 
therefore, will fit into one particular group, it was necessary that the objects selected 
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were consistently rated as either power or precision grip compatible. Thus, a second aim 
of the study was to determine which items were strongly associated with a particular 
grip type by observers. 
Finally, the study considered how participants categorised object properties, in 
terms of their relevance to either acting with the items, or the appearance of the item. 
This area does not inform the design of later studies, but is an interesting question. 
Previous studies that use object properties as a cue or similar frequently assume a 
difference between features such as shape and colour, (e.g., Tipper et al., 2006). While 
these assumptions are reasonable, they are usually not the result of any particular 
investigation into how people judge properties. Furthermore, while more common 
properties like colour may be relatively easy to class, this may not be as clear for 
properties like texture, which participants might not be so consciously aware of in their 
everyday dealings with items. Of course, participants’ judgement of properties may not 
be relevant for how the current task settings affect the perception of object properties: 
we rarely explicitly consider the shape of a mug when we are reaching for it. However, 
by investigating what properties people do consider to be most important with regards 
to viewing or using an object, we can determine which properties it might be of most 
importance to test for in the future memory investigation. 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Twelve participants (1 male) with a mean age of 20.2 (SD 2.3) were recruited 
for the study, with 6 completing the forced choice version of the questionnaire, and 6 
the free response version. All participants were undergraduate Psychology students at 
the University of Dundee, with access to the on-line study recruitment system. 
Participants received course credit in return for participating. 
3.3.2 Apparatus and Materials 
The study employed two versions of a questionnaire designed for the purposes 
of the experiment. One version used AFC questions, while the other allowed free 
responses to most of the questions. This allowed us to determine if there were other 
options for the background environment or property type which had not been 
considered in the choices provided in the forced choice questionnaire. Both 
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questionnaires were divided into 19 sections, for the 19 objects selected as potential 
stimuli. Within each section, participants were asked to decide what location they would 
most often find that object; what they thought the main use of the object was; what 
properties of the object they thought were most related to its use; what properties of the 
object they thought were most related to its appearance, and what grip they thought the 
object would be most usually held in. 
3.3.2.1 Background. For both questionnaire versions, participants were asked 
what room they would most expect to find the particular object in the question. The four 
options in the forced choice questionnaire were ‘Garage’, ‘Kitchen’, ‘Office’ and 
‘Bathroom’. The objects would be assessed in terms of their compatibility with the 
Garage and Kitchen environments in particular, in accordance with previous studies 
which have used objects from these two different environments, (see, for example, 
Symes et al., 2005; Derbyshire et al., 2006). These two environments are particularly 
useful for such studies, as there is very little or no overlap between the objects typically 
found in each area. The alternative two options, Office and Bathroom, were included as 
they were judged to be sufficiently different from the Garage or the Kitchen, and allow 
participants a wider range of options. Without these, the participants might opt for a 
‘best fit’ approach for categorising the objects, leading to items being assigned to one 
location simply on the grounds that they were never found in the alternative 
environment, rather than due to a true association with the selected background. The 
presentation order of the four options was randomised across the 19 object sections. The 
free response option allowed a response of up to 60 characters. 
3.3.2.2 Object use. In both versions of the questionnaire, this was a free-
response question, allowing a response of up to 60 characters. This question was 
intended as a check that the participants knew what the object was, since it was not 
possible to include pictures as part of the questionnaire. Answers to these questions 
were not used in subsequent analyses. 
3.3.2.3 Properties. In both questionnaires, participants were given the examples 
of shape and colour in the question text, to give them some information as to what was 
meant by the term ‘properties’. For the forced choice version of the questionnaire, eight 
property options were provided for both the use and the appearance of the object: 
‘Colour’, ‘Shape’, ‘Size’, ‘Weight’, ‘Handle orientation’, ‘Object orientation’, 
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‘Decorative patterns’ and ‘Texture’. Up to eight options could be selected by the 
participants. The options were not randomised across the 19 object sections. For the free 
response questionnaire, participants were allowed a response of up to 60 characters.  
3.3.2.4 Grip. As it was unlikely that participants would know the terms ‘Power’ 
and ‘Precision’ when classifying grip types, this question was presented as a 2AFC in 
both questionnaire versions. In the question text, descriptions of the two grip types were 
given, so that participants were informed about the differences. The descriptive text ran 
as follows: ‘When we use objects, we can hold them in one of two different grips. In 
one, we hold the object with a PRECISION grip: holding the object between the thumb 
and fingertips. The other grip is a POWER grip, where the object is held using all the 
fingers against the palm of the hand.’ Participants would then be asked to select the 
appropriate grip type when using the object in that question. 
3.3.3 Procedure 
The study was conducted using an on-line questionnaire, available to people 
signed up to the Dundee University Experiment Manager System. After participants had 
registered for the study, they were immediately presented with the questionnaire. No 
time limit was imposed for completing the study, and participants’ responses were 
saved to the system prior to being downloaded for analysis. To prevent overlap, the 
system stopped participants from signing up to both versions of the questionnaire. 
3.3.4 Design and Analysis 
The responses relating to location, properties and grip were considered 
separately. For the location and properties options, where alternative options could be 
provided by participants, the free response results were coded and combined with the 
options in the forced choice questionnaire. This is explained in more detail in the results 
section. For the questions relating to grip, responses from the two questionnaire types 
could be combined without any changes. Between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted 
on the location options for each object to determine which option was most commonly 
associated with that object. For object properties, pairwise t-tests were conducted to 
determine if each of the properties was more commonly associated with the use or the 
appearance of the object. Similarly, independent t-tests were conducted for each of the 
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objects to determine if they were associated with one grip type significantly more than 
the other. 
3.4 Results 
The responses generated in the free-response questionnaire were combined with 
those from the forced choice version. Most of the free responses were the same or very 
similar to the multiple choice options, and so could be easily incorporated. More detail 
on the extra options that were produced is given in the relevant analyses sections below.  
Responses to the question about object use showed that all participants understood what 
the object was, and how it was normally employed. 
3.4.1 Background 
Participants responding to the free response questionnaire did not generate many 
new locations for this section (that is, those not presented in the forced choice 
questionnaire). The options most commonly provided were ‘Garage’ and ‘Kitchen’, or 
alternative names for locations that were judged to be very similar e.g., ‘Utility room’ 
and ‘Garden shed’ were considered to be similar to Garage, while ‘Dining Room’ was 
considered to be similar to Kitchen. Other options provided by the participants were 
‘Living Room’, ‘Dark Room’, ‘Bedroom’, ‘Hallway’ and ‘Porch’, which were judged to 
not be close enough to any of the four options provided in the forced choice options. As 
the aim of the location questions was to determine whether objects belonged most 
strongly in the Garage or Kitchen, the other options were combined into the single 
category of ‘Other’.  
Free and forced choice responses were combined for the following analyses. 
Seven objects were unanimously classed as belonging in the Kitchen location, so no 
analyses were carried out on these. These objects were the mug, kettle, eggcup, 
peppermill, teaspoon, herb jar and juice bottle. For nine of the remaining 12 objects, 
only two of the three options were selected, so comparisons were made between them 
using dependent t-tests. In order to calculate the scores, the number of times a location 
was selected for an object was counted, and the mean calculated by dividing by twelve 
(the number of participants). These means were compared using a t-test for each of the 
objects. Table 3.1 displays the means and t-values for these items. 
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Table 3.1.  
Mean location scores and t-values across objects 
Object Garage Kitchen Other t-value 
Hammer 0.750 - 0.167 3.92** 
Saw 0.833 - 0.083 5.74** 
Key - 0.417 0.583 -1.48 
Iron - 0.750 0.250  1.92 
Paint tin 0.750 - 0.167 2.55* 
Weed killer 0.917 - 0.083 5.00** 
Superglue 0.750 0.250 - 1.92 
Clothes-peg - 0.833 0.167 2.97* 
Spanner 0.833 - 0.083 4.18** 
  **significant at the .001 level 
  *significant at the .05 level 
For the remaining three objects responses were made across all categories, so 
these were analysed using one-way ANOVAs and post-hoc Bonferroni corrected 
comparisons. Two of these objects were rated as being significantly more likely to 
appear in the Garage location: the screwdriver, F(2,22)= 16.08, p<.001, and the knife, 
F(2,22) =7.21, p=.004. The measuring tape was marginally significantly more likely to 
appear in the Garage, F(2, 22)=2.96, p=.073. 
3.4.2. Grip Type 
Selection of power or precision grip was forced choice in both questionnaires, as 
participants were unlikely to have come across the terms normally, thus data from the 
two questionnaires could be easily combined by tallying the number of times each grip 
was selected for each of the objects. Means were calculated by dividing the total for 
each grip type by twelve, and dependent t-tests were conducted on the resulting 
averages. In some cases, a participant would decline to respond to the question, leading 
to proportion scores which did not sum to one: however, this was not a prevalent 
response. 
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For nine of the objects, the most associated grip type was unanimously decided, 
so no further analysis was necessary. Items that were always associated with a power 
grip were the hammer, saw, paint tin and spanner. Items that were always associated 
with a precision grip were the key, stanley knife, teaspoon, clothes-peg and superglue. 
For the remaining ten objects, Table 3.2 displays the mean scores for power and 
precision responses, and the t-values from the dependent t-tests carried out. 
Table 3.2. 
 Mean power and precision scores and t-values. 
Object Power  Precision t-value 
Mug 0.667 0.333 2.35* 
Kettle 0.917 0.083 7.42** 
Screwdriver 0.667 0.25 2.80* 
Eggcup 0.083 0.917 7.42** 
Peppermill 0.667 0.25 2.80* 
Juice bottle 0.833 0.167 3.55* 
Iron 0.917 0.083 7.42** 
Weed killer 0.833 0.167 4.69** 
Measuring tape 0.25 0.75 3.32* 
Herb jar 0.5 0.417 1.00 
**significant at the .001 level 
*significant at the .05 level 
Together, the location and grip findings allowed us to determine how to class the 
objects for potential use in subsequent studies. Table 3.3 shows all 19 objects and how 
they have been grouped according to location and grip type. Those marked with * are 
the ones which were to be used in further experiments. As well as choosing items that 
had a clear association with a location and a grip, it was also necessary to consider how 
easy it would be to obtain examples of the objects that would vary in properties, such as 
colour or shape, while still remaining a clear example of that item. Due to this, the 
measuring tape and superglue were among the objects chosen for stimuli, although their 
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Location scores showed that they were only marginally more likely to be associated 
with a Garage location. 
Table 3.3.  
Most common grip type and location associated with objects 
Object Location Grip Type 
Hammer* Garage Power 
Saw* Garage Power 
Mug* Kitchen Power 
Kettle* Kitchen Power 
Screwdriver* Garage Power 
Key Other/Kitchen Precision 
Eggcup* Kitchen Precision 
Peppermill Kitchen Power 
Teaspoon*  Kitchen Precision 
Juice bottle* Kitchen Power 
Iron  Kitchen/Other Power 
Paint tin Garage Power 
Weed killer Garage Power 
Clothes-peg* Kitchen Precision 
Superglue* Garage/Other Precision 
Stanley knife* Garage Precision 
Measuring tape* Garage/Other Precision 
Spanner Garage Power 
Herb jar Kitchen Equal  
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3.4.3. Properties 
From the free response questionnaire, participants most frequently produced 
properties that matched the options provided in the forced choice questionnaire, e.g., 
colour, shape, size, weight and patterns. Participants also suggested handle presence, 
materials and labels or marks. The property of materials was added to the texture 
responses, and both labels and marks were added to pattern responses. Handle presence 
was considered to be more closely linked to shape than handle orientation, but was often 
produced alongside the shape option. 
 In the following analyses, the handle presence option was used, but was only taken 
from the 6 participants who responded via the free response questionnaire. Similarly, 
handle orientation scores come only from the forced choice questionnaire responses. 
Also, the property of object orientation was not produced at all in the free response 
questionnaire, and so again, scores were only calculated based on that set of 
participants’ responses. 
The responses from the two questionnaire types were combined, and mean 
scores for each property were calculated. Scores were calculated as a proportion of the 
times the property could have been selected, across all the 19 objects, with the exception 
of the score for the properties of handle orientation and handle presence, where only the 
12 objects with prominent handles were considered. The means and standard deviations 
were then calculated from these proportions. Table 3.4 shows the means and standard 
deviations for each properties action and visual score, while Table 3.5 gives the means 
and standard deviations for the separately considered properties handle orientation, 
object orientation and handle presence. Dependent t-tests were carried out on each 
properties action and visual score, to determine if there were significant differences in 
terms of the times each property was associated with use or appearance. The t values 
and their significance are presented in the final columns of Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 
below. 
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Table 3.4.  
Means and Standard Deviations (SD) of property action and visual scores 
Property Action 
 
Visual 
 
t-value 
 
Mean SD Mean SD  
Colour 0.368 0.597 3.89 1.59 10.76** 
Shape 8.47 1.65 8.11 1.7  -1.07 
Size 7.21 1.13 5.42 1.22 -7.20**  
Weight 4.26 1.69 0.579 0.507 11.67** 
Pattern 0.3684 0.761 1.63 1.71 3.19 * 
Texture 0.684 0.749 0.211 0.419 -2.96 * 
**significant at the .001 level 
*significant at the .05 level 
Table 3.5.  
Means and SDs for properties considered separately 
Property Action 
 
Visual 
 
t-value 
 
Mean SD Mean SD  
Handle 
Presence 2.08 1.44 2.50 1.09 -1.82 
Handle 
Orientation 4.75 1.19 2.17 0.866 -9.94** 
Object 
Orientation 1.68 1.01 0.579 0.507 4.85** 
** significant at the .001 level 
* significant at the .05 level 
 
With the exception of shape and handle presence, all properties were strongly 
classed as either action or visual. Further comparisons were made between the 
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properties to determine if some properties were more readily associated with either the 
action or visual category. Some properties, such as object orientation and texture were 
never produced in the free response category. In the case of texture, free-response 
participants did produce answers such as ‘materials’, which might have been intended to 
convey the same idea. However, as it wasn’t certain that participants intended this, it 
was decided that the data from the forced choice and free response questionnaires would 
be considered separately. 
Scores were again calculated as a proportion of the number of times a property 
could be chosen as either an action or a visual feature, across all objects and 
participants. Both action and visual property scores were compared using within-
subjects one-way ANOVAs.  
For the both the forced choice and free response questionnaires, the ANOVAs 
showed a main effect of property, indicating that the individual properties were 
considered to be of differing importance for the use of the objects by participants. This 
main effect was found to be strong for both the forced choice questionnaire, F(3.65, 
65.68)=92.17, p<.001, and the free response questionnaire, F(3.49, 62.85) = 31.57, 
p<.001. Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons were carried out to determine where the 
differences lay, and again, the patterns were very similar. Figure 3.1 displays the scores 
for responses made in both the free and forced choice questionnaires. 
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Figure 3.1. Mean scores for the properties when rated as relevant to object use, 
top: forced choice responses, bottom: free choice responses. 
The forced choice response participants selected shape as the most important 
property for using an object. Size and weight were also often selected; while less than 
Shape, the amount did not significantly differ (p>.999) Size and weight also did not 
differ significantly from handle orientation (p>.999), and this property was also only 
marginally less selected than shape (p=.059). Object orientation was the next most 
important, chosen significantly more often than the remaining properties, texture, 
pattern and colour (p<.05). The selections of participants in the free response condition 
showed a very similar pattern. Again, shape was the most commonly selected action-
relevant property, significantly more so than size (p<.001), the next most important. 
Handle presence and weight were the next most important properties selected, 
significantly more than texture, pattern and colour (p<.05). 
For the assessment of how visually relevant the properties were, a significant 
main effect of properties was again found for both groups of participants: participants 
responding to the forced choice questionnaire showed a strong main effect, F(3.19, 
57.42)=56.81, p<.001, as did those participating in the free choice version, F(4.25, 
76.56)= 20.14, p<.001. Figure 3.2 displays the mean scores for the visually relevant 
ratings, and Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests were again conducted. 
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Figure 3.2. Mean scores for the properties when rated as relevant to object 
appearance, top: forced choice responses, bottom: free choice responses. 
For participants responding to the forced choice questionnaire, shape was 
selected as the most important visual property, significantly more than any other (all 
ps<.001). Size was selected as the next most important, significantly more than colour, 
patterns and handle orientation (p<.001). The least selected options were weight, 
orientation and texture, with no significant difference between them (p>.999). Similarly, 
participants using the free response questionnaire selected shape as the most important 
visual property, significantly more than size, handle presence and colour, (p<.001). 
These three properties were selected equally often as important visual properties, 
(p>.99). Colour and size were also selected significantly more than pattern, (p<.001), 
although handle presence and pattern did not differ (p>.999). Both pattern and handle 
presence were selected significantly more than weight and texture. These two properties 
did not significantly differ in their selection (p>.999). 
3.5 Discussion 
The findings from Experiment 2.1 were used to inform decisions about the 
objects that will be used in future studies. By asking about the typical location and grip 
type of a set of everyday objects, we can go some way to determining if the objects are 
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appropriate for use as stimuli, due to their associations with the relevant factors. Data 
from these questions is simply confirmatory, but nevertheless important for ensuring the 
validity of the studies that follow. 
The data gathered from the questions regarding properties are not intended to 
inform the design of the later studies. These property judgements are entirely subjective 
on the part of the participants, and so it would not be wise to try to draw strong 
conclusions on the basis of these data. However, it is interesting to consider how these 
subjective ratings relate to previous literature and assumptions about object properties. 
Firstly, it is clear from the questionnaire data that some object properties are 
seen as important when considering objects in terms of both appearance and use. This is 
particularly true for the properties of shape and handle presence (which, it could be 
argued, is strongly linked to the shape of an object). Both these properties were equally 
often selected as action and visually relevant properties, indicating they are considered 
to be equally important to the appearance and use of an object. Indeed, this makes 
sense: not only is an object’s shape important to its use, for example, by informing the 
user of the appropriate grip, it is also an inherent part of the object’s identity as that 
particular object. There are perhaps some links here to Jeannerod’s (1994) suggestions 
that properties are not permanently either pragmatic or semantic, but dependent on the 
situation for how relevant they are to an action or not. Interestingly, while colour was 
strongly rated as a visual property, and weight as an action property, participants still 
occasionally selected colour as action-relevant and weight as visually-relevant. This is 
in some way surprising, given that Jeannerod (1994) suggested that these two properties 
were the ones which would be most strongly linked to only one classification. It is 
possible to consider situations in which a property could be relevant to its alternative 
category, (e.g., the colour of the element on a stovetop indicates whether it is hot, and so 
informs how we act with it), but this most likely reflects a problem with measuring 
properties in this subjective manner. It is much harder to tell exactly how participants 
were interpreting the questions. 
We can link these findings to studies which have used this assumed difference 
between action and visual properties. Tipper et al. (2006) compared affordance effects 
using shape or colour cues, while Phillips and Ward (2002) did the same using texture 
and colour. These studies do not report any particular process used in deciding how to 
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categorise the properties. Instead, it was simply assumed that the divisions fall in this 
way. The assumptions made are reasonable, and borne out by the ratings generated here: 
while shape may be important both visually and for action, it was rated as more action 
relevant than colour; and texture, while less often selected, was more so for action as 
well. However, given that there may be differences in how people rate properties 
depending on the task, it could be useful to make some checks before designing stimuli. 
A final point to consider is the absence of any orientation-related properties in 
the free response version of the questionnaire. It is tempting to consider that this might 
reflect ideas such as Derbyshire et al. (2006), where orientation is suggested to be a 
more extrinsic property and so not an integral part of any object representation. 
However, this is perhaps too speculative a suggestion based only on the current 
questionnaire study. Without the suggestion in the forced choice version of the study, 
participants may simply have not thought of orientation as relevant to the objects at all. 
Perhaps if the questionnaires had included visual images of the objects being tested, 
then this would have prompted more consideration of orientation as a relevant property. 
While the conclusions we can draw from the properties section of the 
questionnaires are perhaps slightly limited, the other sections have provided us with a 
set of object stimuli and their associated classifications for location and grip type. These 
can now be used to inform the analyses of the studies that follow. 
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3.6 Experiment 2.2: Introduction 
Previous work has shown that action preparation can influence the perception of 
objects, biasing attention towards relevant items. Furthermore, memory representations 
can be affected by the nature of the task, with the relevant objects better recalled than 
irrelevant items. However, much of the previous work on how memory representations 
can be affected has focused on the influence that action has either when the task is being 
performed, when it might influence the on-going decisions the participant makes (e.g., 
Droll and Hayhoe, 2007), or after the task, where the resulting memory may have been 
influenced by the actions that have been performed (e.g., Tatler et al., 2013). Very little 
research has addressed how action preparation might also influence the resulting 
representations. The use of preparation means that the study paradigm would involve no 
physical interaction with the objects; instead, the actions are formed almost as an aside 
to the main task. This can be seen in earlier on-line studies, such as Fagioli et al. (2007), 
where the action preparation was interrupted by the search task. Given the strong link 
between action and perception, and perception and memory, it is expected that action 
preparation will affect not only the on-line examination of the scenes, but also the 
representations that are formed. 
In order to examine how perception is affected, the eye movements of 
participants will be tracked as they view the scenes. Eye movements are an invaluable 
measure, as they allow us to determine how the presence of action preparations affects 
how participants perform a strongly perceptual task. Another advantage of the measure 
is that it allows us to determine which objects are not fixated in the course of a task. 
Following the findings that fixated items are better recalled at test (e.g., Hollingworth 
and Henderson, 2002), it is also the case that non-fixated items will not be recalled well, 
if at all. Thus, the records of the eye movements allow us to remove any items that were 
not fixated, and therefore would not be expected to be strongly maintained in the 
representation. 
Memory measures, on the other hand, focus on participants’ ability to recall 
particular properties of the displayed objects. A large amount of memory literature 
shows that object features are stored in a relatively independent way, even without the 
influence of task (e.g., Fougnie et al., 2013). However, various studies have shown that 
task will also influence the memory for properties, making them a useful measure for 
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the influence of action preparation on object representations (see e.g., Triesch et al., 
2003; Tatler et al., 2013). 
The work previously conducted in Experiment 2.1 provided a set of objects that 
are strongly associated with one of the two main grip types. These grips are easy to 
describe to participants in order for them to prepare them, and most objects are closely 
associated with one or the other. Thus, the influence of the grips can be examined in 
terms of the specific objects that relate to them. The presence of the hands at the edge of 
the display screen is used as another means of manipulating the participants’ action 
intentions. This manipulation is not particularly linked to specific objects in the display; 
instead, it allows us to determine if the perception and memory of objects in a particular 
location are affected. Typically, studies which have used the presence of the hands near 
the screen have shown that participants will allocate more attention to items which are 
close to the hands (Davoli et al., 2010; Abrams et al., 2008). Thus, in the present study, 
items which are positioned at the left and right of the screen will be closer to the hands 
than those in the centre, so may receive more attention during the encoding stage, and 
be better recalled at the subsequent memory stage. 
By using real objects presented against real backgrounds, we aim to determine 
whether the presence of action preparations during the encoding of information 
influences both the immediate allocation of attention to the objects, and the subsequent 
storage and retrieval of information in memory. 
3.7 Method 
3.7.1 Participants 
Participants were 46 undergraduate students (13 males), with a mean age of 23.4 
(SD: 3.6). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Handedness and 
eye dominance were measured by self-report: the sample contained 8 left handers and 
15 participants showing left eye dominance. They received course credits or payment 
(£3) for their participation in the study. 
3.7.2 Apparatus and Materials 
3.7.2.1 Object stimuli. Using the results of Experiment 2.1, 12 objects were 
selected from the original 19 presented in the questionnaire. To be selected, objects had 
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to be clearly associated with one location (either garage or kitchen) and one grip type 
(power or precision). The object also had to be available in a range of colours and 
shapes, to allow different exemplars to be obtained for the stimulus sets. In the final set, 
6 items were associated with kitchen locations, and within that group, 3 were classed as 
precision items and 3 as power items. The other 6 objects were associated with a garage 
location, and again, half were precision and half were power grip objects. (See Table 
3.3. for the selected items). 
To create the scenes viewed by the participants, three sets of the 12 selected 
objects were obtained. The 12 object types were repeated across the three groups, but 
the properties of colour and shape differed across the sets (i.e. each set contained a mug 
as an object, but each mug differed from the other in these intrinsic properties).  
Three scenes were created: a kitchen scene, in which each set of objects was placed on a 
work surface; a workshop scene, in which the objects were positioned on a work bench 
and a neutral scene, in which the objects were positioned on a table top, with no 
distinguishing background behind them. Figure 3.3 shows an example of one of the 
versions of the neutral environment. 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of neutral scene and object group viewed by participants 
The extrinsic properties of orientation and position were counterbalanced across 
the three scenes, so that objects were equally likely to appear in the centre or at the 
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edges of a scene, and at different orientations over the three environments. For each 
environment, three scenes were created, each featuring one 12-item set of objects. In 
total, nine stimulus scenes were created.  
3.7.2.2. Stimulus questionnaires. For each object, five questions were created, 
to test participants’ memory for the objects presence, colour, shape, position and 
orientation. These were designed as four-alternative forced choice (AFC) questions, 
with the exception of orientation, which was tested using a 2AFC question. For 
presence and colour, the questions presented the participant with four words (object or 
colour names), of which one was the correct response. For shape, the four options were 
line drawings of shape variations of the target. For orientation, two drawings of a 
standard example of the object were presented, shown orientated to the left or right. 
These orientation drawings did not appear as any of the options for shape, and were not 
the actual shape of the object (this was explained to participants). For position, a line 
drawing of the scene outline was presented, with four positions indicated on the table 
top, labelled A-D. The incorrect position options corresponded to the positions of other 
objects within the scene. In all cases foils were plausible for the type of object under 
test. Figure 3.4 displays examples of the questionnaire images for a single object. 
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Figure 3.4. Example questions for the presence, colour, orientation, shape and 
position of a mug in a neutral environment 
Stimulus presentation and response collection was controlled by scripts written 
in MatLab, using the PsychToolBox and EyeLinkToolBox extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997; Cornelissen, Peters and Palmer, 2002). Both the stimulus photographs and 
the question screens were displayed to the participants on the display monitor of the 
EyeLink 1000, at a resolution of 1024 by 768. 
3.7.2.3 Eye tracking. Participants’ eye movements were monitored and 
recorded on the EyeLink 1000 eye tracker, set to track the participants’ dominant eye. A 
9-point calibration grid, followed by a 9-point validation grid were used to fit and test 
the spatial accuracy of the eye tracker at the start of each experiment. If the validation 
procedure showed a mean spatial accuracy worse than 0.5 degrees or a maximum spatial 
accuracy worse than 1 degree, calibration and set up were repeated. Saccades were 
detected using the standard SR Research algorithm.  
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3.7.3 Procedure 
Each trial began with a central fixation marker, with scene onset triggered by the 
experimenter. The scene was then presented for 20 seconds. Scene presentation order 
was counterbalanced across participants.  
Participants were assigned to four experimental groups, with each group 
required to maintain a different pose with their hands during scene presentation. In the 
passive viewing condition, participants simply observed the scene with no further action 
pose (Figure 3.6a). In the ‘hands’ condition, participants were asked to hold the edges of 
the monitor with both hands; that is, they sat with their arms outstretched, and hands 
touching the edges of the display screen (Figure 3.6b). In the two grasp conditions, 
participants held a device which ensured they were making either a precision grip 
(finger and thumbs gripping a smaller object; Figure 3.6c) or a power grip (the whole 
hand grasping a large object; Figure 3.6d). This device was similar in dimension to the 
response device used by Symes et al. (2008) in their change detection study, with a 
power grip component of 3.5 cm diameter, and a precision grip component of 1.25 cm 
in width and length. To avoid using the grip names, in case this caused participants to 
make conscious associations between their actions and the stimuli, the power 
component was referred to as the black section, and the precision component as the 
white section (see Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5. Grip device used to maintain power (black component) or precision 
(white component) grips 
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Action poses were terminated at the end of scene presentation on each trial (that 
is prior to the memory questions). Figure 3.6 shows the poses adopted by participants in 
the four conditions. 
 
Figure 3.6. Top left- bottom right: examples of Passive, Hands, Precision and 
Power intention conditions 
The monitor was positioned 45 cm from the observer for all conditions. In the 
grip conditions, the placement of the grasp device meant the dominant hand was 30 cm 
from the screen. 
After viewing the scene, participants were presented with the object questions 
for the object set they had just observed. Questions were presented on the same monitor 
on which the scenes had been viewed and objects were tested in random order for each 
participant. For each object, the question about its presence was asked first, followed by 
the questions relating to its particular properties, in random order.  
Participants responded to the questions by pressing keys labelled  ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ 
and ‘D’ on the keyboard (actual keys were the numbers 1-4 on the keyboard number 
pad) corresponding to the option they believed was correct for that question. After 
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answering the 60 questions for that scene, they were re-calibrated on the eye-tracker and 
asked to resume the intention position they had been holding. They then followed the 
same procedure for the next two scenes and associated question sets. 
3.7.4 Design 
One between-subjects independent variable of viewing condition was 
manipulated; this had four levels, passive viewing (baseline), viewing with hands on the 
edge of the screen, and viewing whilst making a grip gesture, either power or precision 
The dependent variables of the study were the participant’s memory for the displayed 
objects, and their properties (colour, shape, position and orientation), and their eye 
movement behaviour as they viewed the scenes. The measures taken from the eye 
tracking for further analysis were the average fixation number (the average number of 
times objects were fixated during the scene presentation), the average fixation duration 
(the average total time participants spent fixating objects during scene presentation) and 
the primacy fixation number (a measure of how early or late in the presentation period 
objects were first fixated by participants). 
3.8 Results 
Objects that were not fixated were removed from the analyses that follow, as we 
were interested in how the action postures might affect the extraction of information 
within and between fixations. The influence of the intention condition was examined 
both for the eye-movements of the participants, and their performance on the memory 
questions. The influence was examined in terms of effects on objects classed by their 
grip type (power or precision), their location within the scene (left, right or centre), and 
their congruency with the background environment (congruent or incongruent). As well 
as how fixations related to objects within the scene, the way in which intention affected 
the overall inspection of the scene was also examined. 
In reporting the results of ANOVAs and other analyses, full statistical results 
will not be given if the results are such that F values are less than 1. This will be so for 
analyses in all following chapters. Similarly, all post-hoc investigations are carried out 
using Bonferroni-corrected tests. 
3.8.1 Influence of intention on inspection 
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3.8.1.1 Scene inspection. Before considering how the intention groups might 
affect the deployment of attention to individual objects in the scenes, we examined how 
the overall inspection of the scene might be affected. In particular, we were concerned 
with how the presence of the hands might influence inspection, as there are several 
studies which suggest an influence of the hands on the distribution of attention, with 
increased attention to items and areas near the hands. Following this idea, scene 
inspection was analysed by splitting the scenes into thirds-left, centre, and right- and 
using these as the regions of interest for analysis. The average total fixation number and 
average total fixation time across all scene areas were examined as functions of the 
intention groups. A third measure of fixation was the average first fixation to a region. 
By determining how many fixations participants made within a trial, it was possible to 
determine an average score which showed how early (or late) in the trials participants 
first made a fixation to a particular scene region. 
Mixed factorial ANOVAs were conducted for the three levels of scene region 
(left, centre and right), and the four levels of intention group (passive, hands, power grip 
and precision grip). The total fixation time spent on each region was first examined. 
For fixation numbers, a significant main effect of the region was found, 
F(1.80,73.89)=82.03,p<.000, with more fixations on the central region (M=26.8 ) than 
the left (M=18.6) and right (M=16.4, ps<.01), but no influence from the intention group, 
or interaction between them (Fs<1). As there was a strong tendency for participants to 
fixate the central region (in line with the standard finding of a central bias in scene 
viewing), a second ANOVA was run without the data for the central region, in case this 
was masking other effects. Without this data, the main effect of region was still present, 
F(1,41)= 5.12, p=.029, with participants making more fixations on the left hand side 
than the right. However, there was still no main effect of the intention group, and no 
interaction between them.  
Similar findings emerged when the average total fixation time was used as the 
measure. A main effect of scene region emerged, F(1.87, 76.71)= 71.55, p<.001, but 
this was again driven by the participants tendency to fixate the centre (M=7744 ms). 
When only left (M=5290 ms) and right (M=4877 ms) regions were compared, this main 
effect disappeared, F(1,41) = 2.11, p=.154. The effect of intention and potential 
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interaction between intention group and scene region were not significant in either 
analysis (all Fs <1). 
Examining how the intention group might influence the scene regions in terms 
of the average first fixation to a region was more promising, as it allowed us to examine 
the initial explorations that participants made to the scenes. It was found that all 
participants made their first fixations to the central region, presumably due to the 
presentation of a drift correction point in the centre of the blank screen that preceded the 
stimulus scene. As a result, the central data was again removed to prevent the results 
being skewed. Here, it was found that there was a strong main effect of the scene 
region, F(1,41) = 23.03, p<.001, with fixations made earlier to the left region of the 
scene (M=8.3) compared to the right, (M= 17.8). No main effect of the intention group 
(F<1) was found. However, there was also a significant interaction between the 
intention group and the scene region, F(3,41) = 3.15, p=.035. Post-hoc comparisons 
showed that this interaction was driven by the power and precision groups in particular. 
Both showed significantly earlier looks to the left hand side of the scene than the right 
(precision left M=5.4, power left M=6.0; precision right M=22.4, power right M=19.6, 
ps<.05). Meanwhile, participants in the passive and hands intention groups appear to 
first fixate the left and right sides equally early on in the trial. Figure 3.7 displays the 
average first fixation number to the left and right regions across the four intention 
groups. 
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Figure 3.7. Average first fixation on left and right of scene across intention 
groups 
When exploring the presented scenes, it seems that participants tended to fixate 
the left side of the screen earlier than the right side, regardless of the intention condition 
they were in. However, this pattern is at its strongest for those participants who formed 
power or precision grips during the scene viewing stage. 
3.8.1.2. Object category. Analyses were conducted to determine if object 
category (kitchen or garage) and its congruency with the backgrounds (garage, kitchen 
or neutral) had an influence on the way particular objects were examined. Measures of 
fixation numbers and durations on the objects in each category were analysed using 
within subject ANOVAs. 
For measures of average total fixation time, a main effect of the object category 
was found, F(1,45) = 44.00, p<.001, such that participants spent significantly longer 
fixating objects compatible with a garage environment (M=1848 ms) than a kitchen 
environment, (M=1519 ms). No main effect was found for the scene category, F(2,90) = 
1.53, p=0.22. However, the interaction between scene and object category was 
significant, F(2,90) = 6.19, p = 0.003. The same pattern of results was found for fixation 
number, with a main effect of object category, F(1,45) = 55.71, p<.001, again due to 
more fixations on garage type objects (M=6.5) than kitchen objects (M=5.2), but no 
significant effect of the scene environment, F(2,90) = 1.43, p=0.25. The interaction 
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between the two was again significant, F(2,90) =6.74, p=.002. Figure 3.8 displays the 
findings for the measure of fixation numbers and total fixation duration.  
The interactions for both measures showed that the tendency to fixate garage 
objects more than kitchen objects was consistent across all scene types (all ps<.05). 
Looking at the two object categories individually showed that kitchen objects were 
fixated less often in the kitchen environment (M=4.7) and for less time (M=1409 ms) 
compared to garage (fixation number M=5.3, fixation duration M=1592 ms) or neutral 
environments (fixation number M=5.5, fixation duration M=1556 ms, all ps<.05), while 
the inspection of the garage objects was unaffected by the environment (fixation 
number, p=0.22; fixation duration, p=0.34). 
 
Figure 3.8. Mean fixation durations (left) and fixation numbers (right) to object 
types across the three scene categories 
3.8.1.3 Object grip type. We examined whether the grip associated with the 
stimulus objects and the intention position maintained by the participants would have 
any influence on their inspection of the objects displayed. Mixed factorial ANOVAs 
were conducted for the two types of grip (power and precision), and four levels of 
intention group (passive, hands, power grip and precision grip). Both average total 
fixation time and number of fixations were used as measures. 
Measures of total fixation time showed a main effect of the object grip type, 
F(1,42) = 63.60, p<.001, but not of intention, F(3,42) =1.06, p=.378. Participants spent 
longer fixating the power grip-compatible objects (M=1822ms) than precision grip-
compatible objects (M=1536ms). The interaction between the two factors was 
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significant, however, F(3,42) = 3.82, p = .017. Post-hoc comparisons showed fixation 
durations on objects compatible with precision grip manipulations differed depending 
upon the intention condition under which they were observed: total time spent fixating 
these objects was significantly longer when participants were generating a precision 
grip M=1672 ms) than when they were generating a power grip (M=1444 ms, p < .05) 
or were grasping the monitor sides with both hands (M=1415 ms, p < .05). No other 
comparisons for precision grip objects were significantly different. The total time spent 
fixating objects compatible with a power grip was not influenced by the intention 
condition in which it was observed.  
Figure 3.9 shows the average total fixation times on object types across the 
intention conditions. 
 
Figure 3.9. Average total fixation times across intention groups and object grip 
types 
The same analyses were conducted for the measures of fixation number, and a 
similar pattern emerged. There was a main effect of object grip type, F(1,42) = 108.88, 
p<.001, with more fixations made to power grip-compatible items (M=6.7) than 
precision-compatible items (M=5.1) and only a marginal effect of intention condition, 
F(3,42) = 2.55, p = .067, with a significant interaction between the two, F(1,42) = 2.92, 
p=.045. Again, participants in all intention groups did not differ significantly in the 
number of fixations they made to power-grip objects, but showed a significant 
difference in the average number of fixations made to precision objects across the 
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groups. Marginally more fixations were made to the precision-grip objects (M=5.7) by 
participants in the precision grip group, compared to those in the power (M=4.5, p<.06) 
or hands intention conditions (M=4.6, p<.08). Figure 3.10 displays the data for the 
fixation number analysis, which shows clearly that there is a similar pattern occurring 
with regards to the fixations to precision-compatible objects when participants are in the 
hands or power intention condition. 
 
Figure 3.10 Average fixation numbers across intention groups and object grip 
types 
3.8.1.4 Object position. To examine the influence of position on the fixation 
measures, a similar approach was used to that when analysing inspection at the scene 
level: objects were coded as being located on the left, right or centre of the screen. This 
analysis was conducted largely to further investigate the influence of the proximity of 
the hands to the objects, and how it might affect the attentional allocation to objects at 
the left and right of the screen. Mixed factorial ANOVAs were conducted on the three 
levels of position (left, right and centre) and four levels of intention (passive, hands, 
precision grip and power grip). As DVs we measured total fixation time and number of 
fixations on objects, and the ordinal number in the trial on which an object was first 
fixated.  
For total fixation time on objects there was no main effect of the intention group 
(F<1), but there was a main effect of position, F(2,84) = 4.31, p=.016. Post hoc 
comparisons showed this was driven by participants’ tendency to fixate objects on the 
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right hand side (M=1763 ms) for shorter periods of time in comparison to those on the 
left (M=1552 ms, p<.05). There was also no interaction found between the intention 
group and the objects’ positions (F<1). 
For the measure of fixation number, a marginal main effect of intention was 
found, F(3,42) = 2.58, p=.066, as well as the main effect of position, F(2,84) = 9.74, 
p<.001, and no interaction between them. The main effect of position was due to the 
greater number of fixations made to the right side of the scene (M=5.2) compared to the 
left (M=6.0) and centre (M=6.1, p<.05). After splitting the data into the individual 
intention groups, it was found that the marginal effect came from the precision and 
power grip groups. Participants in both these groups made significantly fewer fixations 
to objects placed on the right hand side (power M=4.7, precision M=5.1) than those in 
the centre (power M= 5.9, precision M= 6.3, all ps<.05). Figure 3.11 displays the mean 
fixation duration and fixation number data for the scene positions across the four 
intention groups. 
 
Figure 3.11. Mean fixation durations (L) and fixation numbers (R) across 
position and intention groups 
Measures of the average first fixation to the objects showed main effects of the 
position, F(2,84) = 14.26, p<.001, but not of intention (F<1), although there was an 
interaction between them, F(6,84) = 2.75, p=.017. The main effect was driven by a 
tendency to first fixate the objects on the right hand side of the screen (M=23.5) 
significantly later than the left side of the screen (M=16.6, p<.01).  
To explore the interaction between intention and position, the data were split by 
both the separate positions, and the intention groups. Three one-way ANOVAs were 
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conducted across the four intention groups, each using data from only a single location. 
For objects on the left of the scene there was an effect of intention, F(3,42) = 4.82, 
p=.005. Post-hoc tests revealed that participants in the hands condition looked later to 
objects on the left (M=20.6) than subjects in the precision grip (M=13.8, p < .05) or 
power grip (M=14.0, p < .05) conditions. For the other positions in the scene there were 
no effects of intention condition.  
Examining the differences in position within each of the intention groups 
showed main effects for the power and precision grip groups. For these conditions, on 
average the first fixation to the right hand side (power M=24.3, precision M=27.8) was 
significantly later than that to the left hand side (power M=14.0, precision M=13.8) and 
the centre (power M=17.2, precision M=17.7; all differences p<.05). A similar pattern is 
seen for participants in the passive intention group, but this was not significant. The 
hands intention group shows no such influence, with a more even distribution of 
fixations across the scene. Figure 3.12 shows the average first fixation number to 
objects across the screen as a function of the intention condition during viewing. 
 
Figure 3.12: Average first fixation number across intention groups and object 
positions 
A possible reason for the inspection patterns seen in participants in the grip 
groups was that they were spending more time on items compatible with their grip 
posture on the left hand side of the screen, reducing the time spent on the right hand 
side, and increasing the time it took them to first fixate that area. To investigate this, 
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each intention group was analysed in terms of the influence both grip and position had 
on the fixation measures. 
Passive. For measures of fixation number, there was a main effect of object grip 
type, F(1,10)=18.44, p=.001, with power items receiving more fixations (power M=7.0, 
precision M=5.5) but no effect of position, F(2,20) = 2.34, p=.12, and no interaction 
between them, F(2,20) = 1.44, p=.26. A similar pattern was seen for the fixation 
duration measures, with longer fixations on power grip objects, F(1,10)=5.46,p=.042, 
(power M=1825 ms, precision M=1616 ms), and a marginal difference between the 
object positions, F(2,20)= 3.45,p=.052 with shorter average fixations on right hand side 
objects than the left (right M=1519 ms, left M=1938 ms, p=.01), but still no interaction 
between them (F<1). 
Hands. For fixation number, there was a main effect of both grip, F(1,11) 
=49.65,p<.01, with more fixations on power grip objects (power M=6.6, precision 
M=4.6). A main effect of position was found, F(2,22)=3.96, p=.03, with means 
indicating more fixations made to the centre of the screen (M=6.1) than the left (M=5.6) 
or right (M=5.2), although post-hoc comparisons did not reveal a significant differences 
between these fixations (ps>.05). No interaction between the factors was found F(2,22) 
= 1.87, p=.17. Measures of fixation duration showed only a main effect of grip, F(1,11) 
=47.39,p<.01 with an advantage for power compatible objects, (power M=1836 ms, 
precision M=1426 ms)and no effects of position, or interactions. 
Precision. Fixation numbers showed more fixations on power grip objects, 
F(1,10)=11.57,p=.007, (power M=6.5, precision M=5.6) and a marginal effect of 
position, F(2,20)=3.36,p=.055, with more fixations on objects on the left hand side 
(M=6.7) than the right (M=5.1, p<.05); but no interaction between them (F<1). 
Measures of fixation duration showed a marginal effect of the grip, F(1,10)=4.30, 
p=.065, (power M=1792 ms, precision M=1652 ms)but not position, and no interaction 
between them (F<1). 
Power. Significantly more fixations were made to power grip objects, 
F(1,11)=57.25, p<.001, (power M=6.2, precision M=4.4) and to items on the left hand 
side than the right hand side, F(2,22)=10.87,p<.001 (left M=5.6, right M=4.5, p<.05). In 
fixation duration measures, significantly longer fixations were made to power grip 
objects, F1,11)=33.38,p<.001, (power M=1823 ms, precision M=1572 ms) but no 
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difference was found for the fixation durations on objects at each position, 
F(2,22)=1.48,p=.250. Neither measure showed an interaction between the two factors 
(Fs<1). 
The tendency to fixate power objects more was consistent across all intention 
groups, but there seems to be no influence of the object grip type on the fixations at 
particular locations in the scenes, when the individual groups are examined. Only when 
all positions were examined in a single analysis did the effect occur.  While participants 
in the power and precision intention conditions did show the expected increased 
fixations to the left hand side of the screen, this did not appear to be due to spending 
increased time on the objects with grip types compatible with the posture they were 
maintaining. 
Thus far, the investigation of the influence of action postures on inspection 
patterns has shown the postures to have some influence on the way in which the scenes 
were viewed. In general, participants tended to inspect the scenes by moving from left 
to right. This was so at both the scene and object level. The intention condition of the 
participant influenced this left-to-right progression, with participants in the power and 
precision conditions spending longer on the left hand side, and not inspecting the right 
hand side until later in the trial. In contrast to this, participants in the hands condition 
did not show this pronounced left-to-right progression, showing a pattern of first 
fixations which are more evenly spread across the scene. 
While different scene backgrounds were used, this factor did not appear to 
influence inspection, and participants consistently spend more time fixating objects that 
were compatible with a garage location, regardless of the actual scene background. 
The intention condition seemed to affect the fixation patterns in regards to the 
object grip types. Those participants in the hands and power intention conditions made 
fewer fixations, and spent less time fixating objects that were compatible with a 
precision grip, compared to conditions in which the participants formed the precision 
grip during the viewing period. 
3.8.2 Influence of intention on memory 
The memory data were first examined by determining whether the memory 
responses were above chance level for each property question, across the intention 
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groups. Intention groups were considered separately at this stage, as later analyses 
would require examining the memory performance of each intention group 
independently also. Table 3.6 presents the mean scores for the property questions across 
the four intention groups. By analysing the properties separately, we can examine 
differences that emerge between the property types, and determine if these can be 
related to previously considered differences in the properties, such as their action or 
visual relevance (e.g., Tipper et al., 2006), and their relevance to the action 
manipulations participants performed. 
Table 3.6.  
Mean memory scores for individual property questions across intention groups 
Question 
Intention 
Group 
Colour Shape Orientation Position Presence 
Passive 0.553 0.520 0.583 0.627 0.856 
Hands 0.563 0.528 0.593 0.616 0.808 
Precision 0.515 0.492 0.626 0.551 0.841 
Power 0.486 0.484 0.551 0.569 0.789 
 
One-sample t-tests were conducted to determine if responses were above chance. 
Performance on the memory questions for the properties of colour, shape and position 
was found to be above chance (0.25) in all cases (all ps < .01). For the questions 
regarding orientation, the use of 2AFC questions meant chance was rated at 0.50, and 
again, the mean responses across the intention groups were found to be significantly 
above this level (all ps<.05). The object presence question was discarded, as 
performance in trials 2 and 3 were near ceiling, presumably because participants 
realised that the same types of object were present in each scene they viewed: it was 
only the properties of the object that varied between trials. 
3.8.2.1 Object category. An initial analysis of how participants’ overall 
memory score was affected by the object and scene type used the memory score across 
all responses to the three intrinsic property questions, (colour, shape and position). A 
main effect of the scene type was found, F(2,90) = 17.87, p<.001, and also a main effect 
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of object type, F(1,45) = 24.84, p<.001, with significantly better performance on objects 
that were classed as kitchen items. Better performance was found for those objects that 
were present in the garage and neutral scenes compared to those in the kitchen 
environment (p’s <.001). The interaction between the two was not found to be 
significant (F<1). 
Another possibility was that individual properties might be separately affected 
by the environment and object type. Thus, the data were split according to the four 
properties, and examined again using mixed factorial ANOVAs. 
Colour. Participants responses to colour questions showed a main effect of the 
scene type, F(2,90) = 6.65, p=.002, and of the object category, F(1,45) = 23.34, p<.001. 
Again, participants showed better recall for object colours when they were kitchen 
objects (kitchen M=0.60, garage M=0.48), and worse performance on those items that 
were present in the kitchen environment (kitchen M=0.47, garage M=0.58, neutral 
M=0.56, ps<.05). The interaction between the two was found to be marginal, F(2,90)= 
2.65, p=.076, with participants showing no significant difference on responding to 
kitchen or garage items in the kitchen environment, but advantages for kitchen objects 
over garage items in the garage (kitchen M=0.64, garage M=0.53, ps <.05) and neutral 
environments (kitchen M=0.65, garage M=0.47, ps <.05). 
Shape. For shape, a main effect of scene type was found, F(2,90) = 8.70, p = 
.003, as was a main effect of object category, F(1,45)= 26.48, p<.001, but no significant 
interaction between them, F(2,90)= 1.12, p=.331. Performance on this property question 
followed the same pattern, with participants recalling the shape of kitchen objects better 
than garage items (kitchen M=0.57, garage M=0.46), but performing poorly on objects 
in the kitchen environment compared to the other backgrounds, (kitchen M=0.46, 
garage M=0.53, neutral M=0.56, ps<.05). 
Orientation. For orientation, the effects of scene type and object category were 
both found to be only marginally significant. However, again the patterns were similar 
to that of the other properties. For scene type, F(2,90) = 2.71, p=.072, performance was 
worse for the kitchen environment (kitchen M=0.55, garage M=0.60, neutral M=0.63, 
ps<.05), while for object category, F(1,45)= 3.34, p=.074, it was the kitchen items that 
were better recalled (kitchen M=0.62, garage M=0.57). The interaction between them 
was non-significant (F<1). 
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Position. For position, again, there was a significant main effect of the scene 
type, F(2,90) = 11.14, p<.001, and for object category, F(1,45) = 9.46, p=.003, as well 
as a significant interaction between them, F(2,90) = 5.03, p=.008. The interaction 
showed that while participants were better at recalling kitchen items in the garage 
(kitchen M=0.73, garage M=0.55) and neutral environments (kitchen M=0.68, garage 
M=0.59, ps<.01) there was no such difference for the kitchen environment (kitchen 
M=0.50, garage M=0.50). As for the other properties, participants showed an advantage 
for recalling the position of kitchen objects, (kitchen M=0.64, garage M=0.55) but were 
poorer when the objects were presented in the kitchen environments (kitchen M=0.50, 
garage M=0.64, neutral M=0.64, ps<.05). 
Overall, it seems that performance on the property questions largely follows that 
of participants’ overall performance in terms of the effects that the object category and 
scene type have on memory. Figure 3.13 presents the memory scores for each of the 
four property types for the two object categories and three scene types. 
 
Figure 3.13. Memory scores as proportion correct for the four property 
questions across the three scene categories and two object categories (Left to right, top 
to bottom: colour, orientation, shape and position) 
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3.8.2.2 Object grip type. To investigate any potential effects on memory, the 
data set were split by the intention group, and within subjects ANOVAs were conducted 
on the object grip type and question type within each group. This was to determine 
whether the intention condition influenced responses to the questions relating to items 
that were compatible or incompatible with the type of grip, or afforded grip, in the case 
of the hands condition. While the properties of Colour, Shape and Position were 
included within the same ANOVA, Orientation was considered separately, due to its 
presentation as a 2AFC question. Furthermore, while the one-sample t-tests at the object 
level showed participants were scoring above chance for the orientation questions, when 
the scores on orientation questions were examined at the level of different grip postures, 
it was necessary to determine whether these scores were above chance too. These tests 
were performed as appropriate throughout the following sections. 
Passive observation. For participants who did not produce an action pose during 
viewing, there was a main effect of question type, F(2,20) = 6.40, p = .007, and a 
marginal interaction between the question type and object grip type, F(2,20) = 2.78, p 
=.086, but no significant effect of grip (F<1). In examining the influence of the question 
type further, post-hoc comparisons showed a significant difference between 
performance on position (M=0.63) and shape questions (M=0.53, p<.01) and a 
marginally significant difference between position and colour (M=0.55, p<.1). 
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Figure 3.14. Mean proportion of correct responses to power and precision 
objects following passive observation during encoding 
We further investigated effects across the property questions specific to the 
power and precision grip objects, using one-way ANOVAs. The passive observation 
group showed a marginal effect of question type for power grip objects, F(2,20) = 3.10, 
p =.067. Post hoc comparisons showed a marginal difference, with an advantage for 
position (M=0.64) over colour (M=0.53) and shape (M=0.58, p<.1). For the precision 
grip objects, there was an effect of question type, F(2,20) = 5.97, p =.009. Post hoc 
comparisons showed that shape (M=0.48) was answered significantly worse than 
position (M=0.62, p<.05), but no difference between position and colour responses 
(M=0.56). 
For the orientation questions, it was found that while the memory score for 
precision compatible items was significantly above chance (p=.002), the score for 
power compatible objects was not (p=.116). These scores were also found to not be 
significantly different from one another, t (15.53) =-1.40, p=0.181. 
Hands intention. When participants grasped the sides of the monitor while 
viewing the scenes, a marginal main effect of question type was found, F(2,22) = 4.91, 
p=.017, however there was no effect of object grip type (F<1), and the interaction 
between grip and question type was not significant (F<1). Post-hoc comparisons 
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showed position questions (M=0.62) were responded to significantly better than shape 
(M=0.52, p<.05) but were not significantly better than colour (M=0.57). 
 
Figure 3.15. Mean proportion of correct responses to power and precision 
objects following proximal hands at encoding 
For responses to questions on power grip compatible objects, a significant main 
effect was found, F(2,22) = 3.72, p=.041, which arose from a marginally significant 
advantage for position (M=0.64) over shape (M=0.54, p<.1). For responses to precision 
object questions, while a marginal main effect was found, F(2,22)=3.10, p=.065, post-
hoc comparisons did not show significant differences. The trends in the data however, 
suggest a similar position advantage (M=0.60) over the shape questions (M=0.51). 
For both power and precision compatible objects, the score on orientation 
questions was significantly above chance (p=.01 and p=0.003, respectively). No 
difference was found between scores for power and precision objects, t(21.93)=-0.604, 
p=.552. 
Precision intention. When participants maintained a precision grip while they 
viewed the scenes, no main effects or interactions were found within the group. 
Participants showed no difference in their recall of the three question types, 
F(2,20)=1.05, p=.368, or for the two object grip types, F(1,10)=2.40, p=.152. The 
interaction between the two factors was also not significant, F(2,20)=2.21, p=.136.  
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Figure 3.16. Mean proportion of correct responses to power and precision 
objects following precision grip at encoding 
To further investigate potential effects, responses to power compatible and 
precision compatible objects were examined separately, using one-way ANOVAs to 
compare responses to the three questions. For the power grip compatible objects, no 
main effect of question type for power compatible objects was found (F<1). For 
precision grip compatible objects a marginal main effect of question type was found, 
F(2,22) = 3.09, p=.068. Post-hoc comparisons showed no significant differences but the 
trend in the data indicates a position advantage (M=0.61) over shape questions 
(M=0.50). 
Responses on the orientation questions for power and precision compatible 
objects were both significantly above chance (p<0.001 for both). However, there was 
again found to be no significant difference between scores on power and precision 
objects, t(17.99)=-0.122, p=.904. 
Power intention. For participants who maintained a power grip during viewing, 
a main effect of question type was found, F(2,22) = 4.91, p=.017, again driven by an 
advantage for position questions. No main effect of object grip type was found (F<1) 
and no interaction between the two factors was present, F(2,22)=1.94, p=.17. Post-hoc 
comparisons for the main effect of question type showed a significant advantage for 
position (M=0.57) over shape (M=0.48, p<.01). 
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Figure 3.17. Mean proportion of correct responses to power and precision 
objects following power grip at encoding 
The one way ANOVAs conducted on each object grip type showed no 
significant difference between responses to power grip objects (F<1).  
For objects compatible with precision grips a significant effect of question type 
was found, F(2,22) = 8.46, p=.002, in which both position (M=0.59) and colour 
(M=0.52) questions for these objects were answered significantly better than questions 
about object shape (M=0.44, p<.05). 
Scores for the orientation questions on precision compatible objects were only 
marginally above chance (p=0.0592), while scores for power compatible objects were 
no different from chance (p=0.151). No difference was found between scores for power 
and precision objects when testing orientation memory, t(21.95)=-0.441, p=.664. 
In summary, it seems that participants are able to recall the position of objects 
well, with this information consistently being recalled better than the other properties of 
shape and colour. This pattern is present for participants in all of the four intention 
conditions. The intention condition under which the participants encoded the scenes and 
the grip types of the objects themselves does not appear to influence recall of the object 
properties. This finding is also consistent across the intention conditions. 
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3.8.2.3 Object position. In order to consider whether memory was different for 
objects located toward the left, centre or right of the scenes, mixed factorial ANOVAs 
were conducted on the three levels of position (left, right and centre), the four intention 
groups, and the four question types, with orientation questions again considered 
separately. 
No main effect of intention or position was found, although there was a main 
effect of question type, F(2,84) = 15.75, p<.001. This came from the better performance 
on position (M=0.59) questions compared to both colour (M=0.54) and shape questions 
(M=0.51, ps<.05). 
The intention group which might have the most effect relating to position was 
the hands, as the objects at the left or right of the screen would be those in closest 
proximity to the hands, and so might show an advantage for these (Reed et al., 2006). 
We therefore examined effects of position separately for each intention condition. 
Again, data from orientation questions was examined separately. 
Passive observation. For participants who held no action posture during the trial, 
there was found to be a main effect of question, F(2,20)= 6.78,p=.005, such that 
position questions(M=0.63) were answered significantly better than shape(M=0.55, 
p<.05). There was no main effect of position, F(2,20) = 1.62,p=0.223, and no 
interaction between them (F<1). For orientation, there was no main effect of the object 
position (F<1) although only responses to objects on the left hand side were 
significantly above chance (p<.01). 
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Figure 3.18. Mean proportion of correct responses to objects positioned across 
the scene following passive viewing at encoding 
Hands intention. Participants who gripped the side of the screen during the trial 
also showed a significant main effect of the question type, F(2,22)= 5.91,p=.008, but 
again, no main effect of the object position (F<1). The effect of the question type was 
due to the significantly better performance on position questions (M=0.62) over shape 
(M=0.52, p<.05). The interaction between the factors was also not significant, F(4,44) = 
1.89, p=.129. Responses to orientation questions at each position were found to be 
significantly above chance (all ps<.01). However, responses to orientation questions 
also showed no main effect of position (F<1). 
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Figure 3.19. Mean proportion of correct responses to objects positioned across 
the scene following proximal hands at encoding 
Power intention. Participants in the power grip group also showed a significant 
main effect for the question types, F(2,22) = 4.84,p=.018, with an advantage for the 
position questions (M=0.57) over shape(M=0.48) and marginally over colour (M=0.50, 
p=0.80), but no effect of object position, or interaction between then (Fs<1). For 
orientation questions, there was also no main effect of position, F(2,22) = 1.37, p=0.26. 
However, only responses to items on the right of the screen were significantly above 
chance (p<.05). 
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Figure 3.20. Mean proportion of correct responses to objects positioned across 
the scene following power conditions at encoding 
Precision intention. Participants in the precision grip group showed a different 
pattern of performance from those in the other groups. There was found to be no main 
effect of the question type (F<1), but the effect of position was marginally significant, 
F(2,20) = 2.64, p=.096. Post-hoc comparisons did not show significant differences 
between responses to objects at the three positions, although the means for the precision 
intention group suggested higher scores on objects positioned on the left of the screen 
(M=0.58) compared to the centre (M=0.50) and right (M=0.49) regions. The interaction 
between them was also non-significant (F<1). For the orientation responses, all 
responses across the three positions were above chance (all ps<.05) but there was no 
main effect of the objects’ positions (F<1). 
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Figure 3.21. Mean proportion of correct responses to objects positioned across 
the scene following precision conditions at encoding 
Overall, it appears that the position of the objects did not affect how participants 
performed on these items, with the possible exception of those in the precision intention 
group, who showed a weak advantage for items presented on the left hand side. 
3.9 Discussion 
Experiment 2.2 examined the influence of holding action postures when viewing 
scenes depicting a range of objects which were compatible with the action postures 
formed by the participants. The influence of these postures (either the presence of the 
hands near the screen, or a more object-specific grip posture) was examined both in 
terms of how it influenced aspects of inspection behaviour and object memory. 
3.9.1 Influence on Inspection 
3.9.1.1 Object Category. The objects presented in the stimulus displays were 
compatible with either a kitchen or garage background. As a result, each object was 
presented to participants once against a background that was compatible with its usual 
location, and twice against backgrounds that were incompatible. However, these 
backgrounds had no strong effect on the inspection behaviour. Regardless of the 
background scene, participants showed on average more and longer fixations on objects 
compatible with a garage environment, although there was a tendency to fixate the 
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kitchen compatible objects less when in a kitchen environment. This does not fit with 
previous research on the effect of scene context on objects: the earlier eye tracking 
studies suggest that there should be more time spent fixating the inconsistent items in a 
scene, as these are the ones which require more processing (Friedman, 1979), or might 
be more informative to the viewer (Henderson, Weeks and Hollingworth, 1999). 
Kitchen items in a kitchen environment were fixated less than the inconsistent garage 
items, but this finding is consistent across all three scene types, rather than changing 
according to the nature of the background, as might be expected.  
Garage objects were always the more fixated items, possibly because they were 
more unfamiliar to participants in general, rather than being noticeably out of place. 
Davenport (2007) notes that one reason for increased fixations to inconsistent items 
could be that these objects are considered more novel by the viewer, although this 
should still mean that the fixations to garage objects are reduced when they are in a 
consistent environment and thus not so unusual. A related possibility to this is that the 
backgrounds themselves were not as easily categorised as the intended environment. 
For example, participants may not have recognised the garage background as a garage, 
and so there would have been no advantage from the compatible background for object 
recognition in those scenes. This could explain why the garage items were consistently 
viewed as novel, and received more fixations. Indeed, if participants had difficulty with 
identifying the scenes, this could explain why we did not see any indication of a more 
typical effect of the background and foreground consistency. However, we have no 
measures relating to how typical the participants considered the scene, or how familiar 
they were with the objects, so this is largely speculation. 
3.9.1.2 Object Position. We examined how the action posture manipulations 
affected scene inspection, both in terms of the target objects, and broader areas of the 
scene. Both measures of scene inspection showed similar patterns: namely, that 
participants had a tendency to explore the scene from left to right, after their initial 
fixations on the centre. However, this general pattern did seem to be affected by the 
action posture condition the participants were in. While those in the passive, power and 
precision grip conditions all showed this particular behaviour, it was much more 
pronounced in the two grip groups. Participants took longer to first fixate objects or the 
scene area on the right hand side of the screen, and spent less time on those items as a 
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result. The hands conditions is in marked contrast to this, with objects at any position in 
the scene being fixated equally early in the viewing period. 
The left-to-right inspection behaviour may have been encouraged by the layout 
of the scene used. The target objects were arranged in rough rows on the table tops, 
providing a structure to the scenes. Gilchrist and Harvey (2006) have previously shown 
that participants are influenced by the scene structure when viewing, so that more 
ordered arrays in scenes result in an increase in horizontal saccades, compared to scene 
arrays that are less structured and more random. Although the scenes in the present 
study were only approximately ordered, this was still enough to encourage this strategy 
shown by participants. This initial leftwards bias has been demonstrated in more recent 
investigations, during a variety of tasks including memorisation, (Nuthmann and 
Matthias, 2014) and in conditions where the symmetry of the image has been controlled 
for (Ossandón, Onat and König, 2014). This preference for the left side of a scene 
therefore seems to be a consistent presence in scene viewing, due to both asymmetries 
in the hemispheric control of attention, (as suggested by Ossandón et al., 2014) and the 
construction of the image (Gilchrist and Harvey, 2006). Of most importance to the 
present study, however, is the finding that this preference was modulated by the 
participant’s action posture. 
The presence of the grip postures may have led to participants taking more time 
on the objects they encountered. Measures of total fixation time indicated that 
participants spent more time on objects on the left hand side than those on the right, 
although those in the passive viewing condition show a similar pattern. Spending longer 
looking at the left side objects isn’t unique to the grip intention conditions, but is more 
pronounced for them. Furthermore, objects compatible with the grips were not being 
prioritised when the scene locations were viewed, indicating that the presence of the 
grips was not enhancing this aspect of inspection. 
For the hands intention group, the lack of any strong bias to a particular side is perhaps 
surprising, given previous studies using proximal hands that indicate a positional bias 
(e.g., Reed et al., 2006; Abrams et al., 2008), with distant objects receiving less of a 
benefit from the hands’ presence. In the current study, this might have been expected to 
show as increased time spent on items at the left and right of the screen, over those 
items presented in the centre. However, these findings are not necessarily incompatible 
with the literature: Davoli and Brockmole (2012) found that the presence of the hands 
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increased attention to all objects between the hands compared to items beyond the 
hands. This is in keeping with the more evenly distributed fixations shown by the 
participants here. Furthermore, Tseng and Bridgeman (2011) showed that the 
experimental context could influence attention distribution. In a change blindness study, 
where the presence of the hands was used to determine whether it increased detection of 
changing objects, it was found that the improvement due to the hands was largely a 
uniform improvement across the display screen. However, under certain conditions, 
change detection was best at the right hand side of the screen when the hands were 
present, indicating prioritisation of that region. This occurred when the presented set of 
objects was large, preventing participants from viewing all the items within a single 
saccade. As a result, while the whole region between the hands was prioritised, the right 
hand side was prioritised further, simply because it was examined first. The task 
demands in both Experiment 2.2 and Tseng and Bridgeman’s (2011) study are also 
important; as both require participants to view the entirety of the screen in order 
successfully perform the task, making an equal distribution of attention across the 
screen the best strategy. However, the time pressures are different: while in the current 
study, participants had enough time to view the whole screen at least once, Tseng and 
Bridgeman’s participants had only milliseconds. Thus, while there is evidence that the 
presence of the hands does lead to prioritisation of nearby locations, this emerges most 
strongly either when there are time and task pressures, as for Tseng and Bridgeman’s 
study, or tasks such as Reed et al.’s (2006) orienting paradigm, where the best strategy 
is to prioritise a region. In the present study, the nature of the task may have encouraged 
the more uniform distribution of attention rather than the structured left-to-right 
progression; but without the time pressures, the prioritisation of a particular side did not 
emerge. 
While the layout of the scene encourages a particular viewing strategy, 
following the scene structure, the findings here show that the maintenance of a grip 
posture can adjust this pattern. The grip postures enhance this, possibly by increasing 
attention to each of the objects, while the proximity of the hands reduces the effect, with 
a more even distribution of attention. 
3.9.1.3 Object Grip Type. When examining the objects in terms of their grip 
compatibility, there was a tendency across all groups for the power-compatible objects 
to be fixated for longer than the precision objects (and for participants to first fixate the 
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power-compatible items earlier than the precision-compatible items). However, the 
fixation durations and numbers were influenced by the intention condition, so that 
participants who maintained power grips during the inspection spent less time overall 
on non-compatible precision objects than participants who maintained precision grips 
during the encoding phase. A similar pattern of reduced fixation numbers and duration 
on precision compatible objects was observed for those participants who placed their 
hands on the monitor’s sides, compared to those maintaining a precision grip. 
This finding adds to those of Symes et al. (2008); one of their experiments used 
eye movements to show increased fixations on grip compatible objects, in the same way 
that the current study shows that grip compatible objects receive longer inspection 
times. However, while the current study indicates a bias, it is not so straightforward. 
Power compatible objects were always fixated for longer than the smaller precision-
compatible objects, even when participants formed a precision grip. However, when a 
power grip was prepared, or the hands were close to the screen, this difference in time 
spent fixating precision- and power-compatible objects increased. While it appears that 
the grip posture being held during scene inspection influenced object viewing, the effect 
was not as strong as might be expected. This may be due to the nature of the task. 
According to the instructions, all items within the scene were relevant, as participants 
knew they would be tested at the end of the trial. The larger size of the power-
compatible objects may simply have resulted in a bias to fixate these objects in all 
conditions, but forming a precision grip throughout inspection seemed to reduce this 
bias by increasing the time spent on precision-compatible objects. 
Similar results were found in the fixation durations and numbers for those 
participants forming power grips, and those placing their hands either side of the display 
screen. This may be because the ‘open palm’ gesture that participants make when they 
place their hands either side of the monitor is itself thought to afford a power grasp 
(Thomas, 2013). While the open palm is not strictly a grip posture in itself, it is a stage 
in the preparation and progression of postures the hand will make as it forms the end 
state of the power grip. The power grip is more likely to follow the earlier stage of an 
open palm configuration, as the stages from the open palm to end posture are simpler in 
the case of the power grip. Power grips are also considered to be more familiar to 
people (Vainio, Tucker and Ellis, 2007), further increasing the affordance between the 
open palm and the power grip over the precision grip. It is interesting to note that this 
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similarity between the effects of the two postures occurs in the present study, despite the 
fact that they occur at different stages of the grip formation process, and are not equally 
proximal to the screen. These factors seem less important in biasing attention away 
from non-compatible objects than the fact that a power grip is afforded by these two 
postures. 
Overall, the eye-movement data from Experiment 2.2 indicated that the presence 
of action postures during the encoding of object information influenced the way in 
which items were attended. The presence of the hands in close proximity to the monitor 
had an impact on the overall strategy used to examine the scenes, while both the 
formation of grips and the positioning of the hands influenced which objects received 
more or longer fixations depending on their compatibility with the grip in question. 
3.9.2 Influence on Memory 
3.9.2.1 Object Category. The memory findings for the influence of object 
category were similar to those for the inspection data. While kitchen compatible objects 
were recalled better than garage compatible items, performance was uniformly poor for 
objects in the kitchen environment. This doesn’t seem to match with previous studies of 
object-background interactions (e.g., Davenport and Potter, 2004), from which it might 
be expected that compatible items would be better recalled in their correct location. Nor 
do the results match previous work suggesting that incompatible items would show 
facilitated recall in memory (Hollingworth and Henderson, 2000). As for the results 
found for the influence of object category on inspection, these memory findings may be 
due to the nature of the task, preventing participants from spending much time on the 
background details. Familiarity may also have had an effect: we can again speculate that 
kitchen items may be more familiar to the participants than garage items, aiding the 
responses. The poorer results from the kitchen scenes may be due to the layout of these 
scenes: the table-top in this environment was narrower than those in the other locations, 
meaning the objects were more crowded together. Participants generally reported more 
difficulty with this scene, and it appears that this affected all the objects, regardless of 
their location compatibility, again suggesting that the design of the study may have 
prevented a strong effect of the background on participants’ memories for foreground 
objects. 
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3.9.2.2 Object Position. While an influence of intention condition was found for 
when and how long objects in the three areas of the scene were fixated, this did not 
appear to translate into an influence of on-screen position on subsequent memory for the 
objects, across the intention conditions. This was particularly interesting for the 
condition in which the hands were placed in proximity to the screen, as this meant 
objects could be in close proximity to the hands if positioned at the edges, or more 
distant if centrally positioned. As noted, there are previous studies examining the 
influence of proximal hands on memory, indicating the presence of the hands may 
improve LTM (Davoli and Brockmole, 2012), and VWM capacity (Tseng and 
Bridgeman, 2011). However, the present study does not show an advantage in recall for 
objects in particular locations, or across all locations, compared to the other conditions. 
The only condition in which there was a (weak) effect of position was the 
condition in which participants maintained a precision grip throughout inspection. Here 
participants showed marginally better recall of items positioned at the left hand side. 
This finding can be most easily explained with reference to the eye movement 
recordings relating to position. While all conditions (with the exception of that where 
hands were placed either side of the monitor) showed a left to right exploration pattern, 
this was particularly strong for the precision intention condition. Thus, items on the 
right hand side received fewer fixations over the course of the trial in this condition, 
which may have led to an advantage for left side items, based on the amount of time for 
which they were examined. However, this advantage for the left hand side is small, and 
not seen for any one property type. Rather, it is a general advantage for recalling objects 
at that location. It is therefore unlikely that this shows a bias towards recalling relevant 
objects. Instead, it is more likely to be an advantage for the items that are fixated for 
longer. Interestingly, this finding is the only one from the current study which shows a 
link between the eye movements and the memory performance: otherwise, the two seem 
largely disconnected.  
3.9.2.3 Object Grip. When examining the effect of the intention conditions on 
objects associated with the two grip types similar patterns for memory performance 
were observed in all the groups. For precision-grip-compatible objects, responses to 
shape questions were poor, with participants scoring higher on colour, and highest on 
position. There were similar patterns for power-grip-compatible objects, although these 
differences only emerged as significant in the hands and passive conditions. Thus it 
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would appear that adopting an action posture with the hands does not bias memory 
toward particular objects (e.g., those compatible with the action posture) or toward 
particular object properties (e.g., more action-related properties like shape compared to 
less action-relevant properties like colour). This is a little unexpected, given previous 
work which suggests that it is the relevant properties which will be prioritised in 
memory by the context of the task (e.g., Triesch et al., 2003). Given that shape is 
consistently judged to be action-relevant (see Experiment 2.1), we might have expected 
it would be facilitated by the action postures at encoding. This is evidently not the case, 
and the possible reasons for this are considered below. 
Participants showed generally poor performance on orientation questions, with 
scores on several conditions at chance level. It is possible that this reflects the 
suggestion of Derbyshire et al. (2006), that orientation is an extrinsic object property, 
and therefore not stored as part of the object representation. An alternative is simply that 
participants were not expecting to be asked about the orientation of objects, and so did 
not make an effort to encode this information.  
The fact that preparing and maintaining action gestures during encoding did not 
influence subsequent memory performance may reflect a number of possible underlying 
explanations. The first option that must be considered is the possibility that feature 
weighting simply does not occur in memory. The idea that memory representations are 
not weighted has been suggested previously, in relation to strongly embodied views of 
memory. Wilson (2002) suggested that the representations we maintain of objects might 
be ‘purpose-neutral’. A purpose-neutral representation would contain information 
beyond just that which is needed for the immediate task, allowing for more flexibility 
when working with objects. However, while the studies of memory may be sparser, 
there is still evidence to suggest that such influences can occur, suggesting that the 
purpose-neutral representations seen in the present study may be due to the nature of the 
task, and its context. 
Firstly, it may be that the action manipulations used were not sufficient to result 
in action based modulations of the resulting memory representations. The actions were 
only maintained for as long as the scene was being viewed, and when it disappeared, 
participants stopped acting, which may have indicated the end of the task, and the end 
of any necessity to continue priming the representations in favour of action. Earlier 
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studies have noted that memory during tasks may sometimes be fairly sparse (see e.g., 
Ballard et al., 1995), perhaps to avoid memories from one part of a task interfering with 
the later performance. While there is no active manipulation in this present study, it may 
be that the lack of effects seen in the subsequent memory test are due to preventing 
confusion in any actions that may follow. This idea can also be applied to the memory 
for the individual properties displayed here. While certain properties are necessary for 
action over others, it may only be during perception that these are affected. At this 
point, the information is being gathered to inform an action which may be imminent. 
Once items are stored in memory, however, perhaps any such biases are not stored. The 
most useful information to have in memory, particularly for objects that may be acted 
with, is position information. Thus, spatial information may be stored preferentially 
while more intrinsic features are not maintained. Previous studies have noted that the 
spatial layout of a scene is extracted during the early stages of viewing (Tatler et al., 
2003), and more recently, Kondo and Saiki (2012) demonstrated a bias towards position 
information in the context of a feature detection task. While shape and colour 
information could be excluded from the detection when the task settings made them 
irrelevant, location information was added to the representation regardless of the task 
demands. Position information therefore seems to be an important property in the 
formation of object representations, which may account for its preferential storage in 
memory. 
Another possible reason relates to the stage at which the action was presented. 
For the power and precision grips, participants formed the gesture by holding on to a 
device in the appropriate posture, which again may have signalled that the task was 
over, as the grasp was already being formed. Thus, due to both aspects, the strength of 
the intention towards the pictured objects may have been reduced, so that there is no 
need to maintain representations that are informative for any subsequent actions. 
Previous studies do vary on how complete the action manipulations are: many only use 
the preparation of action (e.g., Symes et al., 2008; Fagioli et al., 2007), while others 
have participants performing the action during the task (Witt and Brockmole, 2012). 
While these studies have all shown influences on perception of scenes and displays, it is 
unknown how the different stages of action might influence the maintenance of any 
biases in memory. It is interesting to consider that, given the posture of the hands used 
in the current study can be seen as affording a power grip (Thomas, 2013), if there were 
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a strong effect from the stage the action is at, then there might be a difference between 
the hands intention group, and the power grip group, where the grip in question has 
been completed. There is nothing in the memory results to suggest this, although there 
are other potential confounds in trying to make such a comparison that the current study 
cannot really address that possibility. It remains, however, that the stage of the action 
execution might have a particular influence on any memory biases, particularly if 
memory is used only to maintain such biases when they might be useful later. 
A second important consideration is the realism of the task. In Experiment 2.2, 
participants did not interact with the objects presented: indeed, they could not interact 
with the objects. This may also relate to the strength of the action manipulation. If there 
is no possibility of interaction with the objects, because they are not physically present, 
then again, there may be no need to weight the memory representations formed. 
Furthermore, several of the studies that have examined how memory representations 
might be affected have used more realistic settings involving interactions with the 
objects, and found effects of the manipulation (e.g., Thomas et al., 2013; Tatler et al., 
2013). 
A related factor may be the nature of the task itself. Experiment 2.2 used a 
standard memory task, in which participants had to recall all the items that were 
presented, with no particular item more important than any other. This was necessary 
for the purposes of the study, and allowed investigation of how the presence of an 
action might influence memory when the task itself is fairly unrelated to the action. 
However, in order to show any influences of action on memory, it may be necessary for 
the task to involve more specific instructions regarding the stimulus objects. Studies 
such as those by Droll and Hayhoe, (2007) have demonstrated how the relevance of a 
property to the ongoing task affects the representation of that property in memory. 
Without a more specific task, properties in the present study were not as specifically 
relevant to action, and thus the representations need not have been constructed with the 
requirements of a particular task as a guide. As a result, the representations formed in 
the current task appear to have been, as suggested above, purpose neutral. 
Overall, placing the hands either side of the monitor or forming a power or 
precision grip during scene inspection did not seem to have a strong effect on 
subsequent memory for object properties. There was no indication that the presence of a 
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particular gesture led to improved recall for objects compatible with the gesture (object 
grip type conditions) or simply in proximity to it (hand condition). This is in contrast 
with our findings from the eye movements of participants, which do seem to be affected 
by the action conditions. The rather general nature of the task may have had some 
influence on this: there was no specific requirement to act with the items later, and so 
there was no need to store information with a bias towards action. Some support for this 
view comes from Tatler et al. (2013), where participants who only observed a task being 
carried out showed worse memory for the position of task relevant objects compared to 
participants who acted with them. Alternatively, memory for the intrinsic features of 
objects may never be affected in this way, whatever the task. Instead, the action 
associated with the object might need to be present at the time that the object is being 
recalled, when there is a possibility that it might be required shortly.  
3.9.3 General conclusions 
Experiment 2.1 allowed us to establish a base of usable items which had clear 
and confirmed associations with particular object grip types and locations. Furthermore, 
it provided some evidence on the way that people class properties, which seem to be 
largely in agreement with the way other studies have classed object properties, in terms 
of their action or visual relevance. 
When these findings were transferred into an experimental situation in 
Experiment 2.2, further evidence was found to support the influence of action on 
perception and inspection behaviour. However, from the results so far, this does not 
strongly translate into the memories we form. Several possibilities have been considered 
for why this finding occurs, which can be grouped into two main (and related) areas for 
further investigation. Firstly, the action manipulation may not have been strong enough, 
as it was not maintained, and secondly, that the task may not have been active enough, 
as it involved no real interaction with the objects in a realistic task situation. Both these 
possibilities are addressed in the following chapters, with Experiments 3and 4 focusing 
on the effects of when the action postures are produced, and Experiments 5 and 6 
concentrating on the influence more realistic situations might have on the outcomes for 
perception and memory. 
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Chapter Four- The influence of the 
potential for action at retrieval on the 
formation of object representations 
  
161 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 2.2, we investigated whether the presence of an action posture at 
the encoding stage of memory (i.e. while viewing a scene) could influence the way in 
which the resulting memory representations were constructed. Specifically, we looked 
for an indication that the representation would be biased toward or weighted in favour 
of objects and their features relevant to the particular action formed. However, while the 
preparation of an action during the encoding stage may affect  the construction of the 
representation, in order to measure this, it is necessary for the representation to be 
accessed at a later stage. It is equally important to consider how the retrieval process 
may itself be affected by the action context at the time that the memory is accessed. 
Several studies have demonstrated that, while information from a scene may be 
successfully extracted and stored, it is still possible that the retrieval processes can fail. 
In a change blindness study, Hollingworth et al. (2001) found that despite increased 
fixation durations on changed objects, participants could still fail to detect the change, at 
least in terms of explicit report. Given the relationship between fixation and the 
subsequent memory performance, (e.g., Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002), it was 
assumed that the increased fixation duration on such objects indicated that information 
about the change had been extracted and retained. The failure in detection was thus 
considered to have arisen from a problem at a later stage than that of initially 
constructing the representation, such as a failure in retrieving the stored information, or 
comparing it to the current perceptual information. Hollingworth (2003a) provided 
further support for this when it was demonstrated that change detection rates could be 
improved by including a post-cue which indicated the target object. This reduced the 
retrieval demands: participants only had to determine what change had occurred to that 
item, rather than determine if a change had occurred at all, as for the un-cued version. 
Thus, whatever information is incorporated into the representation at encoding, there is 
still the process of retrieval which can affect what information is later recalled in an 
explicit test.  
According to theories of embodied or grounded cognition, the retrieval of 
conceptual information will lead to the re-activation of neural systems active at the 
initial formation of the event code. These neural systems involved in both the formation 
and storage of the information contain not only the perceptual information, but also 
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motor and affective information, derived from prior experiences with the items, as well 
as learning (e.g., Hommel et al. 2001; Barsalou, 1999). Evidence for these similarities 
has been shown by studies that found the same phenomena are present in conceptual 
processing that are present when the actual items are being processed. For example, 
Connell and Lynott (2010) showed that the disadvantage for processing tactile 
information is present when the linguistic concepts are encountered (e.g., words 
describing a tactile modality are processed more slowly than those for visual or auditory 
modalities). The process of recalling the concepts rather than the real items is therefore 
still subject to the same constraints as the initial processing of the objects. Most 
importantly, there is evidence to suggest that this re-activation will be tailored to the 
current context and the task requirements. Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) investigated 
the influence of context on the processing of conceptual information. Both the nature of 
the stimuli (words or images) and the task (judgement of semantic or iconic 
relationship) affected performance. When the task was predominantly language based 
(semantic judgements on word stimuli), then linguistic factors were the better predictors 
of performance, but embodied factors were the better predictors when the task required 
iconic judgements (on pictorial stimuli). The nature of the conceptual processing is 
sensitive to the particular task constraints, and the context. Thus, re-activating the 
information in order to retrieve it at a later stage is likely to also be influenced by the 
situation under which the retrieval takes place. 
Other studies have shown how the action context at retrieval can affect access to 
memory representations. Dijikstra, Kaschak and Zwaan (2007) investigated the 
influence of the task context on the retrieval of stored autobiographical information. 
When participants held body postures congruent with the autobiographical memory they 
were retrieving (e.g., lying on a recliner while recalling a visit to the dentist), their 
response times for producing the information were shorter than when they held 
incongruent postures. As suggested in theories such as the TEC, the representation 
seems to be grounded in the neural areas active at the time of the processing and 
formation of the representation, and are highly embodied, maintaining the posture and 
motor information as part of the encoded trace. Resuming the associated action 
improves the access and recall of the information. 
Ross, Wang, Kramer, Simons and Crowell (2007) examined whether the more 
specific action gestures associated with the use of objects were similarly incorporated 
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into representations, although they used novel items to investigate the learning process 
involved. The new objects were associated with particular actions (arbitrarily selected 
movements of the objects to the left or right) during a learning phase, followed by a test 
of their recognition of the objects at a later stage. When participants responded to the 
test items by repeating the movement they had associated with that item in the learning 
stage (i.e. moving the item to the left again to categorise it as familiar), they were faster 
and more accurate in recognising the object. Actions associated with objects, even 
arbitrarily, seem to be incorporated into the representation, where they can continue to 
influence further interactions with the object. 
For familiar everyday objects, it would be expected that the repeated use of the 
items over time would also lead to the incorporation of the associated actions into the 
representation of that object. Thus, the power and precision grip postures used in 
Experiment 2.2 would form part of the encoded memory trace. Indeed, Derbyshire et al. 
(2006) showed that accessing the memory of objects could activate the associated grip 
responses and lead to faster execution of them when the object was compatible; 
indicating that grip posture is an important action feature of everyday objects and their 
representations. 
The present study, Experiment 3, aims to further investigate the influence that 
action has when it is presented at the retrieval stage of a memory task. Given the 
previous findings which strongly suggest the inclusion of action information in a 
representation, it is expected that the presence of action will influence participants’ 
ability to access the object’s representation and extract information, with objects 
compatible with the grip being better recalled than those that are incompatible. As in 
Experiment 2.2, we will examine memory access in terms of the recall performance of 
different object properties which are differently relevant to the execution of action (e.g., 
shape may be more easily retrieved under action relevant conditions than colour). While 
the eye movements and inspection behaviours of participants will be recorded as well, it 
is not expected that there will be any influence of the action posture on these 
behaviours, as the action posture is only executed during the recall stage, and is never 
present during the viewing stage. 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-nine participants were recruited (9 males, mean age 24.3, SD = 4.5). 13 
were assigned to the precision grip condition, and 16 in the power grip condition. 
Handedness and eye dominance were measured by self-report: the sample contained 2 
left handers and 11 participants showing left eye dominance. Participants were recruited 
using advertisements on the University’s on-line recruitment system, and received 
payment (£3) for their participation. 
4.2.2 Stimuli, Procedure and Design 
These were identical to Experiment 2.2, with the following changes. First, 
participants did not make action poses during scene presentation, but during the 
subsequent memory tests. That is, participants made action poses with their dominant 
hand throughout the memory questions, responding to the questions using their non-
dominant hand. Second, only two intention conditions were included in Experiment 3: 
the power and precision grip conditions. The proximal hands were not used as an action 
manipulation, as participants had to makes the gesture at the same time as responding to 
the memory questions. Thus, keeping their hands on the sides of the monitor would 
have required the participants to respond another way, which could have introduced a 
confound into the memory measures.  
The same measures of perception (average number of fixations, average duration 
of fixations and primacy fixation numbers) and memory (responses to multiple choice 
questions regarding object features) were used in Experiment 3 as in Experiment 2.2. 
As a baseline, data from the 11 participants in the passive condition from 
Experiment 2.2 were included in the analyses that follow.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Influence of intention on inspection 
4.3.1.1 Scene inspection. The eye movement patterns were examined at the 
level of the scene prior to being examined at the level of the object. Experiment 2.2 
showed that the presence of power and precision grips at encoding led to an influence 
165 
 
on the scene exploration. As the grips were not maintained during encoding, it was 
expected that such effect would not be present in the current study, and thus conducting 
the scene inspection analysis allowed us to determine this. 
The scenes were divided into thirds, and measures of fixation duration, number 
and average ordinal number of the first fixations to the areas were examined in the 
context of the three intention conditions. Measures of average total fixation time 
showed a marginal influence of the intention condition, F(2, 33)2.73, p=.080, due to 
participants in the power condition showing longer total fixation time across all three 
scene areas compared to the other intention conditions, (power M=6169 ms, precision 
M=5966 ms, passive M= 5919 ms) However, this difference did not emerge as 
significant in the post-hoc comparisons. A main effect of the scene area was also found, 
F(2, 66)=57.10, p<.01, with participants spending significantly longer on the central 
scene region (M=7845ms) compared to the left (M=5441ms) and right (M=4844ms, 
ps<.001). The difference between time spent on the left and right regions was also 
marginally significant (p=.056). The interaction between the two was non-significant, 
(F<1).  
For the measures of fixation number, there was no main effect of the intention 
condition, F(2, 33)=1.11, p=.34, but a main effect of scene area, F(2,66)=66.20, p<.001, 
due to significantly more fixations made to the central region (M=26.4) compared to the 
left (M=17.9) and right (M=16.0, ps<.001). As for the measure of total fixation duration, 
the interaction between the two was not significant (F<1). 
Due to the central bias observed, the analyses were conducted again, removing 
the data from fixations to the central region. In these conditions, neither fixation 
duration nor number measures showed a significant effect of the intention condition 
(both Fs <1), and while an influence of the location was still present, it was now 
marginal for both measures (fixation duration: F(1, 33)=3.67, p=.064; fixation number: 
F(1, 33)= 2.92, p=.09). In both cases, participants made more fixations to the left region 
of the scene, and the average total fixation time on this region was longer. 
The average first fixation to a region was analysed, to determine if there was a 
difference in inspection patterns in terms of when the participants first fixated one of the 
scene regions. This analysis used only the data from the left and right scene regions, as 
due to both the central fixation bias and the central drift correction, the first fixation to 
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each scene was always to the central region. Looking at only the left and right regions, a 
main effect of the location was found, F(1,33)=6.23, p=.01, with participants making 
their first fixation to the right hand region of the scene significantly later than the 
average first fixation to the left regions (left M=10.0, right M= 15.2 ). There was no 
main effect of the intention condition (F<1), and the interaction between the two was 
not significant, F(2, 33)=1.36, p=.273. Figure 4.1 displays the measure of average first 
fixation across the intention groups, showing the tendency of participants to fixate the 
right scene region later in the trials, across all intention conditions. 
 
Figure 4.1. Average number for the first fixation to the left and right regions of 
the scene for the three intention conditions 
Unlike Experiment 2.2, no influence of the participants’ intention condition was 
found on the way in which they viewed the scenes presented.  
4.3.1.2 Object Category. The influence of the object category (garage and 
kitchen), and the background environment (garage, kitchen and neutral) was examined, 
to determine if the compatibility of the objects with their backgrounds influenced the 
fixation numbers and durations. An analysis of the fixation numbers showed a main 
effect of the object category, F(2,33) = 69.19, p<.001, with more fixations made to 
garage compatible objects than kitchen items (garage M=6.32, kitchen M=5.18). No 
main effect of the scene type was found (F<1), but the interaction between the two 
factors was found to be significant, F(2,66) = 3.391, p=.039.  
167 
 
The same pattern of results was found for the measures of total fixation time: on 
average, more time was spent fixating garage compatible objects compared to kitchen 
compatible items, F(1,33)=57.25, p<.001, (garage M=1867ms, kitchen M=1574ms), but 
the background scenes had no significant influence on fixation durations (F<1). The 
interaction was significant, F(2,66)=4.36, p=.017. 
Examining the interactions further showed that participants consistently made 
more fixations to the garage items than the kitchen items, within each of the three scene 
types. The difference was strongest in the kitchen scene F(1,33)=35.2, p<.001, (garage 
M=6.6, kitchen M=5.0). It was weakest within the garage scene, F(1,33)=13.0, p=.001, 
(garage M=6.2, kitchen M=5.2) and neutral scene backgrounds, F(1,33)=11.5, p=.002, 
(garage M=6.1, kitchen M=5.4) but still significant for both. 
For the measure of fixation duration, participants showed significantly longer total 
fixation times to garage items over kitchen items in the kitchen, F(1,33)=36.81, p<.001, 
(garage M=2007ms, kitchen M=1503ms) and neutral scenes F(1,33)=8.83, p=.005, 
(garage M=1783ms, kitchen M=1580ms), but only a marginally significant difference in 
the garage scenes, F(1,33)=3.58, p=.067, (garage M=1812ms, kitchen M=1640ms). 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean fixation durations (left) and fixation numbers (right) to object 
types across the three scene categories 
Participants showed a tendency to fixate the garage compatible items more and 
for longer than kitchen compatible items, although this difference was less pronounced 
when viewing items in the garage environment. 
4.3.1.3 Object grip type. Inspection behaviour for objects related to the two 
grip types were examined using mixed factorial ANOVAs for the three intention 
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groups, and two grip categories. As the grip posture maintained by the participants was 
not present during inspection, it was not thought that there would be a strong influence 
of the intention condition on the viewing of the objects presented. 
For measures of total fixation duration, a main effect of grip was found, 
F(1,31)=10.35, p=.003, but there was no main effect from the intention group (F<1). 
For the grip conditions, participants spent significantly longer fixating items compatible 
with the power grip (M=1802ms, precision grip M=1630ms). The interaction between 
grip type and intention group was also non-significant (F<1). 
For the measures of fixation number, a slight difference was found. There was 
again a main effect of grip type, F(1,31)=52.46,p<.001, such that power compatible 
items received more fixations(M=6.4, precision grip items, M=5.1); but there was also 
main effect of the intention group, F(2,31)=4.51, p=.019. Post-hoc comparisons showed 
participants in the passive condition made significantly more fixations to objects overall 
than those in the precision grip condition (passive M=7.00, power M=6.0, p<.05). 
Figure 4.3 presents the data for measures of fixation duration, while Figure 4.4 presents 
the data for measures of fixation number. 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean fixation durations on objects by grip type across the intention 
conditions 
Since the action manipulations took place during the retrieval stage of the 
experiment, it was possible that these poses might have affected the eye movements in 
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the trials following them. Mixed factorial ANOVAs were also conducted including 
Trial Number as a factor, for measures of both fixation number and fixation duration. 
After adding this factor, the main effect of grip was maintained, for both fixation 
number, F(1,31)=50.47,p<.001 and duration, F(1,31)=10.62,p=.003, with more and 
longer fixations on power compatible items. The main effect of the intention group in 
the measures of fixation number was also maintained, F(2,31)=4.44, p=.02. However, 
there was no main effect of the trial number for measures of fixation number, 
F(2,62)=1.97,p=.148, and only a marginal effect for trial in measures of fixation 
duration, F(2,62)=2.88, p=.06. This was found to be due to marginally longer fixations 
on all objects in the second trial (M=1807ms) compared to trial 1 (M=1626ms, p=.06). 
No interactions were found to be significant, so that participants were not behaving 
significantly differently depending on the trial condition (all F’s <1). 
Participants showed a tendency to make more fixations for a longer time to 
objects compatible with the power grip. This did not appear to be influenced by the grip 
posture maintained by participants during the retrieval stage of the trials. 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean fixation number on objects by grip type across the intention 
conditions 
4.3.1.4 Object Position. The influence of the objects positions on inspection 
behaviour was examined across the three intention groups and object positions, for the 
measures of fixation number and duration, and the average first fixation to objects in 
each area. As when analysing the inspection of the scene, this allowed us to determine if 
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there was any influence of the intention condition (particularly the power and precision 
groups) on how they viewed the objects depending on their position. 
For measures of total fixation duration, a significant main effect of position was 
found, F(2,62)=5.10, p=.010, but no effect of the intention condition or significant 
interaction between them (Fs<1). Post-hoc comparisons showed significantly longer 
fixations occurring on objects on the left hand side (M=1833ms) compared to those on 
the right (M=1565ms, p<.001). Fixation number showed a similar pattern, with a 
significant main effect of position, F(2,62)=6.03,p=.004, due to fewer fixations on right 
hand side objects(M=5.1) compared to those positioned at the left(M=6.0, p<.05) and 
centre(M=6.0, p<.05). A main effect of the intention group was also found, 
F(2,31)=4.67,p=.017, with participants in the passive condition making more fixations 
to objects across all positions than those in the two grip conditions (passive M=6.3, 
precision M=5.6, p=.08, power M=5.3, p<.001). The interaction between the two factors 
was again not significant, (F<1). Figure 4.5 presents the data for both fixation durations 
and numbers. 
 
Figure 4.5. Mean fixation durations (L) and fixation numbers (R) to objects by 
position, across intention conditions 
Using the measure of average first fixation to objects for the outcome data, it 
was found that while there was a main effect of position, F(2,62)= 6.59,p=.002, the 
effect of intention condition was non-significant, F(2,31)=1.26,p=.300, as was the 
interaction between them (F<1). In line with the other measures, the effect of position is 
due to the earlier first fixations on objects on the left hand side of the screen(M=16.8) 
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compared to the right(M=21.8, p<.001). Figure 4.6 displays the data for the average first 
fixations on objects at the three locations, across the three intention groups  
 
Figure 4.6. Average first fixation number across intention groups and object 
positions 
As for the influence of grip, factorial ANOVAs were conducted including the 
trial number along with the position and intention condition, to further examine its 
influence on fixation measures. For measures of both fixation duration and fixation 
number, no main effect of the trial was found (fixation duration, F(1,31)=1.91, p=.117; 
fixation number, F<1). All other patterns of inspection were maintained, with both 
fixation measures showing main effects of the objects’ positions, due to more and 
longer fixations on items at the left of the screen than the right (fixation duration, 
F(2,62)=4.82, p=.011; fixation number, F(2,62)=6.28, p=.003). Similarly, while fixation 
duration showed no effect of the intention condition (F<1), participants in the passive 
condition made marginally more fixations to all items than participants in the power or 
precision conditions, F(2,30)=3.22, p=.05. No interactions were found to be significant 
between the factors, (F’s<1), indicating no influence of the trial on inspection 
performance. 
A slight difference was found for the measures of the primacy fixation number. 
For this measure, a main effect of the trial number was found, F(1,31)=13.76, p<.001, as 
well as a main effect of position, F(2,62)=7.23, p=.002, from first fixations to the 
objects at the right being significantly later than those to the left. The average first 
fixation to objects was significantly later in the last trial (M=20.0) compared to the first 
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(M=15.7, p<.05). Furthermore, a significant interaction was found between the trial and 
the intention condition, F(2,31)=3.77, p=.034. The pattern shown in the main effect of 
trial was found to be significant in the eye movement measures for participants in the 
precision condition (Trial 1, M=14.6, Trial 3, M=20.7, p<.05). No other interactions 
were found to be significant (Fs <1). 
All participants showed a significant tendency to fixate objects on the left hand 
side of the screen more, and for longer, compared to items positioned on the right. This 
was unaffected by the intention condition of the participants, and did not vary across the 
trials. Combining the factors of position and object grip type did not reveal any further 
effects, indicating that while there were certain viewing patterns participants followed 
(e.g., fixating power compatible objects and objects on the left hand side), this did not 
appear to be affected by the intention manipulation. 
4.3.2 Influence of intention on memory 
The memory data were first examined by ensuring that the responses to the 
property questions were above chance level. Scores were considered for each of the five 
property questions, across the three intention conditions. Table 4.1 presents the mean 
scores for these groups. (Note that the scores for the passive condition are identical to 
those in Experiment 2.2., as these are the same participants. These are included here for 
comparison.) 
Table 4.1.  
Mean memory scores for individual property questions across intention groups 
Question 
Intention 
Group 
Colour Shape Orientation Position Presence 
Passive 0.553 0.520 0.583 0.627 0.856 
Precision 0.531 0.518 0.640 0.569 0.872 
Power 0.520 0.585 0.628 0.625 0.864 
 
One-sample t-tests showed that performance on the memory questions regarding 
objects’ colour, shape, position and presence were all significantly above chance (0.25). 
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Performance on orientation questions was also found to be better than chance (0.50). As 
for Experiment 2.2, the questions regarding object presence was discarded, as it mostly 
measured participants’ realisation that the same object types were repeated across the 
three trials. 
4.3.2.1 Object Category. The influence of the object’s category and 
compatibility with the background environment were examined for each of the four 
property questions. 
Colour. For colour questions, a main effect of the scene background was found, 
F(2,66)=5.08,p=.009, with performance significantly worse when the background was 
the kitchen (M=0.47) than garage(M=0.57) or neutral environments(M=0.56, p<.05). 
Participants were also better at recalling the colour of kitchen compatible items, 
F(1,33)=10.75, p=.002, (kitchen M=0.58, garage M= 0.50) but background environment 
and object category did not interact (F<1). 
Shape. Participants were significantly worse at recalling the shape of objects 
present in the kitchen environment than the garage or neutral environments, 
F(2,66)=4.61, p=.013, (kitchen M=0.49, garage M=0.58, neutral M=0.57, p<.05), and 
significantly better at recalling the shape of kitchen compatible items, F(1,33)=29.80, 
p<.001(kitchen M=0.62, garage M=0.47). The interaction between the factors was not 
significant (F<1). 
Orientation. For the orientation questions, participants scored significantly 
better when items were present in a neutral or garage environment than a kitchen 
environment, F(2,66)=5.03,p=.009, (kitchen M=0.55, neutral M=0.67, garage M=0.63 , 
p<.05). No significant difference was found between correct responses to kitchen or 
garage compatible objects (F<1), and the interaction between object category and scene 
background was non-significant (F<1). 
Position. For position questions, a main effect of the scene type was found, 
F(2,66)=11.05, p<.001, with participants scoring significantly better on objects in 
neutral(M=0.65) or garage scenes(M=0.66) than kitchen scenes(M=0.52, p<.05). Across 
all the scenes, participants’ performed better when recalling the position of kitchen 
compatible items, F(1,33)=10.90, p=.002(kitchen M=0.66, garage M= 0.56). The 
interaction between the two was not significant, F(2,66)=1.27,p=.30. 
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All the question responses show similar patterns, with better performance on 
kitchen objects, but worse performance on all objects presented in the kitchen 
environment, which matches the pattern of data seen in Experiment 2.2. Figure 4.7 
shows the memory scores for each of the property questions in the three environments 
for the two types of object category. 
 
Figure 4.7. Memory scores as proportion correct for the four property questions 
across the three scene categories and two object categories; left to right, top to bottom: 
colour, orientation, shape and position 
4.3.2.2 Object grip type. The influence of the intention group on the memory 
for grip compatible objects was considered next. For each intention group, a mixed 
factorial ANOVA examining the influence of object grip (power or precision), and 
question type (colour, shape and position) was conducted. Again, due to its different 
chance level, the orientation responses were considered separately within each of the 
intention conditions.  
Passive. The same participants from Experiment 2.2 were used for this data set, 
so the results are the same as presented in Chapter 3. In summary, no difference was 
found between memory scores for power and precision items, but participants were 
better at recalling the position of items. Focusing only on power and precision objects 
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showed that for both groups of objects, participants still performed better on the 
position questions compared to the shape property. 
Precision. Participants who made a precision gesture during retrieval of the 
information showed no main effect of the grip condition (F<1) or the question type, 
F(1,10)=1.52,p=.24, and similarly, no interaction between the factors (F<1). It was 
decided to examine the scores for objects compatible with power and precision grips 
separately, as in Experiment 2.2, this method had shown differences between responses 
at this level. Furthermore, when examining Figure 4.8, it seemed that there was a 
difference between scores which might become significant when the power and 
precision object scores were separated. This was found to be the case. . While scores on 
the three property questions responding to power-compatible objects were not 
significantly different (F<1), an advantage for position questions emerged in the 
responses to precision compatible objects, F(2,20) = 4.49, p=.025. Participants were 
better at recalling the position of objects compatible with their grip type (M=0.61) 
compared to colour (M=0.54), and shape (M=0.52, ps <.05). 
For orientation questions, scores on power and precision items were 
significantly above chance. However, no significant difference was found between the 
scores for power and precision items, t(18)=.27,p=.78. 
 
Figure 4.8. Memory scores for object properties in power and precision groups, 
retrieved under precision intention conditions 
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Power. Participants who made a power gesture during retrieval showed no 
difference in their scores on power and precision items (F<1), but a main effect of the 
question type, F(2,22) = 4.99, p=.016, with an interaction approaching significance, 
F(2,22)= 2.74, p=.086. Again, it was position questions that participants showed an 
advantage for answering (M=0.63) over the shape (M= 0.59) and colour (M=0.52, 
ps<.05). Examining the power and precision objects separately showed further results. 
While responses to the three questions for precision compatible objects did not 
significantly differ from each other (F<1), a significant difference was found between 
the responses to property questions for the power compatible objects, F(2,22) = 9.20, p 
= .001. Participants were significantly better at recalling the shape (M=0.61) and the 
position (M=0.65) compared to the colour (M=0.48) of the power compatible objects, 
(ps<.05). 
For orientation questions, scores on power and precision items were significantly above 
chance. No significant difference was found between the scores for power and precision 
items, t(21)=-0.196, p=.85. 
 
Figure 4.9. Memory scores for object properties in power and precision groups, 
retrieved under power intention conditions 
Participants in the power and precision intention conditions did seem to show 
some effects of the grip posture they made during the retrieval stage. Participants who 
formed the power grip showed an advantage only for recalling the position of power 
objects (and some indication that they recalled the shape of the power objects better 
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than their colour). Participants who formed the precision grip showed a similar 
advantage for recalling position information, but only for those items compatible with a 
precision grip. 
4.3.2.3 Object Position. The objects’ positions (left, centre and right of screen) 
were analysed to determine their influence, along with the question type, for each of the 
intention conditions. 
Passive. The results for participants who made no action posture during the 
retrieval stage are the same as those reported in Experiment 2.2. In summary, 
participants in this condition showed a significant difference between the question 
scores, with better performance on position questions. However, neither the position of 
the objects, or the interaction between position and question showed significant effects. 
Precision. Participants who made a precision gesture during the retrieval stage 
showed no effect of the objects positions, (F<1) and no significant difference between 
the property questions, F(2,20)=1.80,p=.193. The interaction between the two factors 
was also non-significant (F<1).  
For the orientation questions, all responses were significantly above chance. However, 
no significant effect of object position on the memory scores was found (F<1). 
 
Figure 4.10. Memory scores for object properties at the three positions, retrieved 
under precision intention conditions 
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Power. Participants who formed a power posture during retrieval showed an 
influence of the object position, F(2,22)=4.74,p=.019, with better performance across 
the three property questions when responding to objects on the left hand side of the 
screen(M=0.63), compared to the centre (M=0.53, p<.05). Participants also performed 
better on position questions compared to colour items, F(2,22)=5.79,p=.009, (position 
M=0.63, colour M=0.51, p<.001). Furthermore, the interaction between the position and 
question type approached significance, F(4,44)=2.31,p=.073. Further investigation of 
this interaction showed that while recall of object properties for those items at the left of 
the screen was uniform, significant differences emerged between property recall for 
items at the screen centre, F(2,22)=3.86,p=.037, and the right, F(2,22)=6.05, p=.008. 
Post-hoc comparisons showed no significant differences between the question scores for 
central items, although the means indicate the standard advantage for position over the 
other properties (position M=0.46, shape M=0.55, colour M=0.59,. This difference was 
significant for the items at the right of the screen (position M=0.44, shape M=0.60, 
colour M=0.65, p<.05), with significantly worse recall of object colour compared to 
shape and position for items at this location. For orientation, no effect of the object 
position was found, (F<1), although responses to objects’ orientation at any location 
was significant. 
 
Figure 4.11. Memory scores for object properties at the three positions, under 
power intention conditions 
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In recalling objects positioned at the left, right and centre of the scenes, it was 
found that participants in the precision condition were not affected by the locations of 
the items. This was not the case for participants in the power conditions, who showed an 
advantage for recalling items placed on the left hand side, and differences property 
recall when the items were placed at the centre and right of the scene. 
4.4 Discussion 
Experiment 3 examined the influence of maintaining an action posture while 
recalling object information from previously viewed scenes. As for Experiment 2.2, the 
influence of the gestures was examined in terms of how it influenced both inspection 
and recall performance. 
4.4.1 Influence on Inspection 
4.4.1.1 Object category. The influence of the background environment and 
object category was found to be similar to that seen in Experiment 2.2. Participants 
spent more time fixating the garage compatible items, regardless of the background 
scene environment; although there were interactions indicating that when participants 
viewed the garage scenes, less attention was given to garage compatible objects.  
As in Experiment 2.2, we can speculate that the increased fixation numbers and 
durations spent on garage items indicated that they were less familiar to participants, 
who therefore spent more time examining them in order to perform better on the later 
memory questions they know they will be asked. However, this can be only speculation, 
as we have no measure of how familiar these items really were to participants. 
It is interesting that this difference is reduced for the garage environment, 
perhaps suggesting that participants were recognising the objects are more congruent in 
this setting, and so finding it easier to process the information, which would be in 
agreement with earlier work by Henderson et al. (1999), where consistent items were 
not fixated for as long as inconsistent items. Care should be taken with this 
interpretation, however, as even in the garage environment; it was still the kitchen items 
that were fixated less. The interaction arose from the fact that the difference between 
kitchen and garage objects in the garage scene was not as strong as in the kitchen and 
neutral scenes.  
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It is also unclear why the kitchen items did not receive more fixations from 
being placed in an incongruent scene, although one possibility is the difference between 
how ‘out-of-place’ items were. Underwood, Humphreys and Cross (2007) found that 
the degree of the incongruity between object and background can influence how the 
object is viewed, and while a saw in the kitchen may be strongly implausible, a mug or 
a kettle in workshop is perhaps more realistic. This, along with the increased familiarity 
participants may have with kitchen items, may explain why kitchen-compatible items 
did not receive significantly more fixations in an environment where they were 
technically incongruent. 
Apart from the small difference in the garage scenes, it seems participants in the 
present study performed similarly to those in Experiment 2.2, with very little influence 
of the background scenes on the inspection of the objects presented. 
4.4.1.1 Object Position and Object Grip. The eye movement records of 
inspection behaviour in terms of both position and grip were found to be very similar 
for each of the intention conditions. This is to be expected, as all three groups were 
essentially identical in this inspection phase. As the scenes were observed without any 
concurrent action, all participants were engaged in passive viewing. The inspection data 
here can therefore be seen as exhibiting the standard behaviours for inspection of these 
scenes. 
For the object position, participants showed a similar tendency to that found in 
chapter 3 to inspect the scene in a left to right pattern. As for Experiment 2.2, this is 
likely to indicate both an effect of the scene layout, with the participants following the 
object rows (see Gilchrist and Harvey, 2006), and an influence of the typically 
asymmetric control of attention, which encourages a bias towards the left when viewing 
(Nuthmann and Matthias, 2014; Ossandón et al., 2014). However, the earlier finding, 
that participants in the power and precision condition show a more pronounced viewing 
pattern and take significantly longer to reach the right hand side, was not present in 
Experiment 3. Instead, the pattern did not differ between the three groups. This suggests 
that although the structure of the scene did influence inspection behaviour, the presence 
of the grip postures further enhanced this. Thus, it seems that in Experiment 2.2, by 
holding the grip posture during encoding, participants were encouraged to spend more 
time on the objects. We found no evidence to suggest that they prioritised one particular 
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type of object (i.e., the one that was compatible with their grip posture), so instead this 
may indicate that the presence of the posture at encoding increased attention to all 
objects. This resulted in participants starting at the left of the screen, as a standard 
strategy, but then spending more time on the objects positioned there, and so reducing 
the time available to examine objects positioned on the right. 
For object grip, the results found were similar to those shown in Chapter 3: those 
items compatible with a power grip were fixated more and for longer than those items 
compatible with a precision grip. This is very likely due to the larger power compatible 
items being easier to detect, and so attracting more attention during the viewing stage. 
Both these findings further confirm the standard inspection behaviours seen in the 
passive condition in Experiment 2.2, as well as confirming the interactions seen in that 
study are due to the presence of the action manipulations. 
Another important point is that the action manipulations taking place during the 
retrieval stage of the study did not affect inspection behaviour in the viewing periods 
following these stages. This suggests that when the action posture is finished, and the 
participant releases the grip, then any influence the posture had on either inspection or 
recall of the objects is also completed. This then further supports this possible 
explanation for the lack of a memory influence in Experiment 2.2. While Experiment 3 
showed there were some influences of the trial on inspection behaviour, these did not 
interact with the other conditions, and most likely reflect participants becoming more 
experienced with the demands of the task, and developing more of a strategy over time. 
One aspect of the data for the inspection behaviour is less clear: this is the 
consistent finding that, in measures of fixation number, participants in the passive 
condition were making more fixations to objects than those in the power or precision 
conditions. This was only found for the fixation number measure, while no differences 
emerged for measures of fixation duration, suggesting that participants in the passive 
condition made more fixations of shorter duration. A potential explanation is that the 
presence of the grip postures at retrieval in the power and precision conditions was 
influencing the subsequent inspection behaviours in those groups, shown in fewer 
fixations to objects in the later trials. However, the increased fixation numbers in the 
passive intention condition were still present in the first trial, where no action had 
preceded the inspection. The increased fixation numbers by participants in the passive 
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condition may simply reflect a particular strategy of the participants, but it is unknown 
why this group of participants showed it, while the other two conditions did not. 
Overall, the inspection data shows that, without the concurrent grip postures 
being maintained during the scene viewing, the action postures had no impact on how 
participants viewed the scene. The only effects that remained were those which are most 
likely due to the structure of the scenes, which were identical for both studies. This is 
unsurprising, but acts as a useful contrast to the findings from the influence of action on 
the memory performance, considered below. 
4.4.2 Influence on Memory 
4.4.2.1 Object Category. All property questions showed no effect of the scene 
background, or the categories of the objects themselves. As in Experiment 2.2, the 
compatibility of the items with their background did not influence memory 
performance. Instead, the most influence shown came from the presentation of objects 
in the kitchen environment, with participants scoring lower on all questions for these 
scenes. For the objects themselves, participants performed better on the kitchen items 
than the garage items. These patterns are consistent with those seen in Experiment 2.2, 
and may indicate an influence of familiarity with the kitchen items over the more 
unusual garage items. As mentioned previously, the influence of the kitchen 
environment is most likely due to the more crowded layout of this scene. Again, while 
other studies have shown an interaction between background and foreground in the 
identification and recall of objects (e.g., Davenport, 2007; Lampinen et al. 2001), it is 
suggested that the task pressures in the present study led participants to spend more time 
on the task-relevant foreground objects, at the expense of studying the background, 
leading to the lack of influence this aspect of the scene had on memory. 
4.4.2.2 Object Position. Looking at the memory scores for object properties in 
terms of where the objects were positioned showed some evidence of an action 
influence. While those in the passive and precision conditions showed no influence of 
position on their memory performance, participants in the power condition did show an 
interaction between the object position and the property recall. Items on the left hand 
side of the screen were recalled equally well for all properties, but for those items at the 
right, there was a significant difference between the recall for position and the recall for 
colour. It was not expected that there would be much influence of position in 
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Experiment 3. The proximal hands condition is more associated with influencing the 
location of attention, at least in the broad terms of the sides of the scene versus the 
centre. However, as noted in the inspection data, participants did have a tendency to 
view the scene in a right to left fashion, meaning they were fixating the right hand side 
of the scene closer to the end of the viewing period than the left hand side. It is tempting 
to speculate that this indicates a recency or a primacy effect. Such effects have been 
shown in studies of object memory previously: Körner and Gilchrist (2007) used 
repeated visual searches to show that by having fixated an item in the first search, 
finding it as the target in the second search was facilitated. This facilitation was greater 
if the first fixation to the object was more recent. Similar results were found by 
Hollingworth (2004), with memory for the form of a target found to be significantly 
better if it had been fixated within one to two fixations before test. In the present study, 
it was the items on the left that were fixated earlier, and all the object properties were 
recalled equally well at this location. However, for items placed at the centre and right, 
and therefore viewed (on average) later than other items, colour information was 
recalled less accurately. This may perhaps indicate that colour information is most 
affected by the primacy effect, and requires more time to be incorporated into the 
representation. However, while studies such as Tatler et al. (2005) demonstrate that 
object properties display different time courses for accumulation and retention, colour 
information was found to be retained stably (at least in photographed scenes). 
 
It is also possible that the presence of the actions at retrieval influenced this 
pattern: colour is the least action-relevant property, and so the poorer recall here may 
indicate de-prioritisation of this information when the retrieval context emphasises the 
performance of action. This is more difficult to reconcile with the finding that these 
effects appeared to be strongest for those items associated with a precision grip, 
incompatible with the action actually being maintained in this condition. One 
suggestion for this pattern is that the precision advantage for right hand side items was a 
recency effect: it was a consistent pattern that participants were later to look to precision 
items than power items, and so precision items at the right of the screen were the last to 
be attended to, an influence that then showed itself in the memory performances. It is 
still not clear why this effect should have emerged only for the power condition, as the 
viewing patterns for all conditions were similar; but the effect itself was only marginal. 
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Similar patterns may have occurred in the other conditions, and yet not reach 
significance. 
4.4.2.3 Object Grip. Examining the memory scores in terms of what grip action 
was being performed at retrieval showed perhaps the strongest evidence for an influence 
of the action. Participants in the two grip conditions showed better recall of the position 
information for items compatible with the grip they performed, while incompatible 
items showed no difference in recall performance for their properties. The effects were 
not identical for power and precision groups: only position memory was enhanced for 
the precision compatible items, while both shape and position were recalled more 
accurately than colour information for power compatible objects. 
These findings are in agreement earlier studies suggesting that action 
information is part of an object’s representation, and with the broader grounded 
cognition literature as a whole. Affordance studies, such as Derbyshire et al. (2006) and 
Ellis and Tucker (2004) have shown that the process of recalling mental images of 
objects is enough to activate the well-learnt and intrinsic associated gripping actions. 
Indeed, Ross et al. (2007) showed that this inclusion can even occur with arbitrary 
actions that were simply paired with objects over a short period of time. 
Furthermore, it appears that the context in which the information is retrieved has 
an influence on what can be recalled. We suggest that Experiment 3 provides evidence 
that the presence of action at retrieval allowed participants to better access not only their 
memory representations, but particularly the features that are relevant to acting. This is 
in agreement with studies from the encoding-specificity literature, in particular those 
that use action or body posture similarities at encoding and recall to demonstrate 
influences on the retrieval performance (e.g., Dijikstra et al., 2007; Pine, Reeves, 
Howlett and Fletcher, 2013).  
The current study is not, however, a true encoding-specificity study: participants 
did not interact with the specific objects shown in the stimuli pictures at any time, 
unlike the earlier work where the participants had experienced the action manipulation 
during the formation of the memories (e.g., actually visiting the dentist and lying on a 
chair, as used in Dijikstra et al.’s (2007) study). Despite this, we still demonstrated 
effects in our findings, perhaps due to the familiarity of the objects used. While they 
may not have interacted with the specific stimuli, participants would presumably have 
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interacted with other examples of them before the study, and so incorporated the 
association between the object and its grasp type. This is therefore not simply a case of 
a match between encoding and retrieval situations, but an indication that the 
representations for the everyday stimulus objects contain information about the actions 
associated with them, which, when accessed, will aid retrieval of information about the 
object (as seen in Ross et al., 2007). Furthermore, this is perfectly in line with earlier 
studies that suggest that grip postures are a strongly intrinsic part of an object’s 
representation (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 2006, Iachini, Borghi and Senese, 2008).  
Similarly, the power and precision grips maintained by the participants were not 
calibrated to be specifically compatible for any particular object in the scene: there is 
likely to be some variation in the precision grip required for a teaspoon and the 
precision grip required for a clothes-peg, for example. However, it seems that the more 
generalised grip gesture is enough to have an effect on recall performance, and indeed, 
earlier studies of action preparation influencing perception have typically not made a 
particular attempt to exactly match stimuli and grip posture. Pine et al. (2013) used 
fairly general actions (clenched fist or flat palm) and found these could still increase the 
speed of object naming when they were congruent with the target, despite the gestures 
matching the actions only minimally. For Experiment 3, it is likely that these two 
aspects both contributed to the effect we obtained. The action gestures are well learnt, 
and strongly associated with the concept of the objects presented, and while they did not 
exactly match every object, the overlap between the represented action for an object, 
and the action formed appears to have been enough to lead to the observed memory 
benefit. 
Experiment 3 extends previous work on the influence of action at retrieval by 
showing the memory facilitation is most effective for certain object properties, in 
particular, the position information for the objects. While this indicates spatial 
information being prioritised, rather than a more intrinsic object feature, we noted in 
Experiment 2.2 that there is a clear logic to this situation. Recalling an object’s location 
is perhaps the most important factor during the execution of a task: if the actor knows 
where it is at the start of the task, they can quickly locate it again when it is required, 
without having to spend extra time conducting a more detailed search. Other features 
which may be important (e.g., shape or orientation) can be extracted when the object is 
re-fixated, but position information is necessary to get to that stage. Indeed, while 
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studies show our representations during action have a tendency to be rather sparse, there 
are several findings that indicate spatial information is maintained, and remains 
available to the observer to rely on, if the on-line viewing should be disrupted in any 
way (see e.g., Aivar et al., 2005; Brouwer and Knill, 2007). 
The present study does show an exception to this, however, with participants in 
the power-grip intention condition showing an advantage for recalling both shape and 
position information for the grip compatible items, while no such effect is seen for the 
precision-compatible items. A possible reason for this difference between the groups 
may relate to the nature of the grips used: perhaps the objects selected as power grip 
compatible were all easily matched to the grip posture that participants made during the 
recall phase. As a result, participants retrieved the shape information as it was likely to 
be useful and match their posture. In contrast, the precision posture made by 
participants might not match every one of the precision-compatible stimuli so exactly, 
and so retrieval of the shape information is less useful: the exact shape must be 
extracted from later re-fixation of the object, once it is located. Alternatively, the 
difference may be linked to the differences in fixation during the inspection phase. 
Participants spent more time on the larger power-compatible items whatever their 
intention condition. Possibly, this increased fixation combined with the power posture at 
recall increased the facilitated retrieval, allowing the extraction of shape information as 
well as position. 
It is interesting to note the contrast between the findings of Experiment 3 and 
Experiment 2.2. While the present study found a prioritisation of position information 
specific to the action posture performed, Experiment 2.2 found that participants were 
consistently good at recalling position, regardless of the object type and their action 
condition. As noted, a general advantage for position memory is in accordance with 
other studies which have suggested that the acquisition of position information is 
automatic, and less affected by the particular task demands. Kondo and Saiki’s (2012) 
study demonstrated this by showing that participants could not ignore position 
information, even when the task setting made it irrelevant to performance. Similarly, 
Lamy and Tsal (2000) found that attention was always attracted to a cued location, 
regardless of whether location was task relevant or not, while features such as shape and 
colour were only attended when they were relevant. Studies of the formation of object 
files typically suggest that the spatial information for an object is used as a binding site 
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for the item, as it is an object feature which cannot be shared by another item in the 
scene (see e.g., Wheeler and Treisman, 2002; Hollingworth and Rasmussen, 2010).  
Given this earlier work, the specific facilitation of position information shown in the 
current study is perhaps surprising. One possible explanation for this difference between 
the studies is that the presence of the action posture at retrieval leads to a position deficit 
for the non-compatible objects. If position information is normally well recalled in all 
situations, then when the conditions of retrieval suggest a specific association with 
particular objects, it may become necessary for position information relating to other 
objects to be suppressed. This will then give the appearance of facilitating only the 
information relating to the compatible items, as seen in the present results. While not 
examining exactly the same area, there are suggestions for similar findings in 
affordance effects: Tipper (2010) proposes that attention to specific object details may 
act as a boundary condition in the emergence of the affordances not only by facilitating 
relevant responses, but by suppressing the irrelevant ones. However it is achieved in the 
current study, it seems that the presence of action postures at retrieval does lead to 
benefits for the property of object position for those items compatible with the postures. 
Experiment 3 is in line with the central proposals of theories such as the TEC 
(Hommel et al., 2001), and grounded cognition in general. Our representations contain 
both motor and featural information, gained by incorporating details of the situation 
present at first encoding (e.g., associated action postures) into the resulting memory 
trace. Later reconstruction of some aspect of the trace (in this case, the well learnt grip 
type) aids the process of accessing the trace. The findings presented here go further by 
demonstrating that this facilitation seems to target features that are particularly useful 
for later action performance. 
In the context of this thesis, Experiment 3 provides a contrast to Experiment 2.2. Each 
study shows that either inspection behaviour or later recall processes can be affected by 
the presence of an action posture. However, these studies demonstrate the effects only 
when the action is presented concurrently to the stage in question, either encoding or 
retrieval. In order to further investigate how action may continue to influence memory, 
it is necessary to extend the presence of the action manipulation, so that it continues 
through both encoding and retrieval stages of the task. This is therefore the aim of the 
experiment conducted in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five- The influence of the 
potential for action at encoding and 
retrieval on the formation of object 
representations 
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5.1 Introduction 
One question which arises from the findings of the previous experiments relates 
to how long the effects of the action preparations and postures might be expected to last. 
Thus far, the findings from the earlier studies suggest that the influence of the action 
potential is restricted to the time at which it was present. In Experiment 2.2, where the 
action was present alongside the viewing and encoding process, the effects were seen on 
the eye movements and fixation patterns of the participants. In Experiment 3, where the 
action postures were present at the retrieval stage, it was the recall of information that 
was affected, without any influence on the eye movements. 
There is some previous work examining the influence of action on perception 
which suggests that action effects and representations are fairly short-lived, in line with 
the findings from Experiments 2.2 and 3. At the lowest level, there is evidence from the 
TEC (Hommel et al., 2001) which suggests that the integrated codes for action are more 
transient than those for perception. Part of the proposed system for the TEC is that, once 
items are bound into an event code, they are less available for subsequent events, which 
draw on the same features. Stoet and Hommel (1999) examined this effect when 
participants had to produce responses that overlapped in time, and drew on the same 
action features. Unexpectedly, performance on the second response was not inhibited by 
the amount of overlap between the two aspects as it was when perceptual stimuli 
overlapped. Instead, particularly at short intervals between the two responses, the 
second was facilitated by the amount of overlap with the first. Hommel et al. (2001) 
suggested that, at least for action-related codes, the bindings are short-lived, decaying 
more rapidly than those for object-related event codes. 
While the TEC concentrates on rather more abstract event and action codes, 
there is also evidence from the studies conducted as part of more natural tasks, which 
suggest that representations constructed as part of a natural task are generally transient. 
Tatler (2001) examined participants’ memories for the objects in an environment in 
which they were acting (making a cup of tea). Normal viewing during the task was 
disrupted unexpectedly by the lights being switched off, and participants were asked to 
recall what they had just been looking at. Recall for the contents of the fixation at the 
point of disruption was high, with large amounts of detail. However, recall for the 
information contained in the fixation previous to the one being made during the 
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disruption was poor, with little detail retrieved. In some cases, where participants had 
recently made saccades to a new location just before their vision was disrupted, they 
still recalled information from the fixation previous to that, but over time, the 
information from the previous fixation appeared to be overwritten by that from the 
currently fixated location. Thus, the immediate detail received during a natural task may 
be very transient, and subject to rapid replacement by incoming information. Indeed, 
Land and Tatler (2009) note that, in the midst of a natural task, overwriting the earlier 
information is a necessary process. This information is obtained for a particular part of a 
task, and would only interfere with later sections of the task if it was maintained. For 
example, when driving, maintaining the information about the curvature of the previous 
bend in the road would be no help (and might hinder) navigation of the next bend. This 
is similar to the way in which the type of information maintained is that which is 
necessary for future processes; shown clearly in Triesch et al.’s (2003) block sorting 
task. Participants here would maintain the information about the size of a block only if 
it was a relevant property for a later stage of the task (for example, it informed the 
participant where the object should be set down). If there was nothing to indicate that 
size information would continue to be important throughout the task, it would not be 
maintained, and so it was more efficient for this information to be discarded.) In the 
same way, the length of time information is maintained is dependent on how far in the 
future the information will be required. Thus, when driving, information about the 
previous stretch of road is not maintained for a long period, as it is only relevant for a 
specific part of the task. In other tasks, participants may maintain information, such as 
the spatial location of objects that will be necessary later, over a longer period of time 
until they require the object (see e.g., Land et al., 1999; Pelz and Canoza, 2001).  
Maintaining information therefore seems to depend on its later necessity to the 
task. In terms of our own studies (Experiments 2.2 and 3), participants do not receive 
any outright statement of how the action postures relate to the objects they see (as in all 
previous studies examining how the preparation of action affects perception, e.g., 
Fagioli et al., 2007, Symes et al., 2008). Any effects of action emerge therefore from the 
suggestion of the possibility, via the postures adopted by participants. While effects of 
the actions did emerge, these were closely linked to the period of the study at which 
they were performed, suggesting that ending the action ends the influence it has, as it 
indicates the potential for action is done.  
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The purpose of Experiment 4 is to therefore extend the time at which the action 
manipulations are present, still within the paradigm used for Experiments 2.2 and 3. 
Prolonging the presence of the action potential is done simply by requiring participants 
to maintain the posture throughout both the viewing/encoding stage, and into the recall 
stage. In this way, the potential for participants to act with the objects remains 
throughout the initial construction of the representations, and while the information is 
being retrieved. Such a manipulation is perhaps the least realistic variation of the 
paradigm we have used in Chapters 3 and 4. While we might plan an action when 
viewing, or recall an action when remembering an object, to maintain this action plan 
throughout both processes is something we might be less likely to do within an 
everyday setting. While this study may indicate a reduction in realism, we feel it is a 
reasonable next step to make, to determine if it is the physical presence of the action 
preparation during encoding and retrieval that will lead to influences on both the 
inspection and recall of objects and their properties. As a result of these manipulations, 
it is possible that different effects will emerge in the recall performance. Stronger 
patterns might indicate that by prolonging the action posture, the representations have 
been constructed and accessed in favour of this action, while a weaker influence in the 
results could suggest that the reduced realism of the situation is a factor in the study. 
Another consideration is how the action postures at both encoding and retrieval 
will influence the way in which the representations are constructed and accessed. One 
possibility is that we find similar effects to those in Experiments 2.2 and 3: that is, the 
same patterns will be evident in the eye movements and memory results, but show no 
indication that they are changed by the presence of the action at the other stage as well. 
Such a finding would indicate support for a more purpose-neutral representation 
(Wilson, 2002), where the influence at encoding has no influence on the construction of 
the representation. The retrieval performance might continue to show effects of the 
action presence, but again, this would be due to the context of retrieval affecting the 
access to the representation, unconnected to the way in which the representation had 
been formed. 
Alternatively, the representation may be constructed with the context of the 
action posture in mind, and the retrieval performance similarly influenced by this 
construction. Thus, rather than seeing only one property facilitated (as in Experiment 3), 
other properties would also show an effect in how they are recalled. In this case, it 
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would seem that maintaining the action representation across both postures does indeed 
lead to the formation of a representation weighted for action, where this construction 
continues to affect the success of retrieval when later accessing the memory. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-four participants were recruited, of which 2 were later removed from 
analysis due to poor calibration. The analysed sample consisted of 5 males, mean age 
25.2, SD = 3.5. 10 were assigned to the precision grip condition, and 12 to the power 
grip condition. Handedness and eye dominance were measured by self-report: the 
sample contained no left handers and 8 participants showing left eye dominance. 
Participants were recruited using advertisements on the University’s on-line recruitment 
system, and received payment (£3) for their participation. 
5.2.2 Stimuli, Procedure and Design 
These were identical to Experiment 3, with one change. Participants in 
Experiment 4 performed the action pose they were assigned to during both the viewing 
stage of the study, and the retrieval stage. Participants began these poses before the 
presentation of the first stimulus scene, and maintained them throughout the three trials, 
until after the last memory question of the third trial had been asked. Poses were again 
maintained in the participants’ dominant hand, while their non-dominant hand made the 
responses on the computer keyboard. 
The same measures of perception (average number of fixations, average duration 
of fixations and primacy fixation numbers) and memory (responses to multiple choice 
questions regarding object features) were used in Experiment 4 as in Experiment 2.2. 
As for Experiment 3, the measures from the 11 participants in the passive 
condition collected in Experiment 2.2 were used as a baseline in the following analyses. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Influence on Perception 
5.3.1.1 Scene inspection. As for Experiments 2.2 and 3, participants’ eye 
movements were examined in terms of how their viewing condition affected viewing of 
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the overall scene. The regions of interest for analysis were the scene thirds, that is, the 
left, central and right regions of the scene stimuli. Measures of average total fixation 
number, average total fixation time and the average ordinal number of the first fixation 
to a region were examined for influences of the participants’ intention condition and the 
scene location fixated. 
Using the measure of fixation number, participants showed a significant 
influence of the intention condition, F(2,29)=3.62, p=.040. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that this came from participants in the power condition making fewer fixations 
to the scene (M=19.4), across all the locations compared to the passive (M=21.1) and 
precision (M=22.0) conditions (although post-hoc comparisons did not show significant 
differences here, ps>.05). 
A significant effect of the scene area was also found, F(2,58) = 47.56, p<.001. 
Participants showed significant differences between all three locations, with 
significantly more fixations made to the central region than the two edge regions (M= 
26.3, both ps <.001), and significantly more fixations made to items on the left 
(M=19.3) than the right (M=16.6, p<.05). No interaction emerged between the intention 
condition and the scene location (F<1). 
The measure of total fixation time showed a slightly different pattern. Across the 
three intention conditions, participants did not differ in the time spent fixating the 
scenes (F<1). However, a main effect of the scene location did emerge, F(2,58)=41.81, 
p<.001. Again, significant differences were found between all three regions, with 
participants spending the most time fixating the central region (M=7500ms), compared 
to both left (M=5506ms) and right (M=4853ms) locations (ps <.001), and significantly 
more time on the left scene region compared to the right (p=.033). No significant 
interaction was found between the scene region and the intention condition for this 
measure (F<1). 
For both fixation number and duration measures, there was a strong influence of 
the central scene region. As for the previous studies, this is most likely due to the drift 
correct presented prior to the scene during the experiment. This might bias participants 
to spend more time in this area, skewing the results. In order to investigate, the analyses 
for fixation number and duration were re-run without the data from the central region. 
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This change had a slight effect on the outcome for both measures. For fixation 
number, the main effect of intention was still present, but was now only marginally 
significant, F(2,29)=2.99, p=.06. This was still due to participants in the power 
condition making fewer fixations on the scene overall (M=16.7), compared to passive 
(M=18.4) or precision conditions (M=18.9), although post-hoc comparisons remained 
non-significant (ps>.05). Similarly, the influence of location was still present, though no 
longer as strong, F(1,29)=5.77, p=.023. The left region of the scenes (M=19.3) received 
more fixations than the right hand region (M=16.6) across all groups. No interaction 
was found between the two factors (F<1). 
Similarly, for the measure of fixation duration, the removal of the data for the 
central region changed the strength of the effects, but not the pattern of inspection. No 
main effect was found for the intention condition for this measure (F<1), and the 
influence of scene region was also weaker, as it now emerged as only marginally 
significant, F(1,29)=3.38, p=.077. As before, participants spent longer fixating the left 
region (M=5506ms) compared to the right (M=4853ms). 
Finally, the scene inspection data were examined in terms of the number of the 
average first fixation made to the scene regions. Due to the fact that all first fixations to 
a scene were made in the centre because of the drift correct, the central region was again 
removed from this analysis, and only the average first fixations for left and right scene 
regions were examined. For this measure, no influence of the intention group was found 
(F<1). The scene region did have a significant influence, F(1,29)=18.05, p<.001, with 
participants first fixating the left of the scene (M=9.0) earlier than the right (M=17.5). 
The interaction between these two factors did not emerge as significant, F(2,29)=1.56, 
p=.226. Figure 5.1 displays the results for the average first fixations to scene regions, 
across the three intention conditions. 
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Figure 5.1. Measure of average first fixation to scene regions in the three 
intention conditions 
5.3.1.2 Object Category. As for the previous studies, analyses were 
carried out to determine whether each object’s associated category and the background 
of the scene had any influence on the way in which the scenes were inspected. Both 
fixation duration and fixation number were used as the outcome measures. 
For the measures of fixation number, no influence of the scene type was 
found (F<1). However, a difference emerged for the object category, such that items 
associated with a garage received more fixations than those compatible with a kitchen, 
F(1, 32) = 62.015, p<.001 (garage M=6.6; kitchen M=5.4). Furthermore, the interaction 
between object category and scene type was significant, F(2, 64) = 6.00, p=.004. 
Breaking down the interactions showed that this difference between object types was at 
its strongest in the kitchen environments (p<.001), (garage M=7.0; kitchen M=4.9), 
although the differences for neutral (garage M=6.5; kitchen M=5.8) and garage (garage 
M=6.3; kitchen M=5.4) environments were also significant (ps <.05). 
A similar pattern was found for the measures of fixation duration. Again, 
no significant difference was found between the three scene types (F<1), but the garage 
compatible objects were fixated for a longer average time, F(1, 32) = 48.61, p<.001, 
(garage M=1853ms; kitchen M=1562ms). The interaction between object category and 
scene type was also significant, F(2, 64) = 11.14, p<.001, and this was once again 
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driven by the garage items in the kitchen environment being fixated for significantly 
longer than kitchen items (p<.001, garage M=2207ms; kitchen M=1445ms). However, 
for the fixation duration measure, this difference was not significant for the items in the 
garage scene (p=.19), and only marginally so for items in the neutral scenes (p=.053, 
garage M=1744ms; kitchen M=1600ms). 
Figure 5.2. shows both the results for measures of fixation number and 
fixation duration. 
 
Figure 5.2. Graphs for (L) fixation duration and (R) fixation numbers on garage 
and kitchen compatible objects, across the three scene types 
5.3.1.3 Object Grip. The influence of the objects grip compatibility on 
inspection behaviour was compared across the three intention conditions. 
Fixation duration. For the measure of fixation duration, an effect of the object’s 
grip type was found, F(1, 30) = 23.80, p<.001, with significantly longer fixations to 
objects compatible with a power grip (M=6.7) than precision grip (M=5.3). No effect of 
the intention condition was found, and the interaction between the two factors was 
similarly non-significant (both Fs <1). Figure 5.3 shows the data for the fixation 
durations. 
197 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Average fixation durations to power and precision compatible 
objects, across the three intention conditions 
Fixation number. The pattern found for the measure of fixation numbers was 
very similar to that for fixation duration. Again, an effect of the object’s grip type was 
found, with significantly more fixations to power items (M=1811ms) than precision 
(M=1588ms), F(1, 30)=70.33, p<.001. However, this effect did not differ across the 
intention conditions (F(2, 30)=2.28, p=.12) and no interactions were found(F<1).  
 
Figure 5.4. Average number of fixations to power and precision compatible 
objects, across the three intention conditions 
5.3.1.4 Object Position. Mixed factorial ANOVAs were run to examine the 
influence of an object’s position in the scene on inspection behaviour, firstly across the 
three intention conditions, and then examining each separately. Measures of fixation 
duration, number, and average first fixation to objects were analysed. 
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Fixation duration. For this measure an effect of position was found, F(2, 60) = 
3.62, p=.032, due to participants spending significantly longer on objects at the left 
(M=1815ms) than the right (M=1593ms, p<.05). However, no difference was found 
between the intention conditions, (F<1) and no interaction between the two factors 
(F<1). 
 
Figure 5.5. Average fixation durations on objects positioned across the scene for 
the three intention conditions 
As before, the participants in the passive condition were the same as in previous 
studies. Their results are therefore the same as previously reported, with participants 
spending significantly longer on the left side objects than those on the right. However, 
for both the power and precision intention conditions, participants showed no influence 
of the position on their fixation durations (both F’s <1). 
Fixation number. A similar pattern was found, with a significant effect of 
position, F(2,60)=5.35,p=.007, due to participants making more fixations to objects on 
the left (M=6.4) than the right(M=5.4, p<.05).Once again, the three intention conditions 
did not differ, F(2,30)=2.13, p=.136 and no interaction was found between the 
factors(F<1).  
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Figure 5.6. Average number of fixations to objects positioned across the scene 
for the three intention conditions 
Examining the responses from the power and precision intention conditions 
separately, participants in neither the precision, F(2, 18) = 1.69, p=.212 nor power, 
F(2,22) = 1.80, p=.189 conditions showed a significant influence of the object’s position 
on their inspection behaviour (Figure 5.6). 
Average first fixation number. A similar pattern emerged, with an effect of the 
object position, F(2, 60)=13.45, p<.001, due to later first fixations to right hand 
(M=23.8) items than those on the left hand side (M=16.5, p<.001) or at the centre 
(M=16.9, p<.001). The intention condition continued to have no influence (F<1) and no 
significant interaction was found, F(2,60)=1.33, p=.269. 
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Figure 5.7. Average first fixation to objects positioned across the scene for the 
three intention conditions 
Examining the power and precision intention conditions, however, did show 
significant differences emerging (Figure 5.7). Unlike participants in the passive 
intention condition, where no significant difference was found between the average first 
fixations to objects at the three positions, the two grip conditions did show a significant 
effect of position. Both participants in the precision condition, F(2,18) = 15.33, p<.001 
and the power condition, F(2,22) = 3.62, p=.045 showed that they were later in first 
fixating items present at the right of the screen (power M=22.0, precision M=27.3) than 
those at the left (power M=16.5, precision M= 15.1) and centre (power M=16.0, 
precision M=16.2). This is strongest for the precision intention condition (p<.001), 
while for the power intention condition, the effect is solely between the centre and right 
objects, and only approaches significance (p=.087). 
5.3.2 Influence on Memory 
Table 5.1 shows the proportion of correct responses for each property question, 
within the three intention conditions. (As before, the results for participants in the 
passive condition are the same as those presented in Experiments 2.2 and 3, and are 
included here as a baseline.) 
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Table 5.1.  
Proportion of correct responses to property questions across the intention conditions 
Question 
Intention 
Group 
Colour Shape Orientation Position Presence 
Passive 0.553 0.520 0.583 0.627 0.856 
Precision 0.549 0.473 0.552 0.535 0.800 
Power 0.532 0.496 0.565 0.554 0.832 
 
These scores were checked to ensure they were above the appropriate chance 
level, using one-sample t-tests. All responses to the Colour, Shape, Position and 
Presence questions were significantly above the chance level of 0.25 (all ps <.01); while 
responses to the Orientation questions were significantly above the chance level of 0.5 
(all ps <.05). As for the previous studies, the responses to the Presence questions were 
not included in further analysis, due to the artificially high score. Orientation responses 
were analysed separately from the other questions due to the different level of chance. 
5.3.2.1 Object Category. The influence of the scene type (kitchen, garage or 
neutral) and object type (garage or kitchen) was examined for each of the four analysed 
property questions. 
Colour. A main effect of the scene type was found, F(2, 64)=7.57, p=.001, with 
participants significantly better at recalling object colours in the garage environment 
(M=0.61) than the kitchen (M=0.48, p=.003). An effect of the object category was also 
found, F(1,32)=10.90, p=.002 showing participants to be better at recalling the colour of 
kitchen compatible items (M=0.59) compared to garage compatible items (M=0.50), but 
the interaction between the two factors was non-significant (F<1).  
Shape. For the recall of shape information, an effect of the scene type was again 
found, F(2, 64)=5.06, p=.009, with participants marginally better at objects in the 
garage environment (M=0.53) and significantly better in the neutral environment 
(M=0.54) than the kitchen environment (M=0.44, p=.070; p<.05 respectively). Better 
recall was also found for kitchen compatible items (M=0.55) over garage items 
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(M=0.46), F(1,32)=12.71, p=.001, but again, no interaction between the two factors 
(F<1). 
Orientation. For the recall of orientation information, it was found that there 
was no significant effect of any factor. Participants did not perform differently when 
recalling the information from different scene types, F(2, 64)=1.28, p=.29 or categories 
of the objects, F(1,32)=1.56, p=.22 and the interaction was also non-significant (F<1). 
Position. When recalling the position of objects, an effect of the scene type was 
found, F(2, 64)=8.82, p<.001, with participants significantly better at recalling items in 
the garage (M=0.64) and neutral environment (M=0.59) than those in the kitchen 
(M=0.50; p=.001; p=.070 respectively). As for the other property questions, participants 
recalled the position of kitchen items (M=0.61) significantly better than garage items 
(M=0.54), F(1,32)=5.43, p=.026. Again, no interaction was found between the factors, 
F(2, 64)=1.72, p=.187. 
Figure 5.8 displays the scores for object categories within the scene types, for 
each of the four property questions analysed here. 
 
Figure 5.8. Scores for object categories within the three scene types; top left to 
bottom right: Colour, Orientation, Shape, Position 
203 
 
5.3.2.2 Object Grip Type. Investigating the effect of the objects grip type on 
recall, a mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted including all the intention conditions. 
In this analysis, no significant difference was found between the scores for the intention 
conditions, F(2, 30)=1.12, p=.34, or the grip type of the object (F<1). However, a main 
effect of question type was found, F(2,60)=8.32, p<.001, with higher scores for position 
questions (M=0.57) than shape (M=0.50) or colour (M=0.54) (although a post-hoc 
comparison did not reveal a significant difference between scores). 
Examining the interactions showed that most were non-significant (F<1). However, the 
interaction between the grip type and the question type was significant, F(2,4)=4.94, 
p=.010. Closer examination of this interaction showed that precision items displayed a 
strong difference between the scores for the three question types, F(2,64)=10.84, 
p<.001, with participants successfully recalling the colour (M=0.55) and position 
(M=0.53) of these objects better than their shape (M=0.47, ps<.05.). Examining the 
orientation measure separately showed no difference between the three intention 
conditions (F<1) or the object grip type, F(1,30)=1.04, p=.32. The interaction between 
the two was also not significant, F(2,30)=1.94, p=.16. 
The three intention groups were next examined separately, in order to determine 
whether any further effects were present. 
Passive. Participants in the passive condition are the same as those in 
Experiment 2.2 were used for this data set, so the results are identical to those presented 
in Chapter 3. In summary, no difference was found between memory scores for power 
and precision items, but participants were better at recalling the position of items. 
Focusing only on power and precision objects showed that for both groups of objects, 
participants still performed better on the position questions compared to the shape 
property. 
Precision. Participants in the precision intention condition were unaffected by 
the type of grip the objects were compatible with (F<1), but did show an effect of the 
question type, F(2, 18) = 5.08, p = .018. Recall of shape information (M=0.47) was 
worse than that for recall of the position (M=0.53) and colour (M=0.55) information, 
although comparisons run with Bonferroni-corrections were too conservative to show a 
significant difference between the scores. The interaction between the two was non-
significant, F(2, 18) = 1.053, p=.369. 
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Responses to the orientation questions were examined separately, as before. The mean 
scores for the power and precision questions were rather close to the chance level for 
this question type (0.50), and so one-sample t-tests were conducted to determine 
whether responses were any different from chance. The scores for recalling the 
orientation of precision compatible objects did not significantly differ from chance 
(p=.765), although recall of power objects’ orientation states were significantly better 
than chance (p=.013). Comparing the orientation scores for recall of power and 
precision items showed that the difference approached significance, F(1,9)=3.64, 
p=.089, with participants showing marginally better recall for the power objects’ 
orientations (M=0.59) compared to precision items (M=0.51). 
Figure 5.9 shows the proportion of correct responses to the object 
properties for participants in the precision condition. 
 
Figure 5.9. Proportion of correct responses to property questions encoded and 
retrieved under precision conditions 
Power. Participants in the power intention condition showed no effect of the 
object grip category (F<1), or the question type, F(2, 22) = 1.280, p =.298. Furthermore, 
the interaction between the two was non-significant, F(2, 22) = 1.592, p=.226. The 
scores for the orientation responses were again considered to be close to chance, so each 
grip type response was analysed with a one-sample t-test. For both power and precision 
objects, recall of the orientation information was above chance, significantly so for 
205 
 
power, (M= 0.58, p<.05), and approaching significance for precision, (M=0.54, p=.075). 
However, no significant difference was found between the orientation recall for 
precision and power items (F<1). 
Figure 5.10 displays the response scores for participants in the power grip 
condition. 
 
Figure 5.10. Proportion of correct responses to property questions encoded and 
retrieved under power conditions 
5.3.2.3 Object Position. Examining the influence of the object’s position as part 
of the scene across all three intention conditions, it was found that the three groups did 
not appear to differ in their responses, F(2,30)=1.04, p=.367. However, effects of 
position, F(2,60)=4.56,p=.014 and question type, F(3,90)=8.34,p<.001 did emerge, 
showing a tendency for participants to recall items on the left (M=0.57) better than those 
in the centre (M=0.50, p<.001) and an advantage for position information(M=0.57) over 
shape (M=0.50, p<.05). 
Splitting the data set into the three intention conditions allowed us to look more 
closely at the effects within each group. 
Passive. The findings for the passive intention group are as reported in more 
detail for Experiment 2.2. In summary, these participants were better at recalling the 
position of items, but showed no effect of the general object position within a scene, and 
no interaction between the effects. 
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Precision. Participants in the precision condition showed a significant influence 
of the position of the objects in the scene, F(2, 18) = 4.68, p= .023, with centre 
items(M=0.46) recalled worse than items at the left (M=0.55, p=.064) and right 
(M=0.56, p=.030). There was also a significant effect of the question type F(2, 18) = 
5.64, p=.012. Examination of the means showed better performance on position 
questions (M=0.54) than shape questions (M=0.47) although this effect was not strong 
enough to remain in a post-hoc tests (p=.28). The interaction between the two factors 
was also non-significant (F<1). 
The mean scores for the responses to orientation questions were found to be 
close to chance for objects at the three positions. One sample t-tests showed that 
participants recalled the orientation of objects at the left hand side significantly better 
than chance (M=0.62, p=.051), but objects at the centre and right of the screen were 
recalled no differently from chance (M=0.52, p=.331 and M=0.50, p=.691, 
respectively). No significant difference was found between the recall of the orientation 
information for objects positioned at the three locations, F(2,18)=2.25, p=.13. 
Figure 5.11 shows the proportion of correct response to each property question 
at the three scene locations for these participants. 
 
Figure 5.11. Proportion of correct responses to the property questions for objects 
across the three positions encoded and retrieved under precision conditions 
Power. For the participants in the power condition, no significant effects were 
found. All types of property were recalled equally, F(2, 22) = 1.13, p=.341, at all three 
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positions (F<1), and the interaction between the two factors was not significant, F(4, 44) 
= 1.302, p=.284. Mean scores for the responses to the orientation questions were again 
found to be close to chance. One-sample t-tests showed that the objects on the right and 
left hand side were recalled at a level no different to chance (M=0.55, p=.235 and 
M=0.55, p=.105, respectively), while the objects at the centre were recalled marginally 
better than chance (M=0.57, p=.074). No significant difference was found between the 
three locations when comparing scores for orientation recall (F<1). 
Figure 5.12 shows the proportion of correct responses to each property questions 
at the three scene locations for the power condition participants. 
 
Figure 5.12. Proportion of correct responses to the property questions for objects 
across the three positions encoded and retrieved under power conditions 
5.3.3 Comparisons with previous experiments 
The data from Experiment 4 appear to show no strong similarities to the findings 
from the previous Experiments 2.2 and 3, at least in terms of the influence the action 
postures have on inspection and recall, despite the strong similarity between the 
designs. Other effects that seem to reflect the general means by which participants go 
about the task are the same (e.g., the tendency for early fixations to the left region of a 
scene when examining it). However, the differences in the designs may have had an 
effect on the outcomes. 
Comparing the retrieval stage of Experiment 4 to the earlier two designs shows 
that this phase is different from the preceding studies. In Experiment 2.2, participants do 
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nothing during the retrieval phase, but this is preceded by an action manipulation at the 
encoding stage. For Experiment 3, the action takes place at retrieval, but this is never 
preceded by action at encoding. In Experiment 4, action at retrieval is always preceded 
by action at encoding. These differences make it more difficult for us to make direct 
comparisons between the retrieval stages of the current and preceding studies. 
For the encoding phase of Experiment 4, Trials 2 and 3 are also not comparable 
to Experiments 2.2 or 3.1, as there is an action posture at both the encoding stage, and 
the preceding retrieval stage for both. However, the encoding stage of Trial 1 from 
Experiment 4 is comparable to the encoding stage of Experiment 2.2., as action occurs 
during both, but is not preceded by any earlier action postures. As a result, extra 
analyses were carried out on the data from Experiment 4, comparing the results from the 
study across the three trials. The trial number was included as a factor in the analyses of 
Experiment 4, re-examining the eye movement data only. 
5.3.3.1 Grip. A 3x2x3 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on the fixation 
duration and number. The effects of the object grip type (power or precision), the trial 
number (first, second or third) and the intention condition were examined (passive, 
precision and power). 
Fixation duration. No difference was found between the three intention 
conditions (F<1). A marginal effect of the trial number was found, F(2, 60)=2.95, 
p=.06, as was a significant effect of the grip condition, F(1,30)=22.84, p<.001. 
Significantly longer fixations were made to power-grip compatible items (M=1770ms) 
over precision compatible items (M=1573ms), and participants showed marginally 
shorter fixations in Trial 1 (M=1602ms) compared to those made in Trial 3 (M=1767ms, 
p=.06). 
A marginally significant interaction between the trial and the intention condition 
was also found, F(4, 60)=2.53, p=.05, and a significant interaction between the trial 
number and the grip type, F(2, 60)=3.52, p=.036. The interactions between grip and 
intention, and between grip, trial and intention were not significant, (all Fs <1). 
Further investigation of the interactions showed that the effects came only from 
the power condition, where an effect of the trial was significant, F(2,22)=4.65, p=.021. 
Participants spent longer fixating objects in the third trial (M=1890ms) compared to the 
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first (M=1565ms, p<.05) and marginally compared to the second (M=1614ms, p=.08). 
The other intention conditions showed no such effect of the trial (Fs <1). 
Fixation number. For this measure, no main effect of intention condition was 
found, F(2,30)=2.30, p=.117. However, a significant effect of the trial number emerged, 
F(2, 60)=3.27, p=.044. This was due to fewer fixations to objects in the first trial 
(M=5.72) than the second (M=5.83) and third (M=6.18), although this difference did not 
emerge as significant when tested using the Bonferroni correction. A significant effect 
of the grip condition was also found, with more fixations made to power compatible 
items (M=6.54) than precision (M=5.28), F(1,30)=69.00, p<.001. 
Examining the interactions showed a significant interaction between the trial and the 
intention condition, F(4, 60)=2.62, p=.044, and a significant interaction between the 
trial number and the grip type, F(2, 60)=3.32, p=.043. All other interactions were non-
significant (F<1). 
As for the measure of total fixation time, the interaction between trial and 
intention group was due to the power intention condition, where the main effect of trial 
was seen, F(2,22)=6.68, p=.005. This was due to fewer fixations made to items in the 
first trial (M=5.1) compared to the third (M=6.1, p<.05). The other intention conditions 
showed no differences in the trials (Fs<1). 
Primacy fixation number. Using the first fixation to objects as a measure 
showed strong effects of both trial, F(2,60)=10.05, p<.001 and grip type, F(1,30)=57.36, 
p<.001, although no difference was found between the intention conditions (F<1), and 
the interactions were similarly non-significant (all Fs <1). Participants looked 
significantly earlier to the power compatible objects (M=16.7) than the precision 
compatible objects (M=21.1). Participants also looked earlier at items in the first trial 
(M=16.0) compared to those in the second (M=20.8) and third trial (M=20, ps<.001). 
5.3.3.2 Position. Mixed factorial ANOVAs were conducted on the measures of 
total fixation time and number. The effects of the object location (left, centre or right), 
the trial number (first, second or third) and the intention condition (passive, precision 
and power) were examined. 
Fixation duration. Examining the influence of objects’ positions across the 
trials on fixation duration showed a main effect of the trial number, 
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F(2,56)=3.44,p=.039, with means indicating, shorter fixations made to objects in Trial 1 
(M=1596ms), compared to Trials 2 (M=1656ms) and 3 (M=1753ms), but no significant 
difference emerging in post-hoc tests. A marginal effect was also found for position, 
F(2,56)=2.90, p=.063, with a shorter time spent on all objects placed at the right hand 
side (M=1598ms), compared to those at the left (M=1785ms, p=.08) but no different 
from those objects at the centre (M=1623ms, p=0.76). No difference emerged for the 
intention groups (F<1), or for any interactions between the factors (all Fs <1). 
Fixation number. For the measure of fixation number, no difference was found 
across the three trials, F(2,56)=2.30, p=.12, or the intention groups (F<1). A main effect 
of position was found, F(2, 56) = 4.76, p=.012, with significantly fewer fixations made 
to objects at the right hand side(M=5.4) than to the left, (M=6.3, p=.01). No interactions 
were found to be significant (all Fs <1). 
Primacy fixation number. Examining the influence of trial number and position 
on the primacy fixation number showed a strong main effect of trial, F(2,56)=8.61, 
p<.001, with participants showing significantly earlier first fixations to items in trial 1 
(M=15.9), compared to trials 2 (M=20.9, p<.01) and 3 (M=20.3, p<.01). A main effect 
of position was also found, F(2, 56)=14.80, p<.001, with participants examining items 
on the right of the screen for the first time (M=24.0) significantly later than those at the 
left (M=16.3) or centre (M=16.8, both ps <.001). No difference was found between the 
intention conditions (F<1). The interactions between the factors were also non-
significant (all F’s <1), with the exception of the interaction between trial and position, 
where the effect approached significance, F(4,112)=2.18, p=.076. Further investigation 
of this interaction in the individual groups did not reveal any significant effects. 
Looking at the performance of participants in Experiment 4 across the three 
trials shows the standard effects associated with the object grip types and positions 
persists across the trials. Participants still fixated more and earlier on the objects at the 
left hand side, and on items compatible with a power grip. There appears to be no 
consistent pattern to any differences that emerged across the trials, and no indication 
that influences of the action posture were emerging in the first trial only. 
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5.3.4 Comparison with Experiment 2.2 
As noted above, the encoding stage of Trial 1 of Experiment 2.2 is the only part 
of the previous experiments that is directly comparable with Experiment 4. The eye-
tracking results from Experiment 2.2 were therefore re-run, including Trial as a factor as 
well. This allowed for the emergence of effects in different trials for this earlier study to 
be examined, in order to determine if the patterns produced within each trial 
(particularly the first) were similar or different to those found in the trial analyses for 
Experiment 4. The hands intention group were excluded from this analysis, as this 
condition was not used in Experiment 4. 
5.3.4.1 Grip. Mixed factorial ANOVAs were conducted on the measures of total 
fixation duration and number for the data from Experiment 2.2. The effects of the object 
grip type (power or precision), the trial number (first, second or third) and the intention 
condition were examined (passive, precision and power). 
Fixation duration. For the measure of total fixation duration, significant 
influences of both the grip condition, F(1,31)=28.19, p<.001, and the trial number, 
F(2,62)=3.06, p=.054, were found. Participants spent longer on objects compatible with 
a power grip (M=1829ms) than precision compatible (M=1535ms), and made spent 
longer fixating objects presented in Trial 2 (M=1764ms), compared to those in 1 
(M=1563ms, p<.01) and 3 (M=1721ms, p<.05), (post-hoc comparisons, p<.05). There 
was no main effect of the intention condition (F<1). 
One interaction emerged as significant, between Trial and grip type, 
F(2,62)=3.32, p=.043. Further investigation of this pattern showed that only Trial 2 
showed a significant difference between power(M=2114ms) and precision 
items(M=1709ms) F(1,31)=23.28, p<.001, while Trial 1 showed only a marginal 
difference(power M=1745ms; precision M=1543ms), F(1,31)=3.64, p=.066, and Trial 3 
showed no difference at all, F(1,31)=1.92, p=.176. 
Fixation number. For measures of fixation number, the pattern was similar, 
with significant effects of both Trial, F(2,62)=3.96, p=.024, and grip type, 
F(1,31)=60.78, p<.001. Again, power compatible objects received significantly more of 
the fixations (M=6.6) than precision compatible items (M=5.1), and objects in Trial 2 
(M=6.0) were fixated more than those in Trials 1 (M=5.4, p<.05) or 3 (M=6.0, p=.06). A 
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marginal effect of the intention group was also found, F(2,31)=2.58, p=.092, with 
participants in the precision intention condition (M=5.4) making fewer fixations to 
objects that the power (M=6.1, p=.08) and passive (M=6.3, p<.01) intention groups.  
As for fixation duration, only the interaction between trial and grip type 
approached significance, F(2,62)=2.67, p=.077. Examining each trial separately showed 
that all three showed significant differences in the number of fixations made to power 
and precision items, with power items consistently receiving more (Trial 1: 
F(1,31)=16.12, p<.001; Trial 2: F(1,31)=38.20, p<.001; Trial 3: F(1,31)=13.35, p<.001). 
Primary fixation number. For the measure of average first fixation to objects, a 
significant effect of trial was found, F(2,62)=15.90, p<.001, as participants were earlier 
in making their first fixations to objects in Trial 1 (M=16.3), compared to Trials 2 
(M=20.3) and 3, (M=20.6, ps<.001). A main effect of grip type was found, 
F(1,31)=47.66, p<.001. They were also significantly later to first fixate precision objects 
(M=21.1) compared to power items (M=17.0). 
No other main effects or interactions were found to be significant for this measure (all 
F’s <1). 
With regards to how the influence of object grip type differed across the three 
trials of Experiment 2.2, it seems that the pattern of a preference for the power 
compatible items persisted across all trials. However, the previously reported interaction 
between intention condition and object grip type did not emerge within the individual 
trials, indicating that it was a cumulative effect. 
5.3.4.2 Position. Mixed-factorial ANOVAs were conducted on the three levels 
of position (left, right and centre), intention conditions (passive, precision and power) 
and the three trials. 
Fixation duration. The measure of fixation duration showed a significant main 
effect for Trial, F(2,82)=8.10, p<.001 and a marginally significant effect for position, 
F(2,82)=2.60, p=.080. Participants were making significantly longer fixations to objects 
in Trial 2, (M=1737ms) than Trials 1 (M=1553ms, p<.05) and 3 (M=1740ms, p=.06). 
They also made marginally longer fixations to objects on the left hand side 
(M=1770ms), compared to those on the right, (M=1740ms, p=.062).  
No other main effects or interactions were found to differ significantly (all F’s <1). 
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Fixation number. For the measure of fixation number, significant effects of 
both Trial and position were again found. As before, participants made more fixations to 
items in Trial 2, F(2,82)=6.90, p=.002 (M= 6.0) than Trial 1, (M=5.4, p<.05), and more 
fixations to objects on the left side of the screen, F(2,82)=8.01, p<.001(M=6.1) than the 
centre (M=6.0, p<.01) or right (M=5.2, p<.01).  
One interaction emerged as marginally significant, between the intention 
condition and the trial number, F(6,82)=1.94, p=.084. Investigating this further showed 
that the difference in trials emerged as significant only in the group of precision 
intention participants, F(2,20)=4.44, p=.025. Here, participants made significantly more 
fixations to objects in Trial 2 (M=6.5) than Trial 1 (M=5.4, p<.01) and Trial 3 (M=6.0, 
p<.05). 
Primary fixation number. For the measure of average first fixation number 
made to the objects, both Trial, F(2,82)=8.28, p<.001, and position, F(2,82)=16.37, 
p<.001, were significant main effects. Participants were significantly earlier to first 
fixate items in Trial 1 (M=16.8), than 2 (M=20.7, p<.01) or 3 (M=20.9, p<.01) and 
significantly later to first fixate items presented on the right side of the screen (M=24.1) 
than the left (M=16.5, p<.001) or centre (M=17.7, p<.001). No significant effect of 
intention condition was found (F<1). 
The only significant interaction to emerge was between position and intention 
condition, F(6,82)=2.55, p=.026. Further investigation showed that this was due to 
participants in the power and precision conditions first fixating right side objects (power 
M=24.3, precision M=29.1) significantly later than those on the left (power M=13.8, 
precision M=14.3, ps<.001), while the passive condition showed no such difference. 
Examining the effect of object position across the trials for participants in 
Experiment 2.2 showed that the finding of a leftwards bias when examining the scenes 
was consistent over all trials. The finding first reported in Experiment 2.2 (that 
participants in the power and precision intention conditions take significantly longer to 
first fixate objects on the right hand side) were thus maintained across all three trials. 
Participants in Experiment 2.2 seemed to show that some effects (such as that of 
intention group on viewing object grip types) were not seen within every trial, but were 
a cumulative effect, found when all trials were analysed together. The influence of 
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intention group on examining objects located at the different positions, however, was 
maintained across the trials, suggesting that this was a stronger effect. 
5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 4 replicated the design of Experiments 2.2 and 3, but extended them 
by increasing the time during which the grip posture was maintained. Rather than 
restrict the posture to only one stage, participants maintained their action throughout 
both encoding and retrieval, in an attempt to maintain the relevance of action throughout 
both stages of the memory process.. Patterns of effects observed in previous studies 
remained present in Experiment 4. For inspection behaviour, participants still showed a 
tendency to inspect the left of the screen earlier than the right, and spent more time 
fixating power compatible objects over precision compatible items. For memory 
performance, participants showed a general advantage for recalling the position of the 
objects over the other tested properties. The action effects reported in Experiments 2.2 
and 3 did not persist, however, with the exception of the influence of the power and 
precision grips on the participants’ inspection of the scenes. 
5.4.1 Influence on Inspection and Memory 
For both inspection and recall behaviours, the set of participants used for this 
study responded to the stimuli in very similar ways to those in the earlier studies. So, for 
object category, participants spent more time fixating the garage compatible objects, 
particularly when they were presented in the kitchen background. As in the previous 
studies, this suggests that the unfamiliar or incongruent items attracted more attention, 
particularly when they were placed in an environment in which they were particularly 
incongruous (see e.g., Gareze and Findlay, 2007).  
The structure of the scene layout is most likely responsible for the left-to-right 
progression of fixations shown by participants (Gilchrist and Harvey, 2006), in 
conjunction with the asymmetric biases in attentional processing that has been found to 
influence viewers into showing a leftwards bias (e.g., Nuthmann and Matthias, 2014). 
The linear arrangement of objects in our stimuli encourages a similar ‘reading’ of the 
scene in the eye movements. 
Finally, when examining the influence of the object’s grip type, the larger, 
power-compatible items received more fixations and were examined for a longer time 
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than the smaller precision items, due to attracting more attention during the encoding 
phase. 
Similar patterns were seen for memory performance. For all properties, 
participants showed better recall for the more familiar kitchen items, but an overall 
worse performance in the kitchen environment itself, considered to be due to the 
construction of the scene. While no influence of object grip or object position within the 
scene was found on the memory performance, participants continued to show an 
advantage for recalling the position of objects, regardless of their grip type, and shape 
information in particular was poorly recalled. Again, this is very much what was found 
in both the earlier studies of this thesis, and work by others. Participants seem to always 
do well at recalling position, possibly because this is an important property for the 
construction of object representations (Hollingworth and Rasmussen, 2010), and 
extracted early from a scene (Tatler et al., 2003). Shape is also often the poorest 
recalled, possibly due to the use of outline drawings at the test phase. Other studies 
which have used the same approach also report that participants find this difficult to 
match to the correct objects (e.g., Tatler et al., 2005).  
These patterns have been found in all our experiments which use this particular 
paradigm, and are all most likely due to the stimuli used, and the way in which the 
stimulus displays were constructed. Thus, the fact that we continued to find these 
patterns in Experiment 4 indicates that it was not completely different to the previous 
versions of the study. As a result, the absence of effects linked to the participants’ 
intention conditions and action postures can be more reliably attributed to the new 
manipulation (maintaining the action postures throughout encoding and retrieval), rather 
than differences in the participants, or the overall construction of the paradigm.  
Both Experiment 4 and Experiment 2.2 were examined by trial, to determine if 
the differences between them could be more specifically linked to the different action 
manipulations. In particular, it was the encoding stage of Trial 1 for the studies that we 
were interested in, as this trial was equivalent for both versions: an action posture was 
present during the initial viewing of the scene. It was hoped that the action effects 
expected (e.g., the de-prioritisation of fixating on precision items by participants in the 
power grip condition) would be seen in the data for Trial 1 in Experiment 2.2, indicating 
that this was a strong effect that would presumably be present in all trials; and in the 
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Trial 1 data for Experiment 4, indicating that the effect was initially present, but that the 
continued presence of the action postures led to a different effect in the later trials, so 
that when they were examined together, the influence of the action posture on fixations 
did not emerge. 
However, when Experiment 2.2 was examined by trial, it was apparent that no 
one trial was responsible for the effects seen in that experiment. We did not find the 
influence of grip on power and precision object inspection in each trial, but only as a 
cumulative effect when all trials were combined in analysis. Furthermore, no indication 
of an action posture influence was found in Trial 1 of Experiment 4. 
As both experiments did not show the intention condition and object grip type 
interaction within a single trial, it is much more difficult to draw conclusions from these 
null effects. It may be correct that, for the current study, the differences in Trials 2 and 3 
override any emerging effect in Trial 1, so that nothing is detected when the analysis is 
conducted over all trials. Alternatively, there may simply not be enough data points for 
a significant effect to be obtained.  
Only one exception to the absence of action effects was found in the data from 
Experiment 4: in the measure of average first fixation number for the position of 
objects. Here, a significant interaction was found between the intention group and the 
position, with both the power and precision participants taking significantly longer to 
progress from the left hand side of the screen, and first fixate objects on the right. This 
is a similar pattern to that in Experiment 2.2 (and was absent from Experiment 3, when 
the action postures were not present). As in Experiment 2.2, it seems that the presence 
of the action postures enhanced the standard left-to-right pattern, with participants 
giving more attention to items, so that they were slower to reach the right hand side 
items in the time available. 
Given that participants respond in the same way to the stimuli as those in the 
earlier studies, it appears that the way in which this study was constructed was in some 
way affecting the emergence of action effects on inspection and memory. The most 
likely explanation for the lack of effects in both recall and inspection is that of a form of 
adaptation. That is, as participants were maintaining the grip throughout all the stages, 
they became accustomed to it, and perhaps stopped associating it, as an action, with the 
scenes in front of them. Indeed, as they continued to maintain it across the trials and the 
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changing scenes, participants may no longer have been making a clear association 
between the grip, and the set of objects presented to them. In Experiments 2.2 and 3, 
and in previous studies of the influence of action on perception (e.g., Bekkering and 
Neggers, 2002; Symes et al., 2008), the action is completed and then remade with the 
end and beginning of each trial. This ensures that the action is always associated with 
that set of items. This explanation would suggest that such action effects seen in the 
earlier studies are rather transitory, with a tendency to decay.  
This action decay can be linked to the importance of intention in preparing and 
forming an action, and observing effects of this action. In particular, studies by Witt and 
colleagues have demonstrated how the absence of an intention to act can prevent the 
effects from occurring. Witt, Profitt and Epstein (2005) found that, while holding a tool 
could influence perception of the distance to a target, this only worked if the 
participants had the intention to reach with the tool. This was found to occur both when 
the participants made the judgement holding the tool, or before they had picked it up 
(Witt and Profitt, 2008). This emphasis on intention also links very clearly to the TEC 
(Hommel et al., 2001), and the idea of intentional weighting as the process that primes 
event codes for an action. The previous studies presented here, and several earlier 
investigations (e.g., Fagioli et al., 2007; Fagioli, Ferlazzo et al., 2007) showed that the 
intention to act does not have to be explicitly expressed: the act of forming or planning 
a posture seems to be enough. However, it may be this which is contributing to the more 
transient effects. Without an explicit instruction or plan to make the action and execute 
it, the effects will decay. This is largely speculation on our part at this stage: currently, 
there is no research which explicitly compares how long different types of intentional 
cues might last. However, turning to the literature on prospective memory (the 
requirement to remember to do something in the future), there is some indication here 
that the strength of intention can influence an actor’s ability to remember to perform a 
future action. Ellis (1996) describes how the intentional status of a plan can vary in 
terms of how ‘ready to act’ the performer is, and the rewards that will be gained if the 
intention is completed. By increasing the importance and prominence of the future 
action, via incentives or other means, prospective remembering was also increased (e.g., 
Kliegl, Martin, McDaniel and Einstein, 2001).  
Of course, this is not direct support of our own findings: in such prospective 
memory tasks, participants are instructed to perform a particular action (posting a series 
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of cards, or making phone calls) at particular times. In the present studies, participants 
intentions are formed in a much more oblique manner, hinted at by the formation of the 
postures. However, if the strength of the intention is as important to the context of the 
influence of action as it is for the success of prospective memory, then our method of 
creating the intention would certainly be considered to be a weaker method than explicit 
instructions with varying incentives. As a result, the intention we create here may be 
only transitory, and prone to decay if it is maintained over a long period of time. Further 
research is clearly necessary in order to determine what kind of time course these effects 
may take. 
Experiment 4 showed that, when the action postures were maintained across 
several stages, the influences of action did not emerge. This study may therefore 
indicate the limits of this lab-based paradigm, and suggests it is necessary to transfer the 
research into a more realistic setting. In particular, there are two aspects which need to 
be addressed: the participant’s potential ability to act with the objects, and the 
instructions they are given to act with the objects. The final two studies in this thesis 
will examine these two potential influences separately. Firstly, Experiment 5 will 
present a situation in which there is no explicit instruction given to the participants to 
act with the objects, but the objects are physically present in the same environment as 
the participant: thus, it would be possible for participants to act with them if they 
wished. Finally, Experiment 6 will involve a task in which participants are given 
instructions to act with objects in a particular way, in order to achieve a stated goal. 
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Chapter Six- The influence of the 
potential for action in real-world 
environments 
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6.1 Introduction 
The previous studies have considered how aspects of scene inspection and 
memory are influenced by the presence of an action posture during encoding (Chapter 
3), during memory retrieval (Chapter 4) or during both encoding and retrieval (Chapter 
5). However, all three studies took place in the context of a laboratory, in which the 
target objects were presented as photographs on a screen. 
When considering the influence that action might have, both on our initial 
exploration and later memory representations, it is likely that the ecological validity of 
the scene is an important factor. The main concern of the present study is the 
participants’ potential to act with the objects presented to them. Clearly, when the items 
were only represented in photographs in the previous studies, then interaction was not 
possible. In contrast, when both participants and objects are in the same environment, 
then the participant would have the potential to pick up and interact with one of the 
items.  
However, this is not the only difference between real scenes and photographs of 
them. Other factors distinguish the two types of environment, and these too may have 
an influence on participants’ memory performance. Alongside the potential for object 
manipulation, there is the fact that the quality of the information received from a real 
world scene may be different to that from a computer presented photo. Furthermore, the 
scale at which we experience a real scene will be veridical, but a photo may compress 
larger environments into a smaller display size, confusing the perception of objects 
within the scene. Finally, there is the question of movement through a scene, and how 
the changes this would make to an observers view point (and thus their view of the 
objects) might affect the representations they form. 
When viewing a real world scene compared to a photograph, there are obvious 
differences in terms of the information we receive. In a photograph, there is no true 
depth to the environment, as it is presented as part of a 2D plane. While there are cues to 
depth, these are all monocular in nature, such as linear perspective, or interposition, due 
to closer objects hiding parts of distant objects. In real scenes, the scene depth is 
perceived via binocular cues as well (such as stereopsis, due to differences in the images 
projected on to the viewer’s two retinas), which are not present in a photographic image. 
There is also a wider field of view to consider: in our previous studies, where 
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participants kept their heads stationary and examined photographs, the field of view was 
roughly 30x40 degrees. In the real world, we have a field of view which extends 180 
degrees horizontally and 135 degrees vertically (Howard and Rogers, 1995) when the 
head and eyes remain stationary, while movement of the eyes and head allows us to 
inspect a still larger field. The range of brightness values present in a real world scene 
compared to a photograph is also likely to be greater. These differences are likely to 
influence the way in which a scene is explored, as well as potentially the resulting 
memory.  
The differences in eye movements was examined by t’Hart et al. (2009), 
comparing free exploration of a real scene with free viewing of both continuous videos, 
and single static frames of the videos. The viewing patterns in these scene types varied 
accordingly: for example, while a spatial bias to the centre of a scene was found in the 
video viewing, particularly the static scenes, the bias was only weakly present (and not 
particularly central) in the free exploration of a scene. Instead, participants showed a 
bias towards paths they might be asked to walk in the real world, something that would 
not be possible when viewing a video or static scene. Thus, it seems that the 
possibilities offered by the real world environments may be influences on the way in 
which they are viewed, even in the absence of a specific task.  
Differences in both eye movements and the resulting representations were found 
in Tatler et al.’s (2005) study, examining the accumulation and retention of object 
property information over time. Participants performed the encoding stage of the trial 
either by viewing the scene on a computer monitor, or by standing in the doorway of a 
room in which the scene was recreated. While memory performances were largely the 
same for both conditions, Tatler et al. (2005) found that changes still emerged for the 
items recalled, and the eye movements made between the two environments. In the real 
world condition, participants showed a tendency to make longer fixations to the objects, 
and larger saccade amplitudes, most likely due to the larger scale of the real world 
scenes compared to the more restricted computer screens. Tatler et al. (2005) noted that 
the encoding strategies in the two conditions appeared to be similar, with the same 
patterns shown for the uptake of information in both. Information retention, however, 
did show a change: while colour information was maintained only transiently in the real 
world setting, it was stably maintained under lab conditions. The reverse was found for 
position information, with recall performance showing participants maintained the 
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property transiently in the photograph condition, but stably in the real world 
environment. Finally, it was generally found that the effect sizes in the real world 
condition were larger than those in the lab, suggesting that weaker effects might be 
more easily detected in a real world setting, due to enhanced detail that participants may 
extract from a real world scene. Thus, our previous studies may have missed subtler 
effects of the action postures that the use of a real world setting would reveal more 
clearly.  
The scale of a scene is particularly difficult to reproduce with a photograph. 
According to Montello (1993) space is represented at different scales, when dealing 
with real world environments. The smallest scale is figural space, for items smaller than 
the body. Vista space is that which is larger than the body, but restricted to what can be 
seen by the viewer from a single position: for example, the environment of a room. 
Environmental space comprises a space larger than vista space: i.e. not all of it can be 
seen from a single point; but an observer could still view all of it if allowed to move 
around, e.g., a building complex. Finally, geographical space encompasses the largest 
spaces, such as a country, which could not be easily explored by a single observer. 
These levels of spatial representation can become somewhat confused when dealing 
with a photograph of an environment. The scene within the photo could be classed as 
vista space, as it shows an environment viewed from a single point. However, the size 
of the photo itself places it in the context of figural space, as it is smaller than the body 
of the participant viewing it, and indeed the scene is contained within a monitor that 
itself occupies a place in a real environment (the lab) which is itself an environmental 
space (a vista) for the observer. Not only is space represented differently, but this 
confusion in the levels of representation may have an effect on the effects of action. 
Objects presented in the images are now reduced to a size smaller than could be 
interacted with usefully in a normal context, which might change the way in which they 
are represented, and how action preparation might inform inspection and memory. 
Therefore, when participants are present in the same environment as the objects, they 
will be experiencing the objects at the size in which they would normally interact with 
them. This change may allow us to find a greater (or different) influence for the 
presence of action during encoding. 
Another difference from real world scenes is that we typically do not remain 
stationary within them. When conducting a task, it is often necessary to move around to 
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gather what objects we need from their different locations. Even if we do not need to 
touch the items, we may move in order to inspect them from a different angle or 
distance, resulting in several viewpoints being acquired which may affect the eventual 
representation. Several studies have investigated that dynamic movement within an 
environment can affect our perception of and memory for objects within a scene.  
Some have shown that participants in a dynamic, moving environment are often 
poor at detecting changes (e.g., Levin and Simons, 1997). However, later studies 
clarified the nature of the movement by comparing change detection and scene 
recognition performance when participants moved by themselves, or had items moved 
around them. Simons and Wang (1998) found that when participants changed their 
position by walking between two different viewing positions around a table, they were 
better at detecting changes to the object array than when they remained stationary, but 
the table was rotated to produce a change in retinal projection for the objects in the 
scene that was equivalent to the change produced by their free movement. Further 
investigation showed that participants were required to move by their own agency 
between the viewing points: if they were wheeled between the two locations by being 
pushed on a chair, they performed similarly to the condition in which the scene moved 
around them. When we navigate through an environment, it seems we are able to 
maintain and update a viewer-centred representation of our surroundings, which allows 
us to detect changes. Other studies have examined how receiving multiple views of a 
static scene (as when walking through an environment) affects recognition performance. 
While participants find it difficult to recognise a scene from a novel viewpoint 
(Diwadkar and McNamara, 1997; Shelton and McNamara, 1997), experiencing multiple 
novel views of a scene leads to multiple, viewpoint-dependent representations being 
formed. As more views are experienced, it seems that a flexible, schematic 
representation of the environment is created, which will aid recognition based on novel 
views. When participants are able to move naturally about a scene, therefore, it seems 
that they are able to adapt to the changing viewpoints, and should be able to continue to 
recognise the presented objects. However, it is not clear how receiving multiple views 
of an object may affect memory for its properties. In particular, a property such as 
orientation may suffer if participants are unable to reconcile the different views they 
receive. 
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The present study aims to extend the previous studies into a real world 
environment. This will allow us to investigate how such differences between a 
photographic scene and an immersive environment might affect the participants’ 
memories of the presented objects, and how action effects via the preparation of action 
posture may also be affected. However, while it has been mentioned that actual 
interaction with the objects may be an important factor to consider in this setting, the 
present study will not include instructions to the participants to manipulate the stimulus 
objects. As outlined above, there are several other differences between a real world and 
photographed scene which may influence the formation of representations for objects, 
and any and all of these differences could themselves influence the effects of action on 
memory that we wish to investigate. The present study allows us to investigate these 
factors, by using the paradigm of the previous studies in a real world environment. By 
continuing to prevent interaction in the present study, we can determine if any effects 
emerge simply as a result of placing both participants and objects in the same (real) 
environment, where it would at least be possible to interact with the objects even if 
there is no instruction to do so yet. 
The present study aims to investigate how the preparation for action influences 
the encoding of objects and their properties into a memory representation in a real 
world, rather than laboratory environment. Experiment 5 is a replication of Experiment 
2.2, with similar action manipulations during the encoding process. This will allow us to 
determine if the results shown by Experiment 2.2 will generalise from the laboratory to 
the real world, and if further effects (such as the influence on memory which was absent 
in Experiment 2.2) will now emerge, due to the introduction of a potential for action, 
and the differences that exist between a real and photographic environment. If the 
results obtained from Experiment 5 show an effect of the action posture at encoding, 
then this will indicate that the earlier studies were perhaps not powerful enough to allow 
us to see memory differences, or that there must be some possibility for interaction to 
occur with the stimuli to allow effects on memory to emerge. 
Alternatively, we may find that the encoding manipulation continues to have no 
influence on the construction of the objects’ representations. Such a finding would be 
more supportive of our arguments in the previous studies and indicate that the 
representations formed in memory are largely purpose-neutral, despite the presence of 
action at the encoding stage. Another related possibility is that manipulation of the 
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objects is necessary in order for memory effects to persist, and so emerge as a 
measurable result of manipulations at the encoding stage. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 32 undergraduate students (average age 25.8, SD 3.1). 15 of 
the sample were male, and all participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Handedness was measured by self-report as part of the experiment: the sample 
contained 3 left handers. 10 participants were assigned to the passive intention 
condition, 11 to the precision condition, and 11 to the power condition. Participants 
were recruited via on-line advertisements. They received course credits or payment (£3) 
for their participation in the study. 
6.2.2 Stimulus 
The stimuli used were the same 36 objects (divided into three groups of 12) as 
those employed in the three previous intention experiments. Each set was placed on a 
table-top, positioned in the same way as the sets in Experiments 2.2-4. This allowed 
object position and orientation to be counterbalanced across the scenes. As the 
environment for the study was a lab in the department, all objects were effectively 
neutral with regards to the background.  
Figure 6.1 shows the three table-top displays used in the study. 
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Figure 6.1 Table-top displays of the three stimulus groups. 
The questions used to test memory for the stimuli were identical to those used in 
Experiments 2.2-4 (with the exception of the position questions, where the line 
drawings of the backgrounds were re-drawn so that they matched the new environment). 
Question presentation and response collection was controlled by scripts written in 
MatLab using the PsychToolBox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The questions 
were presented to participants on the display monitor of a Macintosh computer, at a 
resolution of 1024 x 768. 
6.2.2 Procedure 
Participants were instructed that they should view the objects presented on each 
table, and attempt to memorise the display. As all three object sets were kept in the 
same room, each was covered with a sheet, which allowed the viewing to be restricted 
to one set of objects during each trial. Participants were asked to close their eyes when 
the sheets were taken off the tables, and open them when instructed. They then viewed 
the table top for a period of 20 seconds. During this time, they were told they could 
walk around the three sides of the table (all tables were positioned against a wall, so that 
participants could not walk directly behind them and view objects in a completely 
switched orientation). However, they were instructed not to pick up, or touch the 
objects. As in the previous studies, participants in the passive condition viewed the table 
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without any further manipulation; while those in the power and precision conditions 
held the device used in Experiments 2.2-4, to form whichever grip was required. After 
the 20 seconds had elapsed, participants were instructed to close their eyes again, while 
the table was re-covered. If they were holding the grip device, they returned it at this 
point, and were taken to the computer in the lab. This was positioned behind a screen, 
blocking the view of the tables, so that participants were not able to look at the covered 
tables and use this to make guesses about the position of objects.  
Participants responded to the questions using the keyboard, and the number keys 1-4 
(re-labelled A-D). When they had finished the set questions for that table top, they were 
instructed to go to the next table, and the previous procedure was repeated for the 
remaining two object groups. 
6.2.3 Design 
As for the previous experiments (2.2-4) there was one between-subjects independent 
variable of viewing condition consisting of three levels, passive viewing (baseline), and 
viewing whilst making a grip gesture, (power or precision) The dependent variables of 
the study were the participant’s memory for the displayed objects, and their properties 
(colour, shape, position and orientation). No eye movement data was recorded for this 
study. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Influence on Memory 
Table 6.1 displays the proportion of correct responses given to each of the five 
property questions, across the three intention conditions. 
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Table 6.1.  
Proportion of correct responses for each property question and each intention group 
Question 
Intention 
Group 
Colour Shape Orientation Position Presence 
Passive 0.636 0.606 0.647 0.627 0.922 
Precision 0.707 0.646 0.657 0.659 0.941 
Power 0.646 0.644 0.604 0.629 0.896 
 
One sample t-tests were conducted to ensure that all scores were significantly 
above chance. For each group, it was found that participants were better than chance 
(0.25) at recalling colour, shape, position and presence (all ps <.01) and better than 
chance (0.50) at recalling orientation (all ps <.01). As before, the questions regarding 
object presence were not further analysed, due to the repetition of the same object types 
possibly influencing recall performance for this question. Orientation responses were 
analysed separately from the other conditions, due to the different levels of chance. 
6.3.1.1 Object Position. A mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine 
the influence of the intention condition (passive, power and precision), the object’s 
position (left, centre or right of table viewed from straight ahead) and the question type. 
No main effects of the intention condition (F<1), the question type, F(3,58)=1.53, 
p=.226, or the object’s position were found (F<1). However, the interaction between the 
position and the question type was significant, F(4,116)=3.03, p=.020. Examining this 
interaction further showed a marginal effect of the object position in the responses to 
shape questions, F(2,62)=3.13, p=.051, with the means indicating that items positioned 
at the left (M=0.65) and right (M=0.67) were recalled better than those in the centre 
(M=0.58, ps<.05). However, these effects did not reach significance when examined 
with a post-hoc comparison. The responses were then examined for each of the intention 
conditions separately. 
Passive. Participants in the passive intention condition showed a marginal effect 
of the object’s position, F(2,18)= 2.96, p=.077, with a trend in the data that indicated 
objects on the right hand side of the table (M=0.67) tended to be recalled better than 
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those at the centre (M=0.61) or the left (M=0.60, ps<.05). However, a post-hoc 
comparison did not show a significant difference in memory performance between the 
different positions on the tables. No other differences were found, with participants 
showing equal performance for all question types (F<1), and no interaction emerging 
between question type and position, F(4,26)=2.00, p=.115.  
Examining the orientation question separately showed that the performance for 
objects at each location were significantly above chance (p<.05). However, no 
difference was found between orientation memory for objects at each of the three 
locations, F(2,19)=1.22, p=.32. 
Figure 6.2 displays the proportion of correct responses for each question type at each 
position for the participants in the passive condition. 
 
Figure 6.2. Memory scores for object properties at the three positions, encoded 
under passive intention conditions 
Precision. For participants in the precision intention condition, no main effects 
or interactions were found. Participants scored equally highly on the three property 
questions, F(2,20)=1.83, p=.19, and recall was unaffected by the position the objects 
were placed in (F<1). There was also no significant interaction between the factors 
(F<1). 
For the orientation questions, it was found that responses to objects at all 
positions were significantly above chance (p<.01). The object’s position had no 
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influence on the score for orientation questions, (F<1). Figure 6.3 displays the 
proportion of correct scores for each question type at each position for participants in 
the precision condition. 
 
Figure 6.3. Memory scores for object properties at the three positions, encoded 
under precision intention conditions 
Power. A similar pattern emerged for the participants in the power condition. 
Responses to the three property questions were equal, F(3,30)=1.21, p=.325, and 
unaffected by the object’s position (F<1). There was also no interaction between the 
factors, F(4,40)=1.14,p=.35. 
Responses to the orientation question showed that only responses to objects 
positioned at the left and centre of the table showed responses above chance (p<.05). 
Recall of object orientations for those at the right hand side were no different from 
chance (p=.85). However, a significant effect was found for these scores, F(2,20)=8.24, 
p=.002. Participants were significantly better at recalling the orientation of objects at the 
centre of the table (M=0.69) compared to those at the right, (M=0.51, p<.01). Figure 6.4 
displays the proportion of correct scores for each question type at each position for 
participants in the power condition. 
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Figure 6.4. Memory scores for object properties at the three positions, encoded 
under power intention conditions 
6.3.1.2 Object Grip. The influence of the object’s grip type was investigated 
using a mixed factorial ANOVA: however, this did not show any strong results. The 
intention condition of the participants did not have a significant effect (F<1), and 
participants showed no advantage for recalling any particular property, F(2,62)=1.47, 
p=.239 or a particular grip category, F(1,29)=1.28,p=.267. No interactions were found 
to be significant (F’s <1). 
In order to determine if differences between power and precision items might be 
more easily detected when examining the intention conditions separately, analyses were 
conducted on each group in turn.  
Passive. Participants in the passive intention condition recalled all object 
properties equally well, and both categories of object grip (Fs <1). There was also no 
significant interaction between grip type and question type (F<1). 
Examining the orientation question score separately showed that participants 
were above chance when recalling the orientation of either category of object. However, 
no significant influence of the grip category was found on recalling this property (F<1). 
Figure 6.5 shows the proportion of correct responses to objects in both grip categories 
made by participants in the passive group. 
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Figure 6.5. Object property memory scores for the two grip categories encoded 
under passive intention conditions 
Precision. For participants in the precision intention condition, there was also no 
difference in memory performance for either the grip type of the object, F(1, 10) = 2.73, 
p = .129, or the type of question, F(2, 20) = 1.87, p = .181. Similarly, the interaction 
between grip category and property question was non-significant (F<1). 
The scores for the orientation questions showed that participants scored above 
chance for both grip types (ps<.01). Again, there was no significant difference in the 
correct responses to the objects’ orientations for the two grip conditions (F<1). Figure 
6.6 shows the proportion of correct responses to objects in the two grip categories for 
participants in the precision group. 
234 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Object property memory scores for the two grip categories encoded 
under precision intention conditions 
Power. As for the other two intention conditions, participants in the power 
intention condition showed no difference in their responses to the property questions, or 
the two grip types (Fs<1). The interaction between the factors was also non-significant, 
F(2,20)=1.90, p=.175. 
The orientation responses were found to be significantly above chance for both 
object grip types (ps<.05), but there was no significant difference between the scores for 
each of the object types, F(1,10)=2.15, p=.174. Figure 6.7 shows the proportion of 
correct responses to objects in the two grip categories for participants in the power 
group. 
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Figure 6.7. Object property memory scores for the two grip categories encoded 
under power intention conditions 
All factors (question type, object position and object grip type) were combined, 
to determine if any further effects emerged as a result of the combination. A mixed 
factorial ANOVA was used to examine any possible interactions between the grip 
categories of the objects, the objects’ positions, and the property question type, for each 
of the intention conditions. 
Passive. Examining participants in the passive condition did not reveal any 
further effects: participants showed no difference in their responses to the question types 
or the grip category (F’s<1), although a marginal effect of the position was found, 
F(2,18)=2.65, p=.098, whereby items at the right (M= 0.67) tended to be better recalled 
than those at the other positions, (left M= 0.60, centre M=.060, ps<.05) although when 
examined with a post-hoc test, the differences did not emerge as significant. For the 
interactions, most were also found to be non-significant (Fs <1), but the interaction 
between position and question type showed a marginal difference, F(4,36)=2.19,p=.090, 
as did the interaction between the grip type, position and question type, 
F(4,36)=2.59,p=.053. 
Breaking down these interactions using 1-way ANOVAs for each property 
score, across the three position regions, showed that participants recalled the properties 
of colour and position equally well at each of the three regions (Fs<1). However, a 
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significant difference was found between the three locations for the recall of shape 
properties, F(2,18)=6.39, p=.008, with participants marginally better at recalling object 
shapes at the right of the screen (M=0.70), compared to the centre (M= 0.51, p=.073), 
but not the left side (M=0.63). 
Further investigation of the three-way interaction also suggested that the effects 
were localised to the central regions of the table tops. For these items, a significant 
interaction was found between the property type and the grip type, F(2,18)=4.21, 
p=.032, with participants recalling the shape of precision items (M=0.61) significantly 
better than they recall the shape of power items (M= 0.40, p<.05). Significant effects 
were not found at either the left or the right locations (Fs<1). For the passive intention 
condition, it seems that items at the centre show the greatest differences in terms of 
score. 
Again, the orientation responses for this group were examined separately. These 
scores showed no main effects or interactions (Fs<1), indicating participants were 
recalling object orientations equally well for each of the positions and grip types. 
Precision. For participants in the precision condition, a main effect did emerge 
when the three factors were analysed together. Participants showed a significant 
advantage for recalling the power compatible items (M=0.69) over precision compatible 
items (M= 0.64), F(1,10)=5.37, p=.043. No other effects showed an influence on 
memory score (Fs<1). 
One interaction was also marginally significant, between the object’s position, and the 
grip type, F(2,20)=3.48, p=.051. This was found to arise from the objects at the right of 
the table top, where participants in the precision condition showed an advantage for 
recalling the power items (M=0.70) over precision compatible items (M=0.55, p=.053). 
For the orientation responses, while there were no significant effects of the grip 
condition, or the position, the two factors did show a marginally significant interaction 
on these scores, F(2,20)=3.14, p=.065. Further investigation showed that participants 
performed differently at each of the three table locations: while they were marginally 
better at recalling the orientation of precision items at the left hand side (precision 
M=0.69; power M= 0.61), F(1,10)=4.52, p=.060, performance was significantly better 
for the power items at the right hand side (power M= 0.70; precision M= 0.52), F(1,10) 
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= 6.42, p=.030. For items at the centre, there was no difference in the recall of object 
orientation for the two grip categories. 
Power. For participants in the power condition, the main effects of the property 
question, the objects position and the grip type of the items remained non-significant. 
However, analysing the factors together in this manner revealed two interactions, a 
significant one between the grip type and the object’s position, F(2,20)=6.66, p=.006, 
and one marginal interaction between the grip type and the property question type, 
F(2,20)=3.25,p=.060. 
Breaking down these interactions showed that participants were better at 
recalling the details of objects that were compatible with a power grip. For the position 
interaction, F(1,10)=15.78, p=.003, power objects (M=0.70) were better recalled than 
precision objects (M=0.55) when they were positioned at the right of the table. The 
interaction with the question type showed that it was the position of power objects 
(M=0.67) that was marginally better recalled than the position of precision objects 
(M=0.59), F(1,10)=3.89, p=.077. 
For the orientation questions, participants in the power condition showed no 
difference in their responses to power and precision compatible items, F(1,10)=2.82, 
p=.124, however, their recall of orientation was affected by the items position, 
F(2,20)=9.11, p=.002. Post-hoc comparisons showed an advantage for recalling items 
positioned at the centre of the table (M=0.69), than those at the right hand side, (M= 
0.51; p<.01). The interaction between grip and position was not significant (F<1). 
6.4 Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 5 was to examine the influence of an action posture 
during encoding on the construction of the subsequent memory representation (as in 
Experiment 2.2). However, to address possible issues with the ecological validity of 
Experiment 2.2’s setting, for Experiment 5, the stimuli used were real objects, 
physically present in the same environment as the participants. Thus a more realistic 
setting was created, to determine if the observer’s presence in the environment would 
enhance any influences of the action posture that might have been lost due to the 
previous lab settings. The data were examined in terms of how being present in a real 
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environment influenced recall performance alone, as eye movements were not recorded 
during this study. 
6.4.1 Property questions 
For Experiment 5, participants showed very little difference between their scores 
for the object properties. Only in a few analyses did a difference emerge: for 
participants in the passive intention condition, with regard to objects positioned at the 
centre; and for participants in the power intention condition, with regard to objects 
positioned at the right hand side. In both cases, participants showed an advantage for 
recalling the location of objects compared to recall of their shape. 
These findings are in contrast to those from Experiment 2.2, where the 
advantage for recalling position information was consistently present across all 
conditions. Examining the means for Experiment 5 indicates the change was due not to 
participants performing worse on position questions, but simply that they scored higher 
for the other properties. Participants in Experiment 2.2 showed mean scores of 0.52, 
0.50 and 0.58 for colour, shape and position, respectively, while participants in the 
current study had mean scores of 0.66, 0.63 and 0.64 for these three properties. This is 
unsurprising: the quality of the visual information received from the real world scene 
may well be greater than that from the photographs; for example, differences in the 
colour values may be more easily distinguished. The general finding that recall from a 
real world situation is better than that in lab based situations has been shown in previous 
studies, (see e.g., Tatler et al., 2005; Tatler et al., 2013). 
It is interesting to note that, where differences between property responses did 
emerge, these were still in the direction consistent with experiment 2.2, with better 
performance on the position questions, and typically rather poor recall of the shape 
information. The findings of somewhat better performance for position information are 
in agreement with previous work showing that position information is extracted early in 
viewing (e.g., Tatler et al., 2003), and the proposal that this information acts almost as a 
marker for more detailed information to be built upon (e.g., Hollingworth and 
Rasmussen, 2010). Poor recall of shape information is consistent with the findings from 
studies which used a similar line drawing measurement to those employed in this thesis 
to test this property (e.g., Tatler et al., 2005). It appears that participants found it 
difficult to match an object representation to a simple outline. Thus, it seems that 
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transferring the stimuli from a lab environment to an immersive one did not change how 
participants represent the information. While it may have been easier for participants to 
extract this information from the real-world environment, leading to better recall 
performance overall, they were still using the same processes, so the same patterns still 
emerged. 
6.4.2 Object position 
Examining the influence of the objects’ positions on the table showed very little 
influence on memory performance. When position was analysed alone, participants in 
the power and precision conditions showed no difference in how they recalled the 
information. Only for the passive condition participants was an effect found, with a 
general advantage for items positioned on the right hand side, an effect which was fairly 
weak. The overall pattern was therefore rather similar to that of Experiment 2.2: 
memory performance was also largely unaffected by the position of the objects in the 
scenes, with the exception of one group. However, here the similarities end, as in 
Experiment 2.2, it was participants in the precision condition who showed a better 
performance for objects on the left hand side, the opposite of what was found in the 
present study. 
When the influence of the object grip type was added into the analysis, then 
further effects did emerge. For the passive condition, while the weak general right hand 
side advantage was found, it appeared that central items were best recalled when tested 
on their position. Better recall of precision objects was also localised to the centre, with 
a particular advantage for recalling the shape of these items being shown. For 
participants in both the power and precision intention conditions, object recall was best 
for those at the right hand side, in an interaction with the grip type in which both 
intention conditions showed an advantage for the power compatible objects. 
Experiment 2.2 showed little effect of the objects’ position on memory, the only 
exception being the participants in the precision condition, where items on the left were 
recalled marginally better than the other conditions. As Experiment 2.2 also measured 
the eye movements of the participants, it was shown that participants in the precision 
group were also tending to spend more time fixating the left hand items. The current 
study shows a similar lack of position influence on the memory performance, except for 
the participants in the passive condition, where the memory advantage was now found 
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for objects at the right hand side. However, without measurements of eye movements in 
this study, it is not clear if participants in the passive condition spent a similarly 
increased time fixating objects at this right hand location.  
The previous studies in this thesis which included eye movement measures 
showed a clear left-to-right gaze progression, most likely due to the structure of the 
stimulus scene layout. Given that the displays for Experiment 5 were direct replications 
of this layout, then it is possible that participants were following this same viewing 
procedure. Items on the right would be the last to be examined, and so better 
performance on their recall might indicate a recency effect in memory. Of course, this is 
in contrast to Experiment 2.2’s findings, where the left side advantage would suggest a 
primacy effect in memory. It is therefore unclear how plausible a recency effect 
explanation is. 
Once the object grip type was introduced into the analysis, this right side recall 
advantage was also seen for both power and precision groups, suggesting this was a 
consistent effect for this study. One possibility is that this reflects an influence of the 
real world setting. Tatler et al. (2005) noted that memory scores in the real world 
version of their study showed stronger effect sizes, indicating that subtler effects might 
be more easily seen when testing in an immersive environment. Thus, the better 
performance on right side objects in the present study could be indicating a recency 
effect which was not strong enough to be picked up in a lab setting. Furthermore, it is 
interesting that this finding was strongest for the two grip conditions, with the passive 
participants showing a much weaker, but similar pattern. This is a similar pattern to 
what was seen in the eye movement measures for Experiment 2.2: these three groups 
showed the left-to-right progression, but in a much more pronounced fashion for the 
two grip conditions. Therefore, perhaps the presence of the grip posture at encoding was 
once again influencing the viewing patterns, while the real world environment aided 
encoding and recall in such a way that we finally saw some effect emerge in the 
memory measures. However, as pointed out, this is not supported by eye movement 
records, so is largely speculative. 
Another factor to consider is that the participants in this study were able to move 
around the stimulus display. As participants now had the ability to view the scenes and 
objects from several different angles, the encoding of position information would 
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become more complex as a result. Position in a static scene is a single piece of 
information, indexing the object to its location in the environment. In a dynamic scene, 
where the observer is moving, the position information must also incorporate these 
movements the observer makes, and other objects relative to the target (Tatler and Land, 
2011). It has been suggested that in such dynamic scenes, encoding of information may 
proceed differently, with potentially multiple representations created in order to hold 
this more complex information. If so, the differences we found in the current study, 
compared to Experiment 2.2, might reflect the increased demands the situation places 
upon encoding position information. 
The ability of the participants to move around the viewing table does not appear 
to have had a strong influence on other aspects of the memory performance. For 
example, performance on the orientation questions were not noticeably lower, which 
might have been expected, given the different viewpoints of objects that participants 
would have received, due to their movements. 
Given that participants moved of their own choice, rather than having items moved 
around them, this finding is in line with previous studies (e.g., Simons and Wang, 
1998). Furthermore, the amount by which the participants could move was somewhat 
restricted. As all the tables displaying the objects were placed against the walls, 
participants could not walk directly behind them, preventing them from seeing objects 
in a complete reversed position, which might have been the most disruptive to later 
recall. 
6.4.3 Object grip 
While no influence of the object’s grip type emerged for any group when this 
factor was examined alone, when position and grip were combined in the same analysis, 
interactions showed some advantages for particular objects. For both the power and the 
precision intention conditions, participants are better at recalling power-grip compatible 
objects (but only when they are positioned at the right hand side).  
Since both groups show an advantage for recalling power items, it is unlikely 
that this reflects an influence of the specific grip posture maintained during encoding. 
However, the two grip conditions do appear to differ from the passive condition, which 
does not show this advantage for power objects in any analysis. This might indicate a 
more general advantage of the action posture over an absence of any kind of action 
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pose, which only emerges in a real world environment. Experiments 2.2-4 all show 
longer fixations on power items, which is most likely due to their larger size. Once 
again, this effect was not seen in the recall performance for these studies, but may be 
emerging here due to nature of the environment. Furthermore, the fact that this 
advantage was only found on the right hand side for the two grip conditions may 
indicate that this was also linked to the possible recency effect that may be present in 
the grip conditions, due to the viewing behaviour. Thus, while there may be some 
influence from the action maintained during encoding, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the representations constructed were biased in favour of only grip relevant items. 
By transferring the stimulus objects into a real environment, we wished to 
determine if the results obtained in the earlier, laboratory based versions of the study 
would persist in the real world, or differ in the new environment. As participants were 
present in the same environment as the objects, interaction would have been possible, 
and the actions maintained might have been connected more closely with the objects in 
front of them. However, the results do not support this possibility, but instead continue 
to show no influence of the encoding action on the resulting memory, much like 
Experiment 2.2. Without eye movement measures, it is not possible to determine if 
there was any effect of the action on the viewing behaviour, but any such influence did 
not persist beyond the ending of the action. As suggested previously, this might indicate 
that, in a situation where the action is completed, the resulting representation is purpose-
neutral (Wilson, 2002). 
However, while the potential for action was present in this study, the 
participants received no instructions to do so: in fact, they were specifically told not to 
interact with the items. Thus, our studies so far have focused only on those situations in 
which the only action present was the preparation for action. These investigations were 
necessary in order to establish how the indication of action, via these action postures 
might affect both viewing and memory, and so far, our studies seem to indicate that the 
effect, while present under certain situations, is rather weak. The next step, therefore, is 
to increase the realism of the situation once again, by allowing participants to follow 
through on the preparation of action, and physically interact with the objects as part of 
an everyday task. 
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Chapter Seven- The independent 
contributions of task relevance and 
physical interaction to object memory 
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7.1 Introduction 
In examining the interaction between action and perception, the previous studies 
in this thesis (with the exception of Experiment 5) have all been conducted in a lab 
environment. Even Experiment 5, where participants and objects were in the same 
space, was not entirely realistic, as participants were still prevented from interacting 
with the items. Perhaps most importantly, there was no specific instruction to use the 
objects, and no need for participants to use the objects to achieve a goal. All 
connections between the action and the objects was implied, and while this was found to 
have influences on both eye movements and recall, it is possible that, with a specific 
task setting these effects would be stronger, or indeed entirely different. 
When an item is task-relevant to an observer, there is a change in the way this 
object is examined and represented. It is well established that the nature of the task has a 
strong influence on what is looked at and when: Land et al. (1999) and Hayhoe et al. 
(2003) both demonstrated clearly how the eye movements of the participants were 
constrained to the items currently necessary to achieve a goal. In terms of 
representation, Triesch et al. (2003) and more recently, Tatler et al. (2013) demonstrated 
a memory prioritisation for relevant object features. This was shown both throughout 
the task, in the case of Triesch et al.’s (2003) findings, and persisting in the 
representations tested after the task was completed, as in Tatler et al.’s (2013) results. 
These two studies also support the idea of independent properties, which has been 
important throughout this thesis. Each demonstrates the features of the objects that are 
most relevant to the situation (either by informing the on-going task, or facilitating 
possible later interactions) are more prominent within the representation. 
Importantly, these changes in the way relevant items are represented cannot be 
explained simply by the increased time spent fixating these items (e.g., Hollingworth, 
2012). Võ and Wolfe (2012) showed that advantages from previously fixating target 
objects only persisted if the items had been fixated in the course of an identical task 
earlier. That is, if an item was fixated in the course of a search task, subsequent search 
tasks would be facilitated. However, if previously fixated in the course of a memory 
task, then later searches did not benefit. Further support comes from Tatler and Tatler 
(2013), who showed that changes in memory for objects classed as task-relevant or 
irrelevant could only be partly accounted for by the differences in fixation. The fact that 
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they were relevant to the specific task was another significant factor in the changes to 
memory: within a given number of fixations, different amounts of information were 
extracted and retained from the task-relevant and irrelevant items. The task setting is a 
clear contributing factor to the way in which information is extracted and retained. 
While there is strong evidence that task relevance is an important factor, another 
aspect remains largely un-investigated: that of actual physical interaction with objects. 
Studies which do include object interaction have demonstrated that this process can lead 
to changes in the representation of the objects used. In Tatler et al.’s (2013) study, 
participants either participated directly in the task, using the relevant objects to make a 
cup of tea, or they observed videos of others performing the task. In subsequent 
memory tests, the active participants showed better recall of the task-relevant objects’ 
position information, and some indication that the colour information for these objects 
was de-prioritised. In contrast, the participants who observed without interaction 
showed no such evidence of prioritisation. It seems that the interaction with the objects 
changed their importance, by marking them as items necessary for the achievement of 
the task, and ensuring this importance continued to be marked in memory. Properties 
which might be considered to be particularly useful were biased within the 
representation, making them easier to recall. While participants who watched videos of 
the task were aware of what items were relevant to the goal, this knowledge alone did 
not lead to the representation biases seen for those who actively used the objects, thus 
suggesting that interaction is an important factor in the construction of representations. 
However, this study uses only two groups of objects: those that are task-relevant 
and therefore interacted with and those that are not relevant, and are not touched. As a 
result, there is a potential confound between the influence of task-driven interaction, and 
physical interaction with the objects which is not driven by the demands of the task. It is 
possible that the act of manipulation itself can also influence the way in which the 
representation is formed, and may do so separately from the influence of task-relevance. 
Thus, it is necessary to tease these two factors apart, in order to determine if they do 
have separate influences on the resulting object memory. 
In order to differentiate between actions that are task-relevant, and those that are 
simply interactions, we draw a distinction which is similar to Bub and Masson’s (2006) 
suggestion of action gestures for form, and action gestures for function. When we act 
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with an object in order to use it for its designed purpose (e.g., picking up a kettle in 
order to pour hot water), this is a functional action: only a kettle could be used for that 
specific task. When simply interacting, i.e. by picking the object up to hold or move; 
then the identity of the object is not important in the same manner; rather, it is an action 
of form, or a volumetric action, dependent on aspects such as weight and shape, but not 
identity. 
However, previous studies investigating action in the real world have not 
distinguished between these two aspects, despite their differences. The aim of this final 
study, therefore, is to tease apart the separate contributions from task relevant 
interaction and form based interaction, in order to determine if these two factors are 
indeed separate and contribute differently to the resulting extraction and maintenance of 
object information. 
In order to examine this, real-world tasks will be used, placing the participants in a real 
environment where they are specifically instructed to work with the objects. Using 
mobile eye-tracking technology, the influence of the two types of action on inspection 
behaviour can be investigated, along with the influences of action on the participants’ 
later memory for the objects used, after the task is completed. As in the previous studies 
in this thesis, memory will be tested by examining recall for individual object 
properties, in order to determine if separate properties are differently affected by the 
types of interaction used and their relevance to the task. 
We aim to determine if the two action types have separate influences on the way 
in which participants inspect and represent the objects in a scene. Such a finding would 
indicate that the nature of the task (and the participants’ understanding of the goal) 
contributes something different to these processes, which cannot be gained from simply 
picking up an object. It would suggest that the participant must have some sort of goal 
in order for information to be extracted and represented in a manner that is biased 
towards the nature of the task. 
Alternatively, it may be that there is no difference between the two types of interaction, 
in which case, any way of interacting with an object will lead to similar effects on 
inspection and recall. This will also suggest that task relevance may not be such an 
important factor, if simply holding an item is enough to prioritise.  
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In order to separate the two action types, participants in Experiment 6 were 
required to either use an object in the course of completing a task, or simply move an 
obstructing object out of the way. While moving an object can be regarded as part of the 
task itself (particularly if the object must be moved in order to access a task-relevant 
item), we feel that there is enough of a distinction between the two actions for effects to 
be expected. The process of moving an object is strongly form-based: it is completely 
irrelevant what the identity of the obstructing object is, and its properties (with the 
possible exception of shape) are not important to the on-going task to be performed. 
This is in contrast to the task-relevant items, where identity is the main factor in 
determining if the object is the correct one to use in order to fulfil the set goal.  
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Twenty participants (6 males) with a mean age of 21.8 (SD= 1.63) were 
recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of Dundee. A further nine 
participants (3 males) were recruited from the same population for the control memory 
group. This group had a mean age of 22.3 (SD = 1.66). None of the 29 participants had 
previously participated in Experiments 2.2-5.1.All 29 participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and received course credits in return for their participation. 
7.2.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
7.2.2.1 Eye movement recording. Participants in the active task condition wore 
the Positive Science LLC mobile eye tracker during the task. This tracker consists of 
two video cameras, mounted on the frame of a pair of glasses, both recording at 30 Hz. 
One camera (mounted above the eye) faces forwards to record the head-centred view of 
the scene, while a second camera (mounted below the eye) faces towards the 
participant, to record the movements of the right eye. The movies from each camera are 
recorded separately, and synchronised after the on-line recording into a single video, 
using the Yarbus software package (v 2.2.3). Gaze direction was estimated via pupil 
tracking, and a nine point calibration procedure at the start and end of the active task. 
The system is accurate enough to allow spatial estimates of gaze direction to within a 
degree of visual angle. 
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7.2.2.2 Task setting. Twenty one objects were obtained and placed in a kitchen 
environment (Figure 7.1 shows the layout of this environment). Within the object set, 7 
were necessary for a tea-making task (kettle, teapot, mug, spoon, milk jug, tea-bag box, 
sweetener container), 7 for a task in which participants made a sandwich and a glass of 
juice (plate, bread-bin, peanut butter jar, jam jar, knife, juice bottle, glass), and the 
remaining seven were items compatible with a kitchen environment, but not themselves 
linked by a task set (toaster, cooking pot, salt cellar, bowl, fork, washing-up liquid, 
measuring jug). These objects acted as a control group, as they were items that were 
simply present in the scene, but not interacted with in any way.  
 
Figure 7.1. Photograph of the kitchen area and objects for the tasks 
In placing the items in the kitchen, the items were positioned in groups of three. 
These groups contained a tea-making object, a sandwich-making item, and a 
background item (e.g., kettle, plate and toaster). Depending on the task that would be 
carried out, the relevant item would be obstructed by the alternative task item. For 
example, in the tea-making task, the task-relevant kettle would be obstructed by the 
task-irrelevant plate, which was placed on the top of the kettle. In the sandwich-making 
task, the now relevant plate would be obstructed by placing the irrelevant kettle on top. 
Thus, in order to use the obstructed (task-relevant) object, participants would have to 
interact with the obstructing (task-irrelevant) object, by moving it out of the way. In 
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both situations, the background item (in this example, the toaster) would be placed in 
the vicinity of the task pair, but would not hinder access to either of the items. 
   
Figure 7.2. Examples of the object positions used in Experiment 6, left: tea-
making task; right: sandwich-making task 
7.2.2.3 Stimulus questionnaire. For each of the 21 objects, three questions 
were created to test participants’ memories for the colour, shape and starting position of 
each of the objects. All question types were 4AFC questions. For colour questions, the 
options were presented as colour names, with each of the foil options plausible colours 
for the item. The shape options were presented as line drawings of possible examples of 
the object type. For the position questions, a line drawing of the environment was 
presented, with four locations marked with letter options. The foils in each case were all 
positions for another item in the kitchen. The order in which the objects were asked 
about was randomised, as was the order of the property questions for each item. 
Stimulus presentation and response collection was controlled by scripts written 
in MatLab, using the PsychToolBox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Both the 
stimulus photographs and the question screens were displayed to the participants on the 
display monitor of a Macintosh computer, at a resolution of 1024 x 768. 
7.2.3 Procedure 
7.2.3.1 Active task. Participants in the active task condition were informed that 
they would carry out either a tea-making or sandwich-making task. They were also 
informed that there would be irrelevant items obstructing the objects they required to 
successfully complete the task. In order to deal with these, they were told to move them 
to another table in the kitchen, located on the other side of the room. Participants were 
told they should move the obstructing objects as they came to them at the stages of the 
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task, rather than moving all items at the beginning of the task. This was to prevent 
participants from moving all the obstructing objects at the beginning of the experiment, 
and so avoiding the possibility of primacy effects in memory for these objects. 
Participants were fitted with the mobile eye tracker and calibrated, then began the task. 
No time restriction was given but for both tea and sandwich-making the average time 
taken was three minutes. At end of the task, the tracker was removed, and participants 
were informed they would now perform a memory task for the items in the kitchen, 
which they were previously unaware of. The questions were presented on the lab 
computer, and participants responded using the keyboard, and the number keys 1-4, 
which had been relabelled A-D.  
7.2.3.2 Memory control group. Participants in the control group were not fitted 
with the eye tracker. They were informed that there was a memory test, and their only 
instruction was to memorise the items that were present in the kitchen. They were 
instructed not to pick up or interact with the items. After viewing the environment for 
three minutes, the participants were taken to the lab computer where the memory test 
was presented as before. 
7.2.4 Design and Analysis 
Experiment 6 had one independent within-subjects variable, which was the 
relevance of the objects participants saw and interacted with in the kitchen setting (task-
relevant, task-irrelevant and background). Dependent variables were participants’ 
memory performance in recalling the features of colour, shape and position for the 
objects, and the participants’ eye movement and fixations on objects. The measure of 
average fixation duration was used, indicating the time participants spent fixating each 
object during the task. 
For the active condition, the videos from the scene and eye cameras were 
combined to produce a single video for each participant, showing the gaze estimation 
for each frame of the movie. To analyse the data, manual frame-by-frame coding of the 
videos was conducted, by counting the number of frames in which each of the 21 
objects was fixated, and the number of frames in which the necessary objects were 
gripped. Grip times were estimated via the scene camera as the times when the hands 
were visibly in contact with the objects. 
Analysis of the effect of the types of interaction was performed using linear mixed 
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effects models, using the lme4 package in the R statistical programming environment 
(Bates, Maechler and Bolker, 2013; R Development Core Team, 2013). 
Models were run to predict total fixation time (the summed duration of all 
fixations on the object), the total grip time (the summed duration of all grips on an 
object) and memory performance for each of the three property questions. Previous 
work has shown that memory accumulates across fixation time (e.g., Hollingworth and 
Henderson, 2002), and so by using this measure, we can determine not only if fixation 
time is predictive of memory performance in the different conditions, but if, when 
fixation time is controlled for, differences still emerge between the memory conditions 
which can be attributed to differences in the tasks themselves. The measure of time 
spent gripping the objects was included as it provided data on whether information 
received from the tactile contact with the objects could also inform the construction of 
memory representations. The distributions of both the total fixation time and total grip 
time were examined, and subsequently log-transformed, in order to meet the 
assumptions of LMMs. 
For modelling the total time spent either fixating or gripping the objects, the 
object type (relevant, irrelevant or background) was used as a fixed factor, while 
subjects and objects were included as random factors. For modelling performance in the 
memory questions, logistic models were run using the object type (relevant, irrelevant, 
background) and fixation time as the fixed factors, and subjects and objects as random 
factors. In all models, we used the most complex random effects structure that resulted 
in models that converged: that is we used models with random slopes and intercepts 
where possible (as recommended in Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily, 2013). However, 
these maximal models often do not converge and in such cases we simplified stepwise 
by first removing the calculation of correlation parameters, followed by removing the 
random slope(s) for any interaction term(s), followed by removing random slopes for 
main effects. In all cases the results are reported from the model with the most 
complicated random effects structure that converged.  
Both binomial and continuous models were run on the data, as appropriate. For 
the continuous models, the criterion for significance used was that the absolute t values 
must be greater than 2. This is in agreement with earlier studies using LMMs (see, e.g., 
Kliegl, Masson and Richter, 2010)   
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Control participants 
LMMs were run on the data from participants in the control group. This was to 
determine that the three object groups were equally memorable to participants under 
conditions where there was no interaction required. Object identity and subject were 
included as the random factors in the models. For each of the property questions 
(colour, shape and position), memory performance was predicted using the object type. 
For the control participants, this was the task the objects were associated with: tea-
making; sandwich-making or background items. 
7.3.1.1 Colour. For colour questions, memory performance was not influenced 
by the object type. Colour recall scores for objects in the tea-making group did not 
differ significantly from the recall of objects in the background condition, β=0.445, s.e. 
= 0.476, z= 0.934, p= 0.350, or sandwich making items, β=-0.539, s.e. = 0.471, z= -
1.15, p= 0.252. Similarly, recall of sandwich-making items did not differ significantly 
from background objects, β= -0.094, s.e. = 0.434, z= -0.217, p=0.828.  
7.3.1.2 Shape. For shape questions, memory was also unaffected by the object 
type. The shape of the tea-making objects was not recalled significantly differently from 
the shapes of items in the background condition, β=0.990, s.e. = 0.956, z= 1.036, p= 
0.300, or in the sandwich making condition, β=-0.366, s.e. = 0.558, z= -0.656, p= 0.512. 
The shapes of sandwich making items were also recalled no differently compared to 
background items, β=0.624, s.e. = 1.01, z= 0.618, p= 0.537. 
7.3.1.3 Position. As for colour and shape, position memory was not affected by 
the object type. Tea making objects did not differ significantly in position recall 
compared to background items, β= 0.536, s.e. = 0.647, z= 0.829, p= 0.407; or sandwich-
making items, β=-0.899, s.e. = 0.676, z= -1.33, p= 0.183. Sandwich-making objects 
were also not recalled significantly differently from those present in the background, β= 
-0.363, s.e. = 0.605, z= -0.600, p= 0.549. 
Figure 7.3 shows the memory scores for each of the three property questions, 
across the three object types. 
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Figure 7.3. Proportion of correct scores for Colour, Shape and Position memory 
question for the three object groups 
7.3.2 Active participants 
For participants who had taken part in the active task, data from both eye 
movement and memory measures were available. Objects that received no fixations 
during the task were excluded from the analysis, as we were interested in how 
information was extracted from fixations made to the objects under the different action 
conditions. 
Participants were placed in two groups, depending on whether they had 
performed the tea-making or the sandwich making task. To determine if participants in 
the two groups acted similarly with the objects, LMMs were run in which the group of 
the participant was used as the fixed factor to predict performance on the three property 
questions, and the fixation behaviour shown by participants in each group.  
For each of the three property questions, memory recall was not significantly 
different between the two groups of participants. No difference was found between the 
groups for colour recall, β= -0.391, s.e. = 0.380, z= -1.03, p= 0.303; shape recall, β= -
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0.275, s.e. = 0.323, z= -0.851, p= 0.395, or position recall, β= -0.209, s.e. = 0.260, z= -
0.803, p= 0.422. 
Similarly, the participants’ group did not predict a significant difference in the 
total fixation time spent on objects, β= 0.143, s.e. = 0.138, t= 1.04. 
7.3.2.1 Selection: Fixation time. Investigating the effect of object type on total 
fixation time showed that the task relevant items were fixated for significantly longer 
than the background items, β= 1.23, s.e. = 0.088, t= 13.96, (background M =2.61 ; task-
relevant M =3.84) as were items irrelevant to the task, but still interacted with, β= 0.574, 
s.e. = 0.087, t= 6.63 (task-irrelevant M =3.18). A significant difference between the time 
spent fixating relevant and irrelevant items was also found, β= -0.659, s.e. = 0.085, t=-
7.72. 
Figure 7.4 shows the log-transformed fixation times to the three object types. 
 
Figure 7.4. Log transformed total fixation times for task-relevant, task-irrelevant 
and background objects 
7.3.2.2 Selection: Grip time. When using the total grip time as a fixed effect, 
items in the background condition were removed from the analysis, as participants 
never physically interacted with these objects. Analyses were conducted only on the 
relevant or irrelevant items. 
It was found that the object type did influence the time spent holding the items, with 
participants spending significantly longer holding items that were relevant to the task 
than those that were irrelevant, but still needed to be moved out of the way, β= -0.598, 
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s.e. = 0.036, t= -16.57 (relevant M= 4.05, irrelevant M=3.45 ). Figure 7.5 displays the 
log-transformed grip times for the two object groups. 
 
Figure 7.5. Log transformed total grip times for task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
objects 
7.3.2.3 Memory: Influence of object type and fixation time. Performance on 
object memory was examined for each of the three property questions by running three 
models for each of the property questions. The first model included the object type as a 
fixed effect, to determine if there were overall differences in memory between the three 
conditions. The second model used only fixation time as a fixed effect, to determine if 
there were differences in memory due to differences in fixation times. The third model 
incorporated both object type and fixation time as fixed effects, allowing us to 
determine if any memory differences were solely due to differences in fixation time, or 
if further differences emerged which could be attributed to the task conditions.  
Colour. Figure 7.6 shows the proportion of correct memory responses to the 
colour questions for the three types of object. 
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Figure 7.6. Proportion of correct responses to colour questions for relevant, 
irrelevant and background objects 
In the first model (object type only), scores for colour memory were influenced 
by the object type, with relevant items, (M= 0.65) being significantly better recalled 
than background items, (M=0.26) β= 2.05, s.e. = 0.529, z= 3.88, p< 0.001; and 
irrelevant items being similarly significantly better recalled than background items, 
(M=0.45) β= 1.15, s.e. = 0.476, z= 2.42, p= 0.016. A significant difference was also 
found between colour recall for relevant and irrelevant items, β= -0.962, s.e. = 0.384, z= 
-2.51, p= 0.012. 
The second model (fixation time only) showed fixation time was a significant 
predictor of performance on colour recall, β= 0.980, s.e. = 0.311, z= -3.15, p= 0.002, 
with greater fixation time on an item predicting better recall of that item’s colour. 
The third model, which included both fixation time and object type as fixed 
effects showed that the pattern of memory performance changed. Task-relevant objects 
were still recalled significantly better than background items, β= 1.55, s.e. = 0.658, z= -
2.36, p= 0.018. However, recall for the irrelevant items did not significantly differ from 
recall for the background items, β= -0.801, s.e. = 0.498, z= 1.61, p= 0.108. Recall for 
irrelevant items also did not significantly differ from recall of relevant items, β= -0.750, 
s.e. = 0.472, z= -1.59, p= 0.112. 
When fixation time was included in this model, it was shown to no longer have a 
significant effect on colour recall, β= 0.320, s.e. = 0.328, z= 0.974, p= 0.330. 
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Shape. Figure 7.7 shows the proportion of correct memory responses to the 
shape questions for the three types of object. 
 
Figure 7.7. Proportion of correct responses to shape questions for relevant, 
irrelevant and background objects 
The first model, using object type showed that this was a significant predictor of 
object shape recall. Participants showed significantly better recall for relevant items 
(M=0.74) compared to background items (M=0.28), β= 2.49, s.e. = 0.560, z= 4.44, 
p<.001, and irrelevant items (M=0.58), β= -1.02, s.e. = 0.369, z= -2.77, p=.006. The 
shape of irrelevant items was also recalled significantly better than background objects, 
β= 1.35, s.e. = 0.423, z= 3.19, p= 0.001. 
The model for fixation time showed this measure to be a significant predictor of 
shape recall, with longer fixation time on an object predicting better recall of the 
object’s shape, β= 0.834, s.e. = 0.365, z= 2.28, p=0.022. 
The final model, which included both object type and fixation time continued to 
show similar patterns in the recall performance for shape information. Participants still 
showed significantly better recall for the shape of relevant items compared to both 
irrelevant, β= -1.30, s.e. = 0.558, z=-2.33, p=.020, and background objects, β= 2.82, s.e. 
= 0.802, z= 3.51, p<.001. The significant difference between shape recall for irrelevant 
and background was also maintained, β= 1.53, s.e. = 0.479, z= 3.20, p=0.001. 
As for colour, shape recall was also no longer influenced by the fixation time when the 
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model included both object type and fixation time, β= -0.184, s.e. = 0.463, z= -0.397, p= 
0.691. 
Position. Figure 7.8 shows the proportion of correct memory responses to the 
position questions for the three types of object. 
 
Figure 7.8. Proportion of correct responses to position questions for relevant, 
irrelevant and background objects 
When object type was included as a single fixed effect, it was not found to be a 
significant predictor of performance on the recall of position information. The positions 
of task-relevant items (M=0.66), were recalled no better than the position of irrelevant 
items (M=0.58), β= -0.397, s.e. = 0.259, z= -1.53, p=0.126, and background items 
(M=0.52), β= 0.626, s.e. = 0.474, z= 1.32, p=0.187. No significant difference was found 
between the irrelevant and background objects recall for position, β= 0.236, s.e. = 
0.480, z= 0.492, p=0.623. 
The model using fixation time as a fixed effect showed that fixation time was a 
significant predictor of position recall performance, β= 0,503, s.e. = 0.217, z= 2.32, 
p=.020. Participants showed better recall for the position of items that they had fixated 
for longer periods. 
When a model was run including object type and fixation time as fixed effects, 
the pattern of performance was unchanged. Participants still showed no significant 
difference between their recall of task relevant items and irrelevant items, β=-0.129, s.e. 
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= 0.441, z=-0.292, p=0.770, or background items, β= 0.173, s.e. = 0.706, z= 0.245, 
p=0.806; or between irrelevant items and background items, β= 0.076, s.e. = 0.571, z= 
0.133, p=0.894. Furthermore, the influence of fixation time was no longer significant 
when included with the object type analysis, β= 0.484, s.e. = 0.350, z= 1.38, p=0.166. 
7.3.2.4 Memory: Influence of grip time. As well as using fixation time as a 
predictor for performance on the three property questions, the time participants spent 
gripping the items was used in order to determine if tactile information about the objects 
received via interaction could influence the way in which object representations were 
formed and thus underpin any of the effects found in the above analyses. As for the 
previous grip analyses, the background objects (which were never interacted with) were 
removed from this part of the analysis. 
Colour. Memory for colour was affected by the time spent gripping the objects, 
β= 0.987, s.e. = 0.482, z= 2.05, p=0.041. The colours of items that were gripped for 
longer were recalled significantly better than items held for a shorter period of time. 
The analysis was then run including both grip time and object type as fixed 
factors. When object type was included, the influence of grip time on colour memory 
was no longer to significant β= 0.021, s.e. = 0.363, t = 0.234. The difference between 
the recall of relevant and irrelevant items remained non-significant as well, β= 0.181, 
s.e. = 0.093, z= -1.96. 
Shape. Shape recall was not affected by the time spent gripping the item. 
Participants did not show better recall for the shape of items that were held for longer 
periods, β= 0.459, s.e. = 0.340, z= 1.350, p=0.177. 
Position. As for shape, the recall for position information was not affected by 
the length of time objects were held for, β= 0.099, s.e. = 0.292, z= 0.340, p=0.734. 
7.4 Discussion 
In Experiment 6, the influences of task driven and simple physical interaction on 
inspection and memory were examined. Items that were task-relevant were fixated for 
longer, and recalled better than those objects that were simply in the background. 
However, differences were also found for the items that were not task-relevant, and yet 
still interacted with, in order to be moved out of the way. While participants did not 
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fixate or recall these items as successfully as those objects that were task-relevant, there 
was still a clear difference between these objects, and those in the background that were 
not interacted with. The finding that there was a difference between task relevant and 
task irrelevant objects suggests that the process of interacting with an object to achieve a 
goal has an influence that is separate to that of simply interacting, and that these two 
processes have separate effects on the memory formed.  
7.4.1 Fixation time and inspection behaviour 
The findings for fixation time in Experiment 6 were much as would be expected 
based on previous studies. Participants spent longer looking at items that are relevant to 
their task, replicating a well-established finding from both lab based (e.g., Yarbus, 
1967) and real-world situations (e.g., Land et al., 1999). Increased fixation time on such 
items is clearly necessary, allowing participants to gain the information they need to 
successfully work with the items, and complete the task.  
Experiment 6 also showed a difference in fixation time between the irrelevant 
items: those that were moved out of the way by the participants, but otherwise played 
no part in the task - and the relevant and background items. These irrelevant items were 
not fixated for as long as the task-relevant objects, but were still attended to for longer 
than the background objects. Clearly, the irrelevant items were not required for as long 
within the task setting; participants were simply required to locate and then move them, 
rather than having to obtain visual feedback during more complex manipulations. 
However, they did still require some interaction, and so the time spent fixating them 
was increased. This is in line with previous work demonstrating the close link between 
task and fixation: participants follow a ‘do it where I’m looking’ strategy, attending to 
those objects that are required for the current stage of a task (e.g., Ballard et al., 1992). 
Thus, these differences in fixation time across the object groups are in line with what 
would be expected.  
However, when considering the influence of the factor of fixation time on recall 
performance, it appears that this does not have a strong influence on the memory. 
Instead, it is the object type, in particular, how relevant the object is to the task, which 
has the greatest effect on performance. 
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7.4.2 The influence of object type 
The results of Experiment 6 show that the object properties were remembered 
differently for the different types of object. There is previous work which suggests that 
differences in memory for objects can be accounted for simply by the differences in 
fixation time (e.g., Hollingworth, 2006; 2012). The current findings do not show this: 
instead, the results are much more in agreement with studies by Võ and Wolfe (2012), 
Tatler and Tatler (2013) and Tatler et al. (2013). The task relevance of an object 
contributes to memory performance beyond that accounted for by fixation time, 
indicating that, for these items, there is a difference in the way in which information is 
extracted from these fixations. Task-relevance therefore appears to lead to strategic 
prioritisation in the encoding and retention of information from such objects. However, 
the act of physically manipulating the objects in order to move them out of the way also 
seems to lead to changes in the prioritisation of object properties in memory. In order to 
consider these effects more closely, we examine the differences that emerge in property 
recall between task-relevant and background objects, task-irrelevant and background 
objects, and task-relevant and task-irrelevant objects.  
7.4.2.1 Task relevant and background objects. By comparing memory 
performance between the task-relevant and background items, we gain insights into how 
important the task instructions are to the extraction and retention of information. Such a 
comparison is similar to those made in previous studies, which used these two object 
groups, interacted and not interacted with (e.g., Tatler et al., 2013), and so allows us to 
make a comparison with earlier works. 
For colour information, the task relevance was a significant predictor of 
performance, with participants significantly better at recalling the colours of task 
relevant items than the colours of background objects. This is perhaps a surprising 
result: most previous studies consider colour to be a strongly visual property (e.g., 
Jeannerod, 1994; Tipper et al., 2006), and, as such, not of much relevance to the actions 
conducted with objects. This is the not the case in the current study. One possibility is 
that the prioritisation of colour is linked to the need to identify the objects necessary for 
the task. Unlike the background items, where the identity is not important, the task-
relevant item is relevant precisely because of what it is, and the role it plays in helping 
to achieve the end goal. As a result, colour information may be extracted and 
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maintained as a way of helping to identify the relevant objects. Alternatively, colour 
may be automatically included in the representation as a result of participants examining 
the objects with the aim of identifying them. Bub and Masson (2006) suggested 
something similar when they found that participants were unable to ignore the colour of 
an object if they were required to name it as well. 
Similarly, participants were significantly better at recalling the shapes of task-
relevant items compared to background items. This is more in accordance with the 
nature of the property. Shape is considered to be a strong active property (although 
Jeannerod (1994) would suggest that it has visual aspects as well). However, it is clearly 
an important factor when interacting with objects, as the shape of the item informs the 
grip that must be formed in order to do this successfully (Tipper et al., 2006). The task 
relevant items must be interacted with, and so prioritisation of this information is 
important. 
In contrast to shape and colour, position information was unaffected by the task 
demands, and only influenced by the time spent fixating the objects. This finding is in 
contrast to that of Tatler et al., (2013), where it was specifically the position information 
that was prioritised for the task relevant items, suggesting that position is a more action-
relevant property than a visual one. It is unclear why this difference between 
Experiment 6 and previous work by Tatler et al. (2013) exists. One possibility is simply 
the difference of the tasks: although both use similar real-world settings, the current 
study did put more of an emphasis on moving the irrelevant objects, which might have 
made position more important for these items, and so increased the prioritisation of this 
property. However, this explanation does not easily account for why participants were 
also very good at recalling the position of the background items; it is noticeable that 
while shape and colour recall for the background were at chance level, position was 
much higher. Furthermore, the question used to test position recall asked participant to 
recall the starting position, which is perhaps of less use to maintain, as it reflects a 
situation which doesn’t exist any longer for moved objects: thus, there is no particular 
reason why this property should be prioritised in memory. 
An alternative explanation fits with the idea of position as a property which acts 
as a binding site for all the other properties when an object representation is constructed 
(see e.g., Hollingworth and Rasmussen, 2010). In this way, the position information is 
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automatically extracted from the scene, for all objects that are fixated, in order to allow 
the rest of the representation to be formed. This would account for the higher 
performance on even the background items. It is also in agreement with other studies. 
For example, Tatler et al. (2003) found that the absolute position of objects in a scene is 
extracted quickly, with high performances achieved by 2 seconds of viewing, 
suggesting that this property is accumulated early on. Similarly, the study by Kondo and 
Saiki (2012) showed that position information was incorporated into an object 
representation, regardless of whether it was task relevant or not. These studies, in 
conjunction with the findings of Experiment 6, do suggest that position information may 
be accumulated differently, independent of the task requirements. Further investigation 
would be necessary to clarify why this role for position information is not evident for 
Tatler et al. (2013). 
7.4.2.2 Task-irrelevant and background objects. Using the data from the task-
irrelevant items, we can go further in teasing apart the contributions of task relevance 
and physical manipulation. Comparing the irrelevant and background items gives an 
idea of how important manipulation alone is to the construction of memory 
representations. 
For colour information, we found no significant difference between the recall of 
irrelevant and background information. While the colour seemed to be important to 
task-relevant items, this is not the case for irrelevant and background items. This is 
perhaps because neither of these object sets needed to be identified with great 
specificity: background objects were not interacted with at all, and irrelevant objects 
needed only to be moved out of the way; thus, what they are was not important. If, as 
we suggest for the facilitated colour memory for task-relevant items, colour information 
is useful mainly for object identification, it may be that there was no need to prioritise 
colour information for the irrelevant and background items as well. 
Significant differences did arise between the recall of shape information for 
irrelevant and background items, with better performance on the task-irrelevant items. 
This difference most likely arose from the fact that the irrelevant items still had to be 
interacted with, in order to reach other objects. Shape is the property which informs the 
grip required to interact with the object, and so was of the most importance to the task-
irrelevant object set. As a result, unlike colour information, this information was 
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prioritised in memory for the objects in the irrelevant group. The process of simply 
manipulating an object does therefore seem to influence the way in which shape 
information is extracted and maintained. 
As for the task-relevant items, there was no difference in position memory 
between the task-irrelevant objects and background objects. The recall of position 
information was high for both object types. Similar explanations can be suggested here: 
that position information was automatically extracted from the scene to act as a binding 
site for all other featural information. 
While no studies have previously differentiated between task-driven and form-
driven interaction, an earlier study by Thomas et al. (2013) is in agreement with the 
current findings that physical interaction alone can lead to changes in the representation. 
In this earlier study, participants were tested on their object memory following a 
learning period in which they were allowed to either hold the objects in the test display, 
or only inspect them visually. When participants touched the items, their recall was 
changed, with participants recalling the objects as being presented in a smaller space, 
with reduced inter-object distances. There are clear differences between Thomas et al.’s 
(2013) findings, and those of Experiment 6: most notably that the current study shows 
an improvement in memory accuracy for properties, rather than a distortion in recall. 
However, both studies indicate that simply acting upon an object is enough to change 
the memory formed. Thomas et al. (2013) suggest an action-specific account for the 
changes in memory: by representing an environment of manipulable objects as closer 
together, the memory encourages later interaction with items, by presenting them in a 
more manageable display. It is less clear how such an account could apply to the 
findings of the current study: while the task relevant objects might be re-used, this 
seems to be less necessary for the irrelevant items, once they are moved out of the way. 
Another possibility is simply that any interaction will lead to automatic changes in the 
weighting of the representation, and the enduring memory trace. This can be seen as 
similar to many of the earlier studies showing an effect of action preparation (e.g., 
Bekkering and Neggers, 2002), or hand proximity (e.g., Davoli et al., 2012) on 
inspection behaviour. These manipulations cause subtler differences, while here the 
interaction leads to stronger effects on memory: but the representation is still 
constructed with the influence of action.  
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7.4.2.3 Task-relevant and task-irrelevant objects. By comparing the memory 
performance for task-relevant and task-irrelevant objects, we can determine whether 
there are influences on memory that come from the nature of the task instructions, 
beyond any contributions of simply interacting with the objects. 
For both colour and position information, there were no such differences. For 
position information, it therefore seems that this information is not affected by the task 
used in the current study, as we consistently found that position information for all of 
the object types was well recalled, and unaffected by the group the object was in. 
The lack of a difference between the groups for colour is more confusing. As we 
have already suggested, the benefit shown for colour information when comparing task-
relevant and background objects suggests that the use of colour for identifying objects 
may have increased the importance of this property for the task-relevant items. This 
would not be expected to be the case for task-irrelevant items, and so a difference would 
be predicted here, but did not emerge. 
In contrast, for shape information, there was a significant difference between the two 
object types. The shape of task-relevant items was recalled better than the shape of the 
irrelevant objects, although, as shown by the comparison between irrelevant and 
background items, manipulation alone did lead to prioritisation of this information. This 
difference can be seen to further illustrate the necessity of actually identifying objects in 
the task-relevant condition. Not only does the shape inform the grip necessary, it is 
tightly linked to the identity of the object. An item’s shape is a very clear indication of 
how it should be used for a task, and so whether it is suitable to be used for a particular 
stage in achieving and end goal. This necessity for identification is not present for task-
irrelevant objects: shape only informs the actions required to move the object, whatever 
it happens to be. 
Thus, while shape information is important for both object types, it is a different 
quality of importance, and so it seems that the prioritisation of this information in 
memory differs for task-irrelevant and task-relevant items in this experiment. Using an 
object as part of a task, to achieve a goal therefore seems to influence the construction 
of a representation beyond changes resulting from the simple manipulation of the 
objects. 
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We have found further evidence to show that the nature of a task influences not 
only where participants look during the task, but also what information they best recall 
from the objects used. The current study can go further by suggesting that simple 
physical interaction with the objects will lead to similar changes in fixation time and 
memory. However, physical interaction and actions driven by task do not lead to 
identical effects in memory: the use of an object as part of task instructions leads to 
further biasing of some object information, beyond the changes due to a task-irrelevant 
interaction. 
7.4.3 Influence of grip 
As well as the time spent fixating the objects, the time spent holding them was 
considered as a potential predictor. Participants could have been gathering information 
about the items not only through visual feedback, but haptic feedback as well. Shape is 
the property most likely to benefit from any information received due to the item being 
held: however, grip has no influence on performance at all, suggesting that all 
information is being extracted from the visual fixations to the objects, which are driven 
by the nature of the task. This is perhaps not so surprising if the objects’ sizes are 
considered: most of the items were larger than the hands, so participants could not 
experience the whole object by touch. Indeed, in order to use the object successfully 
(and safely) they may have needed to only hold certain parts (e.g., the handle of the 
kettle). Vision was therefore a more helpful source of information regarding aspects 
such as shape and position. 
There was an influence of grip on the recall of colour, with better colour 
memory for items that were held longer. However, as for the measure of fixation time, 
this result did not remain when the object type was included in the model as a factor. 
This finding is therefore most likely an artefact of the fact that the relevant items were 
the ones which were used and looked at more, due to the nature of the task. When the 
object type was not included in the model, some of the variance could be accounted for 
by factors such as grip or fixation time, when in fact these differences were themselves 
driven by the importance of the object to achieving the task goal. 
In conclusion, Experiment 6 demonstrates that, in real world settings, the task is 
a significant factor in both directing our fixations, and prioritising information. 
However, it also goes further in demonstrating that any physical interaction can lead to 
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changes in viewing and memory strategies. While these effects are not as strong as the 
influence of a task-set, they still lead to a strategic prioritisation of the information that 
is most necessary for the action to be completed successfully. Our representation system 
appears to be sensitive to the different requirements of different actions, and constructs 
the resulting representation accordingly. 
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Chapter Eight- General Discussion 
and Conclusion 
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8.1 Background and Aims 
The main aim of this thesis was to further investigate the involvement of 
memory representations within the context of grounded cognition, particularly theories 
of situated action such as the Theory of Event Coding (TEC, Hommel et al., 2001). 
Based on the proposal that action and perception are able to influence one another in a 
bi-directional manner, we investigated both directions of this relationship under 
memory conditions. Participants were required to draw on memory representations of 
objects formed under different situations in order either to perform actions, or recall 
object details. This allowed us to determine if, as when performing on-line tasks, there 
was any weighting of the representation due to the situation of the task, indicating that 
memory representations can be tailored to the demands of the task, in order to better 
serve an action to be performed. 
Grounded theories of cognition, in particular accounts of situated action like the 
TEC, suggest that perception and action are more than just low-level input and output 
devices. Rather, they are the central driving force in the system, with the aim of most 
processes being to aid the production of action in the context of a task. The TEC in 
particular takes the view that perception and action are functionally equivalent 
processes, with the codes for both held in the same representational domain. Within this 
domain, event codes, consisting of the necessary action and feature codes, are 
constructed, and weighted by the situation of the task, so that the relevant features are 
more strongly represented within the code. This allows them a greater influence on the 
subsequent performance of a task. Weighting can be either via perceptual means 
(attention to an object) or action based (the intention of making or preparation of an 
action). 
Previous studies have shown evidence for both types of situational weighting. 
Affordance tasks show a situation where perception of an object leads to priming of 
relevant actions, preparing for the response to be executed, while variations of visual 
search tasks have been used to show how the intention of performing an action can lead 
to a biasing of attention to action relevant properties and their associated objects. 
However, the majority of these earlier studies have been conducted in on-line settings, 
where the objects remain visible throughout the task. Very few studies have considered 
whether and how a memory representation might be affected by similar situational 
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weighting. Indeed, theories concerned with memory representations alone (e.g., 
Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; Melcher, 2001) have tended to examine memory in 
a more task-neutral setting, without including action. While Glenberg (1999) proposes 
that memory, like perception, is to serve action, this has been judged to be too broad an 
account to hold for all memory processes. More recently, however, memory studies 
have shown a role for task relevance in influencing the resulting memory performance, 
(e.g., Tatler and Tatler, 2013; Võ and Wolfe, 2012; Tatler et al., 2013) While there is 
still some debate over whether such effects are due to the increased fixations on such 
items, or if it is more strongly linked to the nature of the task itself, these recent memory 
studies all show support for the latter account. Such consistent findings do suggest that 
the nature of the task may be an important factor in shaping our memories of events and 
the objects involved, although more work is still needed to bring further understanding 
to this area. 
Investigating the nature of the action-perception link, and situational weighting 
in memory representations is important for providing more information about how the 
systems of perception and action work together. Our studies concentrated on expanding 
from the experiments already conducted on both sides of the link. While previous work 
on the influence of perception on action had shown that certain aspects of a task (such 
as how participants attended an object e.g., Tipper et al., 2006; or responded to it e.g., 
Bub and Masson, 2010) could influence how perception primed action, no such work 
had been conducted to determine if the same was true for studies using off-line 
affordances. The finding that off-line affordances do occur (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 
2006) indicates that the object representation constructed in these tasks does indeed 
contain both featural and action information. By determining if other task factors could 
also influence the effect, we are able to consider whether this stored information can be 
weighted by the nature of the task. 
For the influence of action on perception, there are studies such as those by Võ 
and Wolfe (2012) and Tatler et al. (2013) which have shown that the performance of a 
task can affect the formation of the memory. In contrast, there are no studies 
investigating how simple action preparation might affect memory, although there is a 
large body of evidence to suggest that it influences perception. We therefore examined 
this aspect of action preparation across four studies, to determine if the representation 
might be similarly biased, perhaps in anticipation of the future action. The last study for 
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this thesis was conducted in a real world environment, based on the findings from the 
earlier, lab-based studies we carried out, as well as the evidence from previous work 
which suggested the importance of real-world locations in this area (in particular Tatler 
and Tatler, 2013, and Tatler et al., 2013). The final study examined how flexible the 
weighting of representations might be when different types of actions were performed 
within the same task setting, and in particular to tease apart the contribution of action 
and task goals in weighting memory representations. The findings from these 
experiments are summarised below. 
8.2 Overview of Empirical Findings 
The first study conducted for this thesis examined the influence of boundary 
conditions in affordance effects that were carried out from memory. Two such boundary 
conditions were used: the property cue (shape or colour, a strongly active or strongly 
visual property), and the type of response (a simple button press, or a more object-
specific pantomime gesture). In visually based affordance studies, both such conditions 
have been found to have an influence on the emergence of the effects, suggesting that 
they contribute to the situational weighting of the event code. It was found that, in 
Experiment 1.1, the property cue had the expected influence (shape cues facilitated 
responses, while colour cues did not). The gesture response also had the expected effect: 
gestures compatible with the object were initiated more quickly than those that were 
incompatible, and - perhaps due to the construction of the study - the gesture did not 
override the influence of the property cue. The effects due to the boundary conditions 
also persisted in memory, indicating that the mental representations could be weighted 
by the situation. However, such influences on action production only occurred when the 
display used four objects. When this was reduced to two, either the affordance effect 
was entirely absent, or the use of a boundary condition had no effect, in either visual or 
memory conditions (Experiment 1.2). Such findings seemed to suggest that the 
complexity of the scene might be another factor in the emergence of the effect. 
Following this indication of the influence of complexity, the next experiments 
used a larger set of objects as stimuli, and placed them in everyday environments. These 
experiments also concentrated on the other side of the action-perception link, focusing 
on the influence that preparing and maintaining an action can have on perception and 
inspection, and subsequent memory. Experiment 2.2 required participants to maintain 
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this action posture during the encoding phase of a memory test, while participants 
viewed the scenes, to examine how it might affect inspection (measured via eye 
movements) and memory. While this first study showed an influence of action postures 
on perception, with certain gestures affecting fixation time and patterns of eye 
movements, there was no influence on the memory results, in contrast to what was 
expected.  
A second version of the study (Experiment 3) required participants to maintain 
the action posture at the retrieval stage of the study rather than during scene inspection. 
In this way, rather than providing conditions that might lead to the construction of the 
representation being weighting, the conditions provided instead had the potential to 
weight the retrieval of the stored memory. Retrieval is equally important to memory as 
encoding, and different factors can contribute to success or failure at this stage, 
independent of encoding (see e.g., Hollingworth et al., 2001). Thus, investigating this 
stage allowed us to determine if retrieval was susceptible to the action manipulation. 
The findings from Experiment 3 showed that there was an effect of the action posture at 
retrieval, suggesting that maintaining action postures when retrieving memories 
influences the nature of the retrieved memory. Taken together the results of 
Experiments 2.2 and 3 suggest that maintaining an action posture influenced only 
concurrent processes and these effects did not persist beyond the completion of the 
gesture. 
The third version of the study (Experiment 4) therefore placed the action 
manipulation at both the encoding and retrieval stages of the task. For this study, the 
effect was entirely absent, with no influence on either stage. This result was somewhat 
unexpected. However, it is speculated that the manipulation of an action posture was not 
strong enough to persist over a long period, possibly suggesting that the effect decays 
over time if the gesture is not ended and reformed to indicate a new task beginning. 
Another possibility is that there was no way for participants to interact with the objects, 
and the overall setting of the experimental paradigm was still too unrealistic. Previous 
work which has shown evidence for the weighting of memory representations was 
conducted in real environments (e.g., Tatler et al., 2013), and thus this particular 
condition was introduced into our own experiments. 
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Two ways in which realism could be an issue were considered in the final two 
experiments. Experiment 5 replicated Experiment 2.2, but with the stimulus objects in 
the same physical environment as the participants during encoding. In this 
environmental context, it might be easier for participants to imagine interacting with the 
objects in the future, and so construct their representations accordingly. The findings of 
Experiment 5, however, did not show this, but replicated those of Experiment 2.2, with 
no influence found on the memory for the objects, suggesting that it was not 
environment alone that had resulted in a lack of influence of action postures during 
encoding on the formation of object memories. However, it remained a possibility that 
actually being able to interact with objects would lead to different memory encoding. 
Thus, the final study, Experiment 6, used a real world task in which participants did 
interact with the objects in order to complete the task. This task examined the 
contributions of different types of actions to the construction of object representations, 
by comparing the memories for objects that were used as part of achieving the task goal, 
and those that were simply moved out of the way. The findings from this experiment 
showed that simply interacting with an object will change the way in which the item is 
examined and represented, but that this effect can be dissociated from the effect of using 
the object as part of the task instructions. This final study suggested that, under the right 
conditions, the context of a task and physical interaction can have quite specific and 
separable influences on the construction of memory representations. 
8.3 Theoretical Implications 
8.3.1 Implications for the TEC. A central part of the TEC (Hommel et al., 
2001) is that it is a cognitive model, rather than an ecological one; and so the capacity 
for forming internal representations is an important aspect. Indeed, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the authors acknowledge the necessity for off-line representation in forming 
the weighted representations. Part of the weighting is suggested to come from prior 
experience of objects, gained across the previous interactions with the items, so that the 
features that have been found to be most relevant for the task ahead are known, and can 
be prioritised via the preparation of action or the direction of attention. As the earlier 
review of the literature demonstrates, there is some scattered evidence for memory 
representations being similarly affected, and so the studies conducted in this thesis were 
attempts to close the gaps in our knowledge, and demonstrate that memory 
representations could show evidence of weighting in favour of an upcoming task. 
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Taking this view, it seems that our results do not entirely fit the expected 
pattern. If weighting occurs to allow for preparation for the upcoming action (by cueing 
the correct response, or directing attention to the correct location), then we would 
perhaps expect to find evidence for memory weighting when action postures were 
maintained during the encoding of photographic scenes (Experiments 2.2 and 4), or 
while viewing a real set of objects (Experiment 5). All these present a situation where 
the action posture is present during the viewing stage, and was expected to lead to 
influences on memory in favour of the task-relevant objects. However, the actual 
outcome is different: memory weighting does not occur in a situation with implied 
action. Instead, the evidence is only seen when there is direct interaction with objects, 
following the completion of the task (Experiment 6). This is the reversal of what we 
might expect: nothing seems to be stored to facilitate the performance of any potential 
future task, but weighting persists in a real task, although the goal has been achieved 
when the memories are tested. However, the finding of an influence of real world 
activity on memory representations is consistent with previous investigations of how 
natural tasks shape memories (e.g., Tatler et al., 2013).  
In contrast to our findings for Experiments 2.2-5, the results for Experiment 1.1 
are much more in line with the finding of Experiment 6, and the idea of memory 
holding weighted representations to aid action. The differences in attention affect 
whether the actions are facilitated, and this can be equally well drawn from a mental 
image of the object as a visual one. Experiment 1.2, however, does suggest that there is 
also another boundary condition: the complexity of the setting. The idea of boundary 
conditions is only really considered in the affordance literature, but examining the 
results from studies in the present thesis, we can suggest that one of the emerging 
findings is that the process of action weighting memory might be subject to these 
conditions too. 
Boundary conditions have been proposed as a way of preventing the automatic 
conversion from vision into action (for affordances). Tipper (2010) pointed out that not 
every fixation made to an object is intended to result in an action. This can equally well 
be applied to the other side of the action-perception link: not every idea or plan is 
necessarily going to lead to a performed outcome. Alternatively, (but not necessarily 
exclusively) there may not be enough information available to the observer for accurate 
weighting to occur, for example, if it is perhaps not clear which objects are task-relevant 
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in a situation. Thus, there may very well be situations in which an intention to act or a 
prepared action will not influence the weighting of memory representations.  
The condition that we have considered throughout this thesis (and which has 
driven each new paradigm) is realism. However, realism is a fairly broad term: there are 
several ways that a study can be made more realistic. Within affordance studies, where 
realism has already been considered as a boundary condition, there are several ways in 
which earlier studies have explored this idea. For example, previous experiments have 
considered the influence of the realism of the action response, as well as the action 
states of the objects (e.g., Tipper et al., 2006), and the perceived ability of the 
participants to act with the objects (e.g., Yang and Beilock, 2011). Within the studies 
presented in the current thesis, Experiments 1.1 and 1.2, indicate that it was the 
complexity of the setting (i.e. the number of objects) which seemed to have an 
influence. Other possible factors that may influence the realism of an experimental 
paradigm are the specificity of the task instructions, the means by which the action 
manipulation is formed, and finally whether there is interaction with the objects; the last 
of these was explored in more detail in Experiment 6.  
Experiments 1.1 and 1.2 are the least realistic of the studies within this thesis, 
and it could be argued that complexity is only a small part of realism. It is certainly 
possible to have very sparse real scenes, and completely chaotic fake environments. 
However, for the requirements of the task, participants needed to locate or recall one 
object amongst a group of distractors. Priming the responses, based on information 
received from the property cue may allow for responses to be made faster when the 
object is located or recalled, even if the initial search or retrieval process will take 
longer. In the easier condition, there is no need for this kind of preparation (although 
learning the repeated cues and their associations may also be a factor here, as noted in 
the discussion of Chapter 2). 
The specificity of the instructions is most relevant for the studies in Chapters 3-
6. Within these studies, the task given to participants was to memorise all of the objects 
displayed. This is in contrast to the earlier studies examining action preparation on 
perception, where typically there was one single object which was the target (e.g., 
Bekkering and Neggers, 2002; Fagioli et al., 2007). In the studies for the current thesis, 
the instructions mean that all objects are essentially targets. Although the action posture 
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or response was not specifically linked to the objects presented in all the earlier studies, 
as well as our own, it seems that when instructions do not specify particular objects in a 
display, no memory weighting will occur. It is interesting that perceptual influences still 
take place, with longer inspection of objects relevant to the grip being formed (shown in 
Experiment 2.2), but this does not carry through to the representation. One possible 
explanation for this is that in a situation such as the one presented in Experiment 2.2, 
the action posture influences fixations on objects, perhaps because it is not particularly 
costly to spend more time on certain items while the entire scene is still being displayed. 
However, as there is no clear target, there is much less point in forming a representation 
biased towards any particular item if it is not certain that these will be required later. 
Indeed, as we considered in the discussion of Experiment 2.2, the nature of the memory 
task is such that all objects should be prioritised, as all of them will be tested at the 
recall stage. Thus, the lack of memory weighting for a specific type of object may 
indicate that the task goals for memory override any action effects that might otherwise 
have been found. Instead, it is much more efficient to prioritise none of the objects, on 
the grounds that any of them could be required in the future. Essentially, without 
enough information, it is more risky to bias memory in a way that might be incorrect. 
Alternatively, in line with the ideas of the ideo-motor principle within the TEC 
(Hommel, 2009), it may be that the production and maintenance of the action posture 
causes a weak association between action and objects, but because the gesture and what 
it relates to (that is, one specific object in the set) are not specified any further, the 
binding is not strong enough to influence the formation of the representation, only the 
initial examination. 
A further aspect to consider is the stage of the gesture used for the action 
manipulation. In all our studies using the paradigm introduced in Experiment 2.2, the 
gesture was technically complete; as it was formed by the fact the participants’ hand 
was holding something. This is a factor which is more difficult to compare across earlier 
studies, as they have varied in what stage the gesture is held during the experiment. 
Some have required participants to prepare the gesture, but only perform it after the task 
is completed (e.g., Symes et al., 2008). Others have used completed gestures as we do 
(e.g., Witt et al., 2005). It is possible that if the action is completed, then, again, there is 
nothing to prepare for, as the hands are already occupied. Indeed, Witt, Kemmerer, 
Linkenauger and Culham (2010) found that if participants were asked to name objects 
279 
 
while holding a rubber ball, they were slower and less accurate at naming tools if the 
handle was towards the occupied hand. It was suggested that, when the hand was 
occupied, this interfered with the simulation of motor actions that occurred during 
fixation. This then impaired object identification, by preventing the use of such 
simulation. However, as noted in the discussion for Experiment 2.2, this may be less 
likely, based on the finding that the influence of proximal hands and the influence of the 
power grip gesture have very similar effects, at least on the eye movement data. This is 
important, as some studies have suggested that the open-hand posture used when 
placing the hands close to displays is an early stage of the postures the hands goes 
through when being closed into a power grip (Thomas, 2013). Furthermore, unlike Witt 
et al.’s (2010) study, where the gesture was not specific to the tools, the postures 
participants adopted in Experiment 2.2 were compatible with a subset of the stimulus 
objects. It is possible that the more specific gestures took the role of simulation. Given 
our findings, in particular the similarities between hand and power conditions, this does 
suggest that the stage of the gesture is not as important in determining whether a 
memory should be weighted or not in our experiments, although this is rather 
speculative. 
We suggest that these factors (scene complexity, instruction specificity and the 
stage of formed gestures, under scene realism as a whole) may be considered (perhaps 
to different degrees) as boundary conditions for the influence of action on the formation 
of memory. Based on the results of Experiment 2.2, the action posture seems sufficient 
to influence inspection behaviour. It is simply that this is not enough for a 
representation to be formed which is biased towards one particular action. Our thoughts 
on this are rather similar to Wilson’s (2002) idea of purpose-neutral representations, 
which allow the observer to maintain more information than would be needed for one 
task, in order that there would be enough stored information for whatever the future  
task might require (in our studies, the need to recall all the objects). 
In Experiment 6, participants conducted a real world task that involved 
interaction with the objects. It could be debated as to whether object interaction is 
simply another aspect of task relevance, as it is the task instructions which determine 
what objects are interacted with. Indeed, there are studies which have not allowed 
participants to interact with objects, and yet still show a strong influence of the task 
instructions on the memory (e.g., Võ and Wolfe, 2012; Tatler and Tatler, 2013), which 
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could suggest that it may be task relevance that is the most important aspect. However, 
Experiment 6 demonstrates that interaction in its own right may have some influence on 
the memory weighting as well, demonstrated by the findings for the task-irrelevant 
items. 
With these conditions, of more specific task instructions and physical 
interaction, it was found that the resulting memory was influenced. We suggest that this 
is a reflection of the learning process by which the weighting is initially required. The 
fact that the bias remains after the end of the task is likely to reflect the information 
gained during the task (for example, that shape is an important property), and this 
allows for the acquisition of new weightings, or the strengthening of old ones, by 
confirming that these properties are important. This is similar to the ideas of the action-
specific theory (e.g., Witt, 2011). According to this view, both action preparation and 
the completion of actions results in biased perceptions which aim to encourage the actor 
to either attempt the task, or avoid it, if it might be too much for them. Thomas et al. 
(2013), who conducted one of the few memory based versions of the studies, suggested 
that their finding (interaction with objects leads to recall of smaller inter-object 
distances) indicates encouragement for future action, as a smaller environment means a 
future task would be easier to perform. It should be noted that our own results show an 
improvement in memory, rather than a skewing of the information, which is a rather 
different way for the system to encourage future actions. However, both such aspects 
might be useful in storing information that might be necessary for later actions. Thus, 
following the successful completion of a task, the memories for the items continue to 
maintain their situational weightings while the information is stored for more long-term 
use, when the same task arises again. 
In summary, the findings of the current thesis provide further support for the 
TEC. We demonstrate that both perception and action can influence each other, in 
accordance with the demands of the task situation. Furthermore, we show that this 
weighting can occur for memory representations as well, and, perhaps most importantly, 
we demonstrate that there are certain boundary conditions that need to be met in order 
for the weighting of a representation to be seen. By determining what conditions are 
necessary in order for weighting to occur, we can better understand the circumstances 
under which action and perception can influence each other. These situational 
restrictions suggest that our cognitive systems are indeed geared for action, but are also 
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more flexible and efficient than simply preparing for action at any hint of a possible 
task. In many ways, this is in keeping with the idea of the TEC as a theory which allows 
the intentions and goals of the actor to be taken into account. It is simply that, in many 
of the studies presented in the current thesis, the intentions and goals are not so clearly 
drawn, which requires a different strategy. When there is not enough information, or not 
a strong indication that action may be required, then our representations remain un-
weighted, in order to provide us with whatever information may prove to be useful in 
the upcoming task. Finally, by using paradigms that followed a path of increasing 
realism, we have demonstrated how ideas seen in previous studies that were rather more 
lab-based (the visual search tasks of Fagioli et al., 2007, and others) can extend to real-
world situations. 
8.3.2 Implications for theories of representation. The findings of this thesis 
have implications for the more general theories of representation. While these theories 
did not initially have a specific role for action, accounts of visual memory have 
suggested a strong link between factors such as task relevance, fixation patterns and the 
resulting memory for the objects (e.g., Hollingworth, 2009; Tatler et al., 2003), although 
the relative contributions of the different factors is debated. One suggestion is that it is 
the fixation pattern that is key in the acquisition of memory, with object prioritisation in 
memory the result of increased fixations on these items, rather than a more specific 
influence of the task instructions themselves leading to changes in acquisition of 
information (within fixations): that is task relevant objects are remembered better 
because they receive more and longer fixations, rather than because information 
extraction within fixations differs. However, many of our studies show results which are 
more in line with the alternative view, that it is the task setting which has the greatest 
influence, directing not only where participants fixate, but what information is extracted 
from such fixations (e.g., Tatler et al., 2013; Võ and Wolfe, 2012). Experiment 2.2, for 
example, shows changes to attention and fixation, and yet this did not result in similar 
changes to the memory performance. Similarly, Experiment 6 shows that while there are 
changes in fixation pattern according to the task demands, it is actually the task itself 
which has the greatest influence on the changes to memory. These findings, along with 
the earlier research, suggest that task settings act as a boundary condition to the 
formation of more task directed memory representations, rather than memory 
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acquisition being due to information extracted from the scene based on where the 
participant fixates. 
Given that the influence of task is now a well recorded factor in influencing 
memory performance, it seems necessary for action to be a more integral part of these 
accounts of visual representation. Inevitably, task goals specify actions to be performed 
on the environment and as such it seems likely that the relationship between our actions 
and memories should be accounted for in theories of representation. Glenberg’s (1999) 
theory of memory for action was seen as too extreme, with the suggestion that all 
memory is for action. However, the alternative proposal, that our representations are 
largely purpose-neutral (Wilson, 2002), seems too rigid as well, given the findings in 
the current thesis, and shown in earlier studies.  
Glenberg’s account is, in many ways, a situationally weighted representation, 
with memories constructed so that only what can be used for action is included. Yet, 
based on the studies presented here, there are certainly situations in which the memory 
representation is unaffected by the task setting. Indeed, in Experiment’s 2.2, 4 and 5 the 
representations act more like Wilson’s purpose-neutral representations, containing 
information beyond that which would be necessary for the future task, so that whatever 
the future task does turn out to be, the information required will still be there. Indeed, as 
we have noted, in memory tasks such as were used in these studies, the purpose-neutral 
representation fits with the task goals of recalling all the objects: neutrality is the best 
strategy, and the action postures used did not interfere with these goals. Experiment 6, 
on the other hand, presented a situation in which such neutrality was not present, with 
clear task goals, and objects relevant to that task. This is in agreement with earlier 
studies demonstrating how differences in the task setting can change how objects are 
prioritised and encoded. In Tatler and Tatler’s (2013) study, recall in the directed 
memory task (memorise only objects related to tea-making) was best for those items 
specified as task-relevant by the instructions. Performance when memory was 
undirected (memorise all objects in the room) showed no such differentiation. When the 
task setting specifies a subset of objects within the environment, our memories show a 
bias in the encoding and subsequent recall of these objects and their properties, which 
may also have a role in aiding the performance of similar tasks in the future.  
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It is also worth noting that even in a situation such as Experiment 6, where there 
is a clear task, the resulting memory is not so restricted as to only maintain the useful 
information and support a strong action bias as Glenberg might suggest. This is in line 
with studies of incidental object memory, which have shown that participants will 
extract information from a scene without any task instructions to guide this process (see 
e.g., Castelhano and Henderson, 2005). In Experiment 6, this incidental recall is 
demonstrated by participants’ ability to recall details of the irrelevant items. However, it 
seems that incidental memory can be improved when items are manipulated: 
participants in Experiment 6 are better at recalling details of the irrelevant (but 
manipulated) items than the background (non-manipulated) items. Acting with objects 
therefore seems to affect not just the intentional extraction of useful information, but 
enhances the incidental acquisition of object details.  
The findings of Experiment 6 also extend our current understanding of memory 
representations in one important manner: the influence of plain object manipulation, 
without a strong task instruction behind it. The manipulation of objects leads to changes 
in the formation and recall of representations, separate from the changes due to the task 
instructions. This is a new finding, and demonstrates that our representational system is 
sensitive to such manipulations, and also flexible in the weighting applied to features in 
construction: manipulation may cause changes to the maintenance of object 
information, but these biases are not as strong as that associated with the interactions in 
the course of task completion.  
The fact that manipulation alone contributes to the construction of memory 
representations may indicate that the predominantly visual representations are also 
incorporating information from other modalities: in this case, from touch. Earlier studies 
have shown that other senses can modulate the performance of certain tasks: for 
example, a light can be perceived as brighter if it is accompanied by an auditory 
stimulus (Stein, London, Wilkinson and Price, 1997). Within studies of memory 
representations, there is evidence that information gained from touching an object can 
be used to help later visual recognition. This indicates that representations formed in 
one modality can be used to help performance reliant on another separate sense 
(Bushnell and Baxt, 1999), although there is still debate about how exactly the 
crossmodal information is maintained (i.e. within one multisensory representation, or 
separate representations for each sense: see Lacey, Campbell and Sathian, 2007, for a 
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review). Such crossmodal representations are in agreement with the ideas of embodied 
cognition: specifically those that suggest that representations are formed by capturing 
states from across the modalities at the time of an experience, and reactivating these 
different modalities at a later time when required (e.g., Decety and Grèzes, 2006). 
However, it should be noted that in Experiment 6 that our measure of haptic experience 
(using the time participants spent holding the objects) did not significantly influence the 
memories once the influence of task instructions had been accounted for. Thus, there 
may be other factors involved beyond simply the extraction of information from touch, 
and thus the exact means by which manipulation influences representation remain to be 
investigated. 
Our findings would seem to suggest neither Glenberg’s nor Wilson’s account is 
entirely accurate when describing how action influences the memory representation, but 
that the best description of the involvement of action in memory is one that lies 
somewhere in between the two extremes. The present thesis demonstrates not only that 
we can form memories biased by a task, but that simple manipulation can also influence 
the memory formation: although this too is flexible, as memory for manipulated objects 
is not as accurate as memory for the truly task-relevant items. However, despite these 
biases, we will acquire and maintain information incidentally, despite the fact it is not 
directly relevant to the situation. This gives our cognitive system a large amount of 
flexibility when we need to successfully interact with the external environment. 
8.3.3 Implications for our understanding of properties contained in object 
representations. Object properties were used in this thesis as both cues to act and 
measures of memory, due to the previous work demonstrating that they are held 
relatively independently in memory, and may be classed as particularly action or 
visually relevant. These factors allowed us to use them as indicators of weighting in 
memory.  
For the first of these two factors (the independence of properties), the studies 
presented here were not designed to specifically test this claim. However, the results 
obtained from the experiments do provide further support for this idea. Experiments 1.1 
and 1.2 demonstrated how attention to a particular property could lead to different 
effects on the resulting responses, while in Experiments 2-6, different patterns of 
memory were found across the individual properties. These findings therefore agree 
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with earlier studies which demonstrate the separate nature of properties (e.g., Tatler et 
al., 2003), and accounts of memory which suggest that the separateness of properties is 
a key aspect (e.g., Brady et al., 2011). 
For the second factor, regarding how to group object properties, our findings 
suggest that the view of properties as belonging strongly to one group or another may 
not be so accurate. Experiment 2.1 considered whether certain properties were regarded 
as more or less action/visually relevant by asking participants to class them accordingly, 
and fairly consistent results emerged in this study. However, this is a very qualitative 
measure, and when considering the results obtained in the later experimental studies, it 
seems that the task setting may be a stronger influence on whether an object property is 
considered particularly action-relevant.  
While accounts such as Glover’s (2004) suggested a more rigid classification of 
properties (spatial or non-spatial in this case), Jeannerod (1994; 1997) proposed that 
properties could better be considered as falling on a continuum between visual and 
active. Certain properties are always strongly on one side of the line (colour is always 
visual, weight always active), but other properties such as shape are positioned 
somewhere in the middle, possessing both action and visual aspects. This is a more 
flexible way of classifying properties, and the findings of the present studies show 
evidence which agrees with this account. For example, in the only lab-based study to 
show effects of memory (Experiment 3), the only influence of the manipulation was 
facilitated recall of position information. In this situation, position is particularly useful: 
if interaction with the objects may be required in the future (as might have been implied 
by the requirement for participants to form postures at recall), then recalling where the 
relevant ones (i.e., those that matched the retrieval grip posture) are located is important 
in facilitating the potential future action. In contrast, shape was not particularly well 
recalled in this study, suggesting that, in this situation, it is not particularly action-
relevant, perhaps because this is information which could be gained by simply fixating 
the objects if there is a future interaction or perhaps simply because the photographic 
stimuli suggests there will be no later interaction, and so shape is simply considered less 
necessary. These findings are in contrast to those of Experiment 6, in which position 
memory remains unaffected by the nature of the task, but shape is quite clearly 
influenced. Here, where there is interaction taking place, shape becomes more 
important, informing that interaction and the use of the objects. The link between shape 
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and actions has been demonstrated previously, not only in affordance studies suggesting 
that the perception of the property can speed responses (Tipper et al., 2006), but in 
investigations that have focused on the specific aspects of preparing to act with an 
object, such as the preparation of the correct grip aperture. As participants reach to 
grasp target objects, the influence of the target’s shape is seen around halfway through 
the process, influencing the hand configuration that is adopted for the upcoming 
interaction (Santello and Soechting, 1998). Without this shape information, the time 
taken to reach the object is increased and the aperture formed less precise to the object 
(Churchill, Hopkins, Ronnqvuist and Vogt, 2000). The property of shape seems 
therefore to be closely linked to interactions, and can not only influence (as in studies 
examining grip aperture) but also be influenced, as demonstrated in our own 
Experiment 6, where shape memory benefits from interaction. 
Position, or at least the starting position of the objects, is much less relevant in 
this situation. The items have been found and usually moved to another place by the end 
of the task and so their position is no longer a concern. Indeed, even if there were to be 
future interaction, the starting position is, for most items, no longer current or useful 
information. However, for this point we must also consider the finding from Tatler et al. 
(2013), where the task-relevance of the objects was associated with increased recall of 
their position. Given that the memory test followed the completion of the task, as it did 
in Experiment 6, the maintenance of this property information is unexpected. Such a 
difference may be attributable to differences in the two studies used, as considered in 
the discussion of Experiment 6, but this is an area to be further explored, in order to 
clarify if there are conditions which will change the way this particular property is 
maintained. 
The finding that manipulation and task-relevance contribute separately to the 
construction of memory representations also provides us with further insight into the 
weighting of properties within these representations. This is particularly so for the 
property of shape: recall is improved both by manipulation and task-relevance, but, 
importantly, not to the same extent. Property weighting, it seems, is not an ‘all-or-
nothing’ occurrence, but one which allows the context of the task to have some 
influence. The present thesis therefore extends our understanding of object properties, 
and their role in memory representations. Properties are a key part of memory 
formation, maintained in such a way that task influences will bias their presence, 
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allowing for weighting to occur. While object properties may be more commonly 
associated with visual or active roles, we suggest that such classification and biasing 
may be as flexible as the construction of the representation. By teasing apart the 
contributions of task-relevance and manipulation, we demonstrate that this weighting is 
sensitive. Properties are not simply ‘weighted’ or ‘not weighted’: rather, there is a 
continuous degree of bias, indicating sensitivity to the demands of the task and the 
importance of the object within it. 
8.3.4 The influence of realism. Throughout the studies presented in this thesis, 
there has been a gradual increase in the realism of the settings. While the means by 
which this was achieved have differed, the results of the studies suggest that realism is 
an important factor for all the experiments. For Experiment 1.1, it is the more complex 
layout that shows the affordance effects being influenced by the boundary conditions, 
whereas such effects disappear when the number of items is reduced. Similarly, there 
are changes even between the results from Experiments 2.2-4, which use images of real 
world scenes, and 5, which uses a very similar paradigm, but in a real environment. 
Participants in the real environment (Experiment 5) were better at recalling all 
properties than those who viewed images (Experiment 2.2), rather than showing any 
kind of bias, in line with the earlier findings of Tatler et al. (2005) which similarly 
showed improved memory for object properties when they were viewed in a real world 
setting. The differences, particularly in the emergence of weighting are at their most 
notable between the lab based studies of Chapters 3-4, and the real world, real task 
version of Chapter 7. 
The realism of a situation is important to consider across many types of 
investigation, but it seems to be particularly important when addressing action. 
Following the ideas of grounded cognition, expressed by Bridgeman and Tseng (2011), 
our cognitive and perceptual systems are there to help us act in the real world, in which 
tasks and interaction are key parts of our daily routine. Not only have these processes 
been developed for action, they have developed for action performed within these types 
of environment, where there is a clear task set and an end goal, and memory is a more 
incidental influence that we are not otherwise consciously aware of, rather than the final 
goal itself. 
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Lab based studies are still necessary, allowing us to reduce down to smaller and 
easily controlled chunks the aspects we wish to investigate. The results obtained from 
such studies are also necessary to drive the design of later studies, and provide useful 
evidence in their own right. However, it is clear from the findings presented here that 
quite different responses can be obtained from studies conducted in different 
environments, and so it is necessary to have both accounts. In the current studies, 
memory seems to be formed differently across the experimental tasks, and it is only in 
the real world (Experiment 6) that we see the weighting procedures we might expect. It 
seems that the lab-based studies allow us to see how our cognitive system might operate 
in a more restricted environment, but studies set in the real world are necessary to 
determine how we operate every day. The current thesis illustrates this clearly with the 
changes that occur as complexity and realism increase. While, once again, it seems that 
our cognitive systems are flexible enough to cope with the situation in these lab studies, 
increasing realism allows the cognitive and perceptual processes to work as they should, 
and present a more accurate account of how we act. 
8.4 Future Investigations 
The findings from this thesis suggest several areas which would benefit from 
further investigation. These future research ideas are all related to the notion of 
examining the concept of boundary conditions more closely, for both the influence of 
perception on action, and the influence of action on perception. Through better 
understanding of the conditions in which effects emerge, we will be able to better 
understand how action and perception influence each other and under what conditions 
these influences can be studied.  
Studies of affordance effects have already established a large number of 
boundary conditions, some of which we used in our own studies. However, the main 
new finding from Experiment 1, (as well as the possibility of weighting for off line 
affordances) is that complexity is an important issue. Given that realism seems to be 
important for the action influencing perception side of the loop, it is possible that this 
may also be an issue for affordance effects. Alternatively, it may simply be the number 
of objects in a scene, whether more or less realistic, which influence the way in which 
the conditions affect the emergence of affordances. Future research is necessary to tease 
this apart, determining whether increasing the complexity (via the number of items) or 
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the realism (perhaps by transferring the task into a real world setting) will affect the 
responses in the same way, or separately. 
Following our suggestion that there are situational factors which may act as 
boundary conditions for action influencing perception, there are several areas that 
require further examination to determine this. The aim of all such studies would be to 
determine at what point the simple preparation of action used in our own studies would 
be enough to influence not only the initial perception and viewing of a scene, but would 
also affect the memory of the items. 
One issue considered is the necessity of including a task which would more specifically 
make certain objects relevant for future action. Such a change would make the study 
more in line with the search tasks of Fagioli et al. (2007) and others. Having only one 
target might be problematic for memory, so one option would be to have similar 
stimulus sets as in Experiments 2-5, with a task to find all the items which would be 
necessary for a particular task/ be found in a particular environment. Within this group 
would be items that were both power and precision compatible, while participants 
viewed the scenes while making one of the two grip postures. A subsequent memory 
task could then determine whether the set of task-relevant items that were also 
compatible with the grip would still be recalled more accurately than task-irrelevant 
items, or those that were incompatible with the grip. 
Given the influence of realism demonstrated by Experiments 5 and 6, an 
important aspect to consider in future work is directly replicating the experiment in the 
real world (as in Experiment 5). However, with this version of the study, participants 
would be informed that there would be interaction with the objects in the future, after 
they had examined them with the task to locate items that would fit a particular 
category. Engelkamp (1997) used the performance of action phrases rather than object 
memory, but nevertheless demonstrated that if participants were intending to enact the 
phrase at test, then their recall was better than if they only intended to verbally recall the 
phrases. A conscious intention to act might also lead to improvements when recalling 
objects and their properties. In such a study, the memory test would be inserted between 
examination and interaction, allowing us to determine if there were influences that came 
from the knowledge that there would be a future requirement to act, a situation in which 
it is most likely that memory weighting would be a necessary process. This is in many 
ways similar to the studies of Droll and Hayhoe (2007) and Triesch et al. (2003) which 
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demonstrated that participants maintain the information that are likely prove to be 
necessary for performing a later part of a task. Participants in this proposed study might 
show a similar strategy, by prioritising potentially important information gained prior to 
the investigation. 
There are areas worth investigating following the findings of Experiment 6. This 
study reveals that not only is memory weighting apparent in the object representations 
after interaction, but that there is also flexibility in the system: even within the same 
task, different object types (e.g., task-relevant; task-irrelevant, but requiring interaction, 
and background) can be classified and their representations weighted for what is 
appropriate. What is of most interest is whether the biases formed in memory as a result 
of the interactions will continue to have an influence on how these objects are used and 
recalled.  
A previous study (Tatler, 2001) examined memory by placing participants in an 
environment in which the lights would be switched off at intervals, and the participants 
were required to determine what they last remembered seeing. A future study for this 
area would be to borrow this particular paradigm, and have participants interrupted in 
their task at various stages. They would then be asked to recall the details of the objects 
in their environment, which would include some they had worked with, some they had 
planned to work with, and some which they might not yet have even fixated. A 
comparison of memory performance across the object types would allow us to see how 
the weighting worked during the actual execution of the task. 
A second follow up study would examine how the weighted representations 
fared after the task was completed. It is important to determine how long the effect 
might last, and also what influence the weighted representation has on subsequent 
performances and memory. This is more difficult to test: for example, it would be 
possible to have participants re-perform a task after having been tested for the memory 
of the first go, but it is likely that the subsequent re-fixation on the objects would lead to 
a re-setting of the memory for the new trial, as the new information would be there in 
front of the participants (and they would very likely be alert to the possibility of a new 
memory test). 
These ideas regarding the influence of memory weighting on later tasks could be 
further investigated to determine how well the weighted memory serves the participant, 
291 
 
using, for example, techniques from false memory and misinformation studies. By 
introducing false memories, it would be possible to determine if the weighting protected 
memories, and for how long after the task was completed this might continue to work. 
Such a study would have links to ideas proposed by Maxcey-Richard and Hollingsworth 
(2013), which suggests that we can protect relevant information within visual working 
memory, allowing this prioritised information to be maintained. Unprotected 
information, that has been classed as irrelevant, is lost from memory. Using actions to 
bias particular objects and their features might lead to similar strategic prioritisation of 
this information, protecting it not only from decay, but from replacement by subsequent 
incorrect information. 
Such studies would allow for the questions raised by the findings of this thesis to 
be further investigated, and perhaps provide further understanding of the processes 
involved in weighting memory for action. 
8.5 Conclusions 
The present thesis explored the contexts in which perception and action might 
interact to influence participants’ memories of objects and their features. Both sides of 
the perception-action link were considered, first the influence of perception on the 
production of action, followed by investigations into the influence of action (both 
prepared and enacted) on the perception and recall of objects. The findings of these 
studies support the ideas of grounded cognition: that perception and action are more 
than just peripheral input/output devices to an internal processor, but that they are both 
central to our everyday interactions with the world. In particular, it was found that 
memory plays a part in this. Depending on the situation, relevant information can be 
stored and retrieved for later use. This may allow for actions to continue in a situation 
where the view is briefly occluded, but a response is still required; or be part of an on-
going acquisition of information about objects and their properties, for use in upcoming 
tasks. 
Furthermore, our findings demonstrate the efficiency of our cognitive processes. 
Across the tasks used in these studies, as the demands and instructions change, so does 
the way in which information is acquired and stored. In some cases, this is as might be 
expected, with the situational weighting of particular features and actions, in order to 
best aid the task. However, in other settings, it is the absence of weighting which is the 
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adaptive response, allowing a wide range of information to be stored for whatever the 
next, currently unknown stage of a task may be. Our memory systems, like other 
cognitive and perceptual processes, have developed in order to best serve our need to 
act within an environment, and to deal with the changing demands of those 
environments. 
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Appendices 
Appendices 1A 
Experiment 2.1: Example question sections for forced choice and free response 
questionnaires.  
Questionnaire: Forced choice response 
1. In what room would you most expect to find a HAMMER? Choose ONE of the four 
options. 
Garage    Kitchen 
Bathroom   Office 
2. What do you think are the main uses of a HAMMER? 
3. What properties (e.g., shape, colour) do you think are most appropriate to how a 
HAMMER looks? Choose as many options as you think are appropriate. 
Colour    Shape 
Size    Weight 
Handle orientation  Object orientation 
Decorative patterns  Texture 
4. What properties (e.g., shape, colour) do you think are most appropriate to how a 
HAMMER is used? Choose as many options as you think are appropriate. 
Colour    Shape 
Size    Weight 
Handle orientation  Object orientation 
Decorative patterns  Texture 
5. When we use objects, we can hold them in one of two different grips. In one, we 
hold the object with a PRECISION grip- holding the object between the thumb and 
fingertips. The other grip is a POWER grip- where the object is held using all the 
fingers against the palm of the hand. 
When using a HAMMER, which ONE of these two grip types do you think is 
appropriate? 
 Power    Precision 
 
Questionnaire: Free response 
1. In what room would you most expect to find a HAMMER? 
2. What do you think are the main uses of a HAMMER? 
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3. What properties (e.g., shape, colour) do you think are most appropriate to how a 
HAMMER looks?  
4. What properties (e.g., shape, colour) do you think are most appropriate to how a 
HAMMER is used? 
5. When we use objects, we can hold them in one of two different grips. In one, we 
hold the object with a PRECISION grip- holding the object between the thumb and 
fingertips. The other grip is a POWER grip- where the object is held using all the 
fingers against the palm of the hand. 
When using a HAMMER, which ONE of these two grip types do you think is 
appropriate? 
 Power    Precision  
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Appendices 1B 
Experiment 2.2: Nine stimulus photos showing the three object groups positioned 
within each of the three background environments (garage, kitchen and neutral). 
Object Set 1 
 
 
Object Set 2 
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Object Set 3 
  
 
 
 
